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FAIRNESS IN NUMBERS: 
A COMMENT ON AT&T V. CONCEPCION, 
WAL-MART V. DUKES, AND TURNER V. ROGERS 
Judith Resnik∗ 
Can eighteenth-century constitutional commitments that “courts shall be open” for 
private rights enforcement be coupled with twentieth-century aspirations that democratic 
orders provide “equal justice under law”?  That question sits at the intersection of three 
cases, AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, decided in the 2010 
Supreme Court Term.  In each decision, Justices evaluated the fairness of particular 
procedures (class arbitrations, class actions, or civil contempt processes) when making 
choices about the meaning of governing legal regimes — the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
and state unconscionability doctrine in AT&T; Rule 23 and Title VII in Wal-Mart; and the 
Due Process Clause and child support obligations in Turner. 
AT&T and Wal-Mart presented related questions about how the form of dispute 
resolution (individual or aggregate) and the place of dispute resolution (public or private, 
state or federal) affect the level of public regulation of consumer and employment transactions 
predicated on boilerplate, rather than negotiated, terms.  The issue in Turner was whether 
state-funded lawyers were required before a person could, at the behest of the child’s 
custodian, be incarcerated for contempt for failure to pay child support.  The specific case 
involved two individuals, but their circumstances illustrated the challenges faced by millions 
of other lawyer-less litigants in state and federal courts. 
Each case exemplifies the challenges that new rights, produced by twentieth-century 
social movements, pose for courts.  When claimants such as consumers, employees, and 
household members presented themselves as entitled to equal treatment, jurists responded by 
interrogating their own procedural parameters.  Relying on the Due Process Clause, courts 
developed distinct lines of analyses that — depending on the context — imposed criteria on 
decisionmaking procedures, mandated subsidies to address resource asymmetries between 
adversaries, shaped processes to reduce intra-litigant disparities, and facilitated access to 
courts.  Requisite to those efforts was a practice that is intertwined with fairness — the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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public quality of adjudication that endows an audience with the authority to watch, critique, 
and respond through democratic channels to the legal norms announced.  A “fair and public 
hearing” became a touchstone of what democratic orders required their courts to provide.  
But, as this trio of cases demonstrates, whether seeking to implement those egalitarian 
aspirations or simply to function, courts have to grapple with economically disparate 
claimants and a vast volume of eligible rights holders.  If eighteenth-century constitutional 
entitlements to open courts are to remain relevant to ordinary litigants, the question is not 
whether to aggregate, subsidize, and reconfigure process but how to do so “fairly,” in terms of 
what groups, which claims, by means of which procedures, and offering what remedies.  But 
without public disclosures and oversight of dispute resolution — in and out of court, single 
file and aggregated — one has no way to know whether fairness is either a goal or a result. 
I.  THE MISE-EN-SCÈNE: POSITIVE RIGHTS TO COURTS AND 
LAWYERS — INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THE AGGREGATE 
A.  Challenging Courts 
The reason to link AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and 
Turner v. Rogers is that all three rest on the role of lawyers in making 
courts accessible, on the challenges courts face when adverse litigants 
have asymmetrical resources and when large numbers of claimants 
seek their services, on the impact of public processes on rights en-
forcement, and on the function of courts in democratic orders.  Each 
case involved individual plaintiffs claiming modest sums — consumers 
alleging an illegal telephone overcharge of $30, employees arguing the 
loss of pay raises of $2 per hour because of sex discrimination, and a 
parent seeking $51 a week in child support.  Given the stakes, lawyers 
would be unavailable absent two forms of market intervention — reallo-
cating resources among litigants (such as through the class action rules on 
which AT&T and Wal-Mart turn) and state subsidies (at issue in Turner). 
The three cases present related questions about how the form of 
dispute resolution (individual or aggregate) and the place of dispute 
resolution (public or private, state or federal) alter the level of public 
regulation of transactions that are rarely custom made.1  In AT&T and 
Wal-Mart, the Court concluded that class actions put corporate defen-
dants and absent co-plaintiffs in unfair positions.  In Turner, the Court 
declined to require counsel as of right when the opponent also lacked 
counsel but held that civil contempt detention was unfair absent pro-
cedures to ensure that a court had information to assess whether a vi-
olation of a payment order was willful. 
When read together, these cases provide a wide window into adju-
dication circa 2011.  They make plain that the constitutional concept 
of courts as a basic public service provided by government is under 
siege.  Pressures come from the demands imposed by the host of new 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 See Todd D. Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, in BOILERPLATE: THE 
FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 200, 206 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007) [hereinafter 
BOILERPLATE]. 
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claimants who, because of twentieth-century equality movements, 
gained recognition as rights holders; from institutional defendants ar-
guing the overuse of courts and proffering alternatives; and from com-
petition for scarce funds in government budgets.  
This problem is not unique to the United States.  Parallel chal-
lenges can be found in Europe, where Article 6 of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms expressly 
endows “everyone” with a right to a “fair and public hearing.”2  That 
aspiration is likewise made vulnerable by the volume of eligible clai-
mants, limited funds, and transnational actors debating the utilities of 
public regulatory mechanisms.3 
Like the terms of Article 6, the three 2011 Supreme Court decisions 
revolve around questions of fairness and of the relationship between 
fairness and public adjudicatory processes.  Is it fair (in AT&T) to en-
force a boilerplate provision in a cell phone contract waiving court 
access and class actions, fair to hold a class arbitration, or fair to insist 
on individual and private arbitrations?  Is it fair (in Wal-Mart) to de-
termine corporate liability for discrimination across thousands of em-
ployees through a class action, and is it fair to require individuals to 
participate in class actions?  Is it fair (in Turner) to incarcerate a per-
son for civil contempt without first providing a lawyer? 
In each case, pivotal texts — the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Due Process 
Clause — are embroidered by the Court’s precedents and its assess-
ments of the quality and adequacy of certain processes.  In each, the 
holdings (that the FAA preempts state contract law finding the class 
action waiver unconscionable; that the class action cannot proceed 
against Wal-Mart; that Turner has no right to counsel but a right to 
alternative procedures) reveal how procedure gives meaning to rights. 
The two class action cases are encased in a thicket of precedents 
and distinctions about kinds of class actions, rendering the Court’s rulings 
inaccessible; they defy ready translations for popular consumption.  
Indeed, they do not make for easy reading by lawyers not fluent in a 
sequence of FAA decisions and in the distinctions among class actions 
as “mandatory” 23(b)(2) or “opt-out” 23(b)(3) classes.  Turner is likewise 
opaque.  Absent familiarity with its precedents, readers can easily miss 
the import of the majority’s due process ruling, just as they might un-
derestimate the role played by judicial assessments of procedural fair-
ness in AT&T and Wal-Mart. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6.1, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 3 See infra notes 504–506 and accompanying text. 
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Yet, despite the doctrinal distinctions, all three decisions raise larg-
er questions of whether positive rights imposing obligations on gov-
ernment to provide certain services (in this instance courts) constitute 
enforceable entitlements, what forms of participation and kinds of pro-
cedures sustain the legitimacy of contracts and of court judgments, 
and what role judges play in shaping answers.  Hence, analysis of the 
trio prompts inquiries into the normative underpinnings of the law of 
courts, the reasons to regulate their practices, the desirability of en-
abling or disabling their use, and the relationship of the use of courts 
to the democratic character of a political order.  
Before turning to the three cases, I need to delineate the constitu-
tional, institutional, and litigation contexts that render this trio impor-
tant as a set.  Hence, this introduction begins with a brief tour of the 
analytic structure of sixty years of due process law.  These doctrines 
are the result of social and political movements that posed questions 
about the meaning of “equal justice under law” and that helped to 
produce the growth in state and federal courts as well as a market for 
private dispute resolution.  I then discuss the participants in each case, 
who, as detailed below, were picture perfect in representing twentieth-
century rights holders as they teed up twenty-first-century problems. 
B.  Open Courts and the Process Due 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his 
land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
and justice administered without denial or delay. 
— Nebraska Constitution of 18674 
Because the three rulings are shadowed by what, in 1950, Justice 
Jackson called the “cryptic and abstract” commands of the Due Process 
Clause,5 unpacking their import requires understanding how, during 
the last century, law came to recognize four distinct ideas as problems 
of “due process” — procedural inadequacies in decisionmaking, asym-
metrical resources of adversaries, disparities among co-litigants, and 
lack of access to courts.  Each of the 2011 cases engages these issues 
and reveals the relevance of a fifth idea, public processes, that the case 
law has nested in an amalgam of rights to jury trial, the First Amend-
ment, and common law traditions but that ought also to be more clear-
ly identified as another facet of due process norms — the obligation to 
open adjudicatory processes to third parties, so as to illuminate and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 Art. 1, § 9.  The Nebraska Constitution, enacted in 1866, went into effect in 1867 when the 
state was admitted to the United States.  The provision was modified in 1996 to permit courts to 
enforce state-mandated arbitration.  See infra pp. 130–31. 
 5 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); see infra pp. 137–39. 
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monitor the other facets of the process “due” and, in democratic orders, 
to legitimate the binding power of the judgments made. 
A first genre of due process analysis probes the authority, the na-
ture, and the kinds of procedures that make specific decisionmaking 
“fair.”  Turner holds that to jail a person for civil contempt without a 
finding of ability to comply with the court order is fundamentally un-
fair.6  AT&T evaluates class arbitrations and finds them too informal 
and unreviewable to be fair.7  Wal-Mart relies on due process to con-
clude that absent plaintiffs must have opt-out rights8 and further in-
vokes due process to establish that Wal-Mart cannot be obliged to 
make payments for back wages without an opportunity to rebut each 
individual’s claim of discriminatory treatment.9 
These assessments fall into a line of “fair hearing” cases in which 
the Court has concluded that, when individuals are at risk of losing 
certain forms of property and liberty (such as statutory entitlements to 
government benefits, jobs, or licenses10), process is due.  Depending on 
the context, constitutionally fair decisionmaking entails various 
attributes, including in-person hearings,11 specific allocations of bur-
dens of proof,12 reasons for the decisions rendered by impartial deci-
sionmakers,13 oversight of whether evidence supports a criminal ver-
dict and of the quality of eyewitness identification,14 and review of the 
award of punitive damages.15 
A second due process inquiry, also at work in the 2011 decisions, 
shifts the focus from fair procedures to the problem of adversaries 
with asymmetrical resources.  Due process (coupled, at times, with 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2011).  
 7 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–52 (2011) (interpreting the United 
States Arbitration Act (known as the Federal Arbitration Act), Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 
(1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006))). 
 8 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011).  
 9 Id. at 2560.  The Court does not cite McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), but the ana-
lytic approach is similar.  See id. at 294–97, 308–19 (rejecting statistical evidence of discrimination 
in the application of the death penalty).  
 10 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 734–37, 751–55 (1964).  Other 
analyses criticize the Court’s development of procedural due process as misguided policymaking.  
See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85. 
 11 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1970) (requiring an in-person hearing before termi-
nation of welfare benefits).  But see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976) (holding 
that in-person hearings were not necessary, given the procedures in place to decide whether to 
terminate disability benefits); infra pp. 157–58. 
 12 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982) . 
 13 See, e.g., Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271; Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 
2259–62 (2009). 
 14 See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 
(1977); New Hampshire v. Perry, No. 2009-0590 (N.H. Nov. 18, 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 
2932 (2011). 
 15 See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Al-
liance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993). 
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other constitutional provisions) is sometimes the basis for a determina-
tion that certain power imbalances require government subsidies for 
one party, made vulnerable for reasons such as poverty or the stakes of 
a proceeding.  Government versus an individual was the initial para-
digm, and the classic example (central to Turner) is the 1963 decision of 
Gideon v. Wainwright,16 which read the Sixth Amendment “right to 
counsel” to require states to provide lawyers for indigent criminal de-
fendants facing prosecutors seeking felony convictions.17  Due process 
has also been the basis of constitutional obligations to give indigent 
criminal defendants resources such as experts and translators neces-
sary to mount a defense.18  Moreover, due process commands that the 
government give exculpatory, material information to all criminal de-
fendants — whether rich or poor.19 
Asymmetrical power and high stakes have also been the predicate 
for civil litigants in certain family conflicts to be accorded due 
process–based equipage rights.  Had Michael Turner argued he was 
not the child’s father, the state would have paid for a paternity test be-
cause, as Chief Justice Burger explained for a unanimous Court in 
1981, the “‘requirement of “fundamental fairness” expressed by the 
Due Process Clause’” would not otherwise be “satisfied.”20  That year 
the Court also concluded that, although a parent facing the loss of that 
status had no per se right to counsel, the presumption against ap-
pointment of lawyers beyond what the Sixth Amendment requires 
could be overcome if a sufficient showing was made.21  Rights to state-
paid transcripts, if required to appeal child custody terminations, fol-
lowed in 1996.22 
The 1966 class action rule (at issue in AT&T and Wal-Mart) pro-
vides another form of intervention to respond to power asymmetries in 
civil litigation.  Aiming to be due process compliant, rulemakers fash-
ioned group proceedings to give members of racial minorities the abili-
ty to seek enforcement of injunctions mandating school desegregation 
and to give consumers claiming statutory rights the capacity to attract 
lawyers through the potential for large monetary recoveries.  The utili-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 17 Id. at 342–44. 
 18 See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).  But see Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Os-
borne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2319–20 (2009) (holding that due process did not oblige Alaska to provide 
a DNA test to a convicted defendant alleging innocence).  
 19 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“Society wins not only when the guilty are 
convicted but when criminal trials are fair.”).  Enforcement is, however, limited.  See Connick v. 
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 20 Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16 (1981) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 
24 (1981)) (describing the “constitutional duty” a man had to support a child he fathered).  
 21 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32. 
 22 See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 129 (1996). 
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ties for would-be defendants included the potential to close out liability 
claims through one proceeding. 
A third due process question, intra-litigant disparities, arises when 
similarly situated litigants on the same side of a dispute are in court.  
Differential resources and capacities can result in “like” cases not being 
treated “alike.”  Constitutional adjudication on intra-litigant equity ini-
tially focused on criminal defendants.23  For example, in 1956, the 
Court concluded that unfairness resulted if some defendants could af-
ford to pay for transcripts for appeals and for lawyers while others 
could not.24  Sentencing guidelines exemplify another effort to make 
decisions fair across a set of individuals proceeding single file; the im-
plementation reflects the complexity of determining when persons are 
enough alike to be treated the same.  Congress and the courts have 
struggled with mandates that judges punish similarly those persons 
whose crimes and backgrounds are comparable and justify the diffe-
rentiations (“departures”) made.25 
Not all “like” litigants are, however, in court involuntarily.  Persons 
who are part of a cohort outside court sometimes seek judgments that 
could affect others who have not filed lawsuits.  Aggregation becomes 
a method to avoid disparate outcomes.  Once again, the challenges are 
to determine what shared experiences suffice to generate a group that 
courts ought to treat as a set, what commonalities of interests (central 
to Wal-Mart) permit representatives to go forth on behalf of absent 
others, what kinds of affiliations and forms of consent (affirmative, 
implicit, or inferred) legitimate binding all through final judgments.26  
And, when judges authorize aggregates, a new version of the question 
of asymmetrical resources of opponents arises, for (as argued in both 
AT&T and Wal-Mart) a class action could give one party undue lever-
age over an opponent. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 Midcentury, the Court’s consciousness of race discrimination in the criminal justice system 
and its resolve to distinguish detention practices in democratic America from those of “totalita-
rian” regimes shaped the development of this due process doctrinal line.  See Judith Resnik, De-
tention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 634–35 (2010).   
 24 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (“There can be no equal justice where the kind 
of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”).  In 1963, the Court held that, al-
though the Constitution did not require appeal as a matter of fair process, states had to subsidize 
appellate lawyers for indigent criminal defendants if appeals were generally available.  Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (announced the same day as Gideon). 
 25 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K1.1–5K3.1 
(2010); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  See generally Nancy Gertner, Rita Needs 
Gall — How to Make the Guidelines Advisory, 85 DEN. U. L. REV. 63 (2007). 
 26 For analyses of the distinct ideas entailed in representation, see STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, 
FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987) [hereinafter 
YEAZELL, MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION], and Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudi-
cative Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 577, 588 (2011). 
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What about individuals hoping to get into court, rather than those 
commanded to appear?  The idea that fairness entails access rights for 
those standing at the door shaped a fourth line of cases that began 
when a class of “welfare recipients residing in Connecticut” argued 
that state-imposed fees of sixty dollars for filing and service precluded 
them from filing for divorce.27  In 1971, in Boddie v. Connecticut, Jus-
tice Harlan wrote for the Court that the combination of “the basic po-
sition of the marriage relationship in this society’s hierarchy of values 
and the . . . state monopolization” of lawful dissolution resulted in a 
due process obligation by the state to provide access.28 
Given the debate on the current Court about the legitimacy of judi-
cial appraisals of fairness, the concurring opinions filed in Boddie il-
luminate why access questions have become centered on the Due 
Process Clause and on the evaluative judgments produced.  Forecast-
ing Justice Scalia’s objections to due process analyses, Justice Douglas 
argued that due process was too “subjective.”29  Unlike Justice Scalia, 
however, Justice Douglas read the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibi-
tion of “invidious discrimination based on . . . poverty” to require sub-
sidizing access.30  (Two years later, the Court rejected poverty as a 
suspect classification for purposes of equal protection.31)  Justice Bren-
nan agreed that Boddie presented a “classic problem of equal protec-
tion”32 on top of due process; the state’s legal monopoly required 
access for all attempting to “vindicate any . . . right arising under fed-
eral or state law.”33  The breadth of that proposition, coupled with lim-
ited resources, resulted in a constitutional retreat from the logic Justice 
Brennan argued.  Rather than mandate equipage for all poor civil litigants, 
the Court identified a narrow band (largely in family conflicts), garnering 
constitutional entitlements to government subsidies to use courts.34 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 372 (1971). 
 28 Id. at 374.   
 29 Id. at 385 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 30 Id. at 386; see id. at 384 (raising the specter of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
 31 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973). 
 32 Boddie, 401 U.S. at 388 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). 
 33 Id. at 387.  The sole dissenter, Justice Black, thought the Court had invaded state preroga-
tives.  Id. at 393–94 (Black, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas also objected on those grounds in his 
Turner dissent.  Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2524–25 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 34 See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446–50 (1973) (rejecting subsidies for bankruptcy 
filings).  See generally Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating 
Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2119 (2000); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right 
to Protect One’s Right — Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153 [hereinafter Michelman, Part I]; Part II, 
1974 DUKE L.J. 527 [hereinafter Michelman, Part II].  Michelman argued that all exclusionary 
filing fees were unconstitutional burdens on what he termed “effective” access rights to courts.  
Michelman, Part I, supra, at 1162–68.  His parallels between effective access to courts and to vot-
ing, see Michelman, Part II, supra, at 540–41, were echoed in the 2010 Term, as the same 5–4 dis-
agreement in AT&T was replayed in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Ben-
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Less clearly articulated in the doctrine to date is the idea that the 
public, as an audience empowered to watch and critique in open 
courts, produces another form of fairness that the Due Process Clause 
should shelter.  Fairness requires not only procedurally adequate hearings 
as well as efforts addressing inter- and intra-litigant asymmetries and 
easing access to courts but also participation from those outside a liti-
gation triangle, invited to partake in interactive exchanges that pro-
duce, confirm, or reject legal rules.  That publicity enables assessments 
of whether procedures and decisionmakers are fair and permits an un-
derstanding of the impact of resources (symmetrical or not), of the 
treatment of similarly situated litigants, and of why one would want to 
get into (or avoid) court.  The presence of the public divests both the 
government and private litigants of control over the meanings of the 
claims made and the judgments rendered and enables popular debate 
about and means to seek revision of law’s content and application. 
Publicity could well be understood as an aspect of the quality of 
decisionmaking and, hence, subsumed within the first fairness inquiry, 
addressing the procedures for making binding judgments.  But because 
publicity entails imbuing a third party — the public — with a specific 
role, and because fairness doctrine has not to date focused specially on 
the function of an “open” hearing, publicity stands in its own right.  
Without authorization for an audience to have a discrete and protected 
place — to serve as what Jeremy Bentham termed “auditors” (in his 
famous commitment to publicity as a disciplinary mechanism for gov-
ernment as well as for prisoners)35 — one has no way to assess the 
practices or understand how nuanced law application can be.  Indeed, 
it is the performance of fairness before the public that legitimates ad-
judication.  (The phrase in the European Convention on Human 
Rights is, after all, a “fair and public hearing.”36)  Moreover, third-
party participation facilitates democratic lawmaking, in which court 
judgments serve as both an object of attention and a basis on which to 
argue for changing legal norms.  Courts in democratic social orders are 
thus one of several venues in which the content of law is debated, and 
other branches of government may, in turn, respond.37 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
nett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011), in which the Court held that states lacked “a compelling state interest 
in ‘leveling the playing field’” and held that a public election financing law violated free speech 
rights, id. at 2825–26. 
 35 JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence (1827) [hereinafter 
BENTHAM, Rationale of Evidence], in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 356 (John Bow-
ring ed., Edinburgh, Tait 1843). 
 36 ECHR, supra note 2, art. 6.1. 
 37 For further discussion of the shift from rituals of performance to rights of access, see JU-
DITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, 
AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 288–305 (2011). 
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Underlying these various formulations of fairness are different 
kinds of theories, themselves doing work in more than one arena.  
Some of the inquiry into the quality of procedure, for example, is justi-
fied through utilitarian concerns for accuracy, as well as by interests in 
guarding against non-arbitrary treatment by the government.  Given 
that the linguistic lineage of due process traces back to traditions 
around the Magna Carta,38 non-arbitrary treatment has a historical 
pedigree independent of democracy.  But democratic values have come 
to provide new understandings of the purposes of non-arbitrary treat-
ment, sounding today in terms of dignity, equality, and in the sover-
eignty of the people.  Similarly, the demand for subsidizing and equa-
lizing opportunities to participate, like the insistence on publicity, 
comes in service of democratic values that recognize the contribution of 
and need for diverse voices and participants being heard in social orders.  
Thus, while political orders of all stripes have courts, the develop-
ment of egalitarian norms during the twentieth century transformed 
the obligations of courts in democracies.  The meaning of constitution-
al guarantees that “every person . . . shall have remedy by due course 
of law” (to borrow from Nebraska’s 1867 Constitution) expanded, as it 
was reread to embrace persons of all kinds.  While theorists of courts 
often worry about whether court judgments tread on majoritarian de-
cisionmaking, the argument here is that courts are themselves demo-
cratic institutions.  The entitlement that “all courts shall be open” pro-
duces a government-sponsored occasion to level differences of 
resources and to impose, albeit fleetingly, the dignity reflected in the 
status held by a juridical person, competent to sue or be sued, able to 
prompt an answer from and entitled to be treated on a par with one’s 
adversary — whether that be an individual, a corporation, or the gov-
ernment itself.  The odd etiquette of the courtroom disciplines both 
disputants and the state, as all are required to respond respectfully to 
claims.  The public enactment of process and judgment documents 
how government officials are to treat individuals in democratic orders 
and enables debate about compliance with those goals as well as about 
the content of the governing legal norms.  
The variegated constitutional case law outlined above documents 
both the development of aspirations to produce fair and equal treat-
ment of disputants and the difficulty of doing so.39  For decades, find-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 38 The history of the terminology of “due process” is provided by Charles A. Miller, The Forest 
of Due Process of Law: The American Constitutional Tradition, in 18 NOMOS: DUE PROCESS 3 
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977) [hereinafter Miller, Due Process]. 
 39 See generally THE COSTS AND FUNDING OF CIVIL LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE (Christopher Hodges, Stefan Vogenauer & Magdelena Tulibacka eds., 2010); 
Geoffrey Davies, Can Dispute Resolution Be Made Generally Available?, 12 OTAGO L. REV. 305 
(2010); Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the Le-
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ing methods to materialize these forms of fairness has also occupied 
Congress, the states, and procedural rulemakers in the public and pri-
vate sectors.  The results are eclectic and uneven, including a few le-
gislated subsidies for criminal and civil litigation,40 statutes authoriz-
ing aggregation, rules promulgated to facilitate filings, and efforts to 
reroute disputes to various alternative fora.  Examples (detailed below) 
range from the banking laws in New York State in 1937 and the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938, both of which pioneered group-based 
resolution techniques, to the 1966 federal class action rule, multidistrict 
litigation, and the revamped reliance on bankruptcy in mass torts.41  
Legislatures also devolved adjudication to administrative agencies 
(such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
which played a role in Wal-Mart) and outsourced to private providers 
(as the mandate to arbitrate in AT&T exemplifies).  Some of these in-
novations, such as administrative adjudication and class actions, are 
more visible and regulated than others, such as arbitration and other 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs. 
States have a special place in the dialogue about procedural en-
titlements.  Despite the conventional claim that, unlike other constitu-
tional orders, positive rights are not common in United States constitu-
tionalism,42 most states operate under mandates such as the 
nineteenth-century provision in the Nebraska Constitution.  Guaran-
tees of “a right of access to the courts to obtain a remedy for injury” 
can be found “expressly or implicitly” in forty state constitutions.43  
Thus, while readings of the United States Constitution have elaborated 
remedies available under certain circumstances,44 many state constitu-
tions offer express guarantees of rights to remedies in open courts.  
And some states have recognized private enforcement of such rights.  
For example, Nebraska’s substantive right to use courts was the basis 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
gal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129 (2010) [hereinafter 
Hadfield, Higher Demand].  
 40 See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006); Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2996 (2006). 
 41 See infra pp. 137–38 (New York State banking laws), 139–40 (Fair Labor Standards Act), 
141–42 (federal class action rule). 
 42 But see ROBIN L. WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 2 (1994); see also VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL EN-
GAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (2010). 
 43 See Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 
1310 & n.6 (2003); infra pp. 104–05. 
 44 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Con-
stitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1779–91 (1991); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Con-
fusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
309, 329–39, 367–73 (1993).  Theories of due process entitlements to judicial review are augmented 
in some instances by specific clauses of the Constitution, such as those protecting against the tak-
ings of property and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 
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in 1889 and in 1991 on which that state’s Supreme Court refused to 
enforce arbitration provisions.45  As the Nebraska Supreme Court ex-
plained its 1889 decision a few years later, in 1902, to enforce contracts 
to arbitrate would “open a leak in the dike of constitutional guaranties 
which might some day carry all away.”46 
But not all celebrate the trajectory that identifies these due process 
obligations, producing more rights and more claimants knocking at 
courthouse doors.  The intersection of high demand curves for courts, 
the burdens of procedures, the costs of lawyers, and the regulatory 
successes achieved by some plaintiffs have prompted diverse critiques, 
styling the civil justice system as overburdened, overreaching, and 
overly adversarial.  Critics also argue that courts can generate unwise 
policies and that the risk of being sued chills productive economic ex-
changes.  Energetic enthusiasts, sometimes gaining funds from institu-
tions identified with repeat-player defendants, have fueled movements 
to shape avenues outside courts for dispute resolution (becoming 
known as “DR”) and to encourage judges to rethink their roles in fo-
cusing on access to courts.47 
From rules mandating the use of court-annexed arbitration and re-
quiring judges to encourage settlement to federal doctrine declining to 
imply private causes of action and reading governmental immunities 
broadly, evidence of a different vision for courts came to the fore dur-
ing the latter part of the twentieth century.  As the debates in AT&T 
and Wal-Mart detail, supporters of privatization argue in terms of util-
ity and fairness, as do proponents of public adjudication.  Yet the sides 
diverge on the vectors of liberty and autonomy (invoked in support of 
limiting courts by enforcing provisions mandating arbitration and of 
protecting individuals from group-based litigation so that they can 
pursue their own property interests in court), and on the import of 
equality (argued to support forms of aggregation).  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 45 German-Am. Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 41 N.W. 406, 406 (Neb. 1889); State v. Neb. Ass’n of Pub. 
Emps., Local 61, 477 N.W.2d 577, 581–82 (Neb. 1991). 
 46 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 92 N.W. 736, 737 (Neb. 1902). 
 47 Diverse views support the ADR movement.  See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, 
Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-shaping Our Legal System, 
108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165 (2003); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The 
Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2000).  Some see litigation as 
harmful to economic expansion.  See generally, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL 
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).  Others believe litigation is insufficiently re-
sponsive to disputants’ interests.  See generally, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It 
Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 
2663 (1995).  For a critique of anti-litigation analyses, see generally Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike 
in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998).  
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C.  Equal, Public, and Stressed Justice 
AT&T, Wal-Mart, and Turner sit at the juncture of these competing 
visions for courts.  Before I turn to the interstices, the next frame to be 
introduced is the set of political and social forces that underlie the abil-
ity of the plaintiffs in the three cases — consumers, employees, and 
parents — to seek redress in court.  The words “EQUAL JUSTICE UN-
DER LAW” were etched in 1935 above the Court’s grand staircase when 
the building opened, but the debate about their meaning came to the 
fore — as Gideon and Boddie exemplify — only in the decades thereaf-
ter.48  The phrase, picked to fit the facade, proved prescient in referenc-
ing a concept broader than what the law of equal protection may entail.  
Invoked in dozens of opinions and by Justices ranging from Brennan to 
Scalia,49 the phrase serves as a signpost for the hopes that democratic 
orders place in courts. 
During the second half of the twentieth century, women and men of 
all colors gained authority to invoke protection as consumers, entitle-
ments to nondiscrimination in employment, and obligations to support 
their children.  The due process law sketched above emerged when 
this array of newly endowed rights holders, with limited economic re-
sources, presented themselves publicly as also entitled to equal and 
dignified treatment in court. 
Courts were specially attractive venues for these pursuits, not only 
because of the power to order change but also because of the qualities 
of adjudication itself.  Judges are supposed to treat all with dignity 
and respect, and disputants are obliged to do the same toward their 
adversaries.  These egalitarian exchanges of mutual recognition make 
adjudication itself a democratic practice, and, as discussed above, 
third-party rights of access put the performance of these obligations 
before the public eye.50  As Bentham put it, “publicity” enables the 
“Public-Opinion Tribunal” to form independent judgments about the 
quality of government actions.51  While presiding over a trial, the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 48 The phrase came not from a judicial opinion or the Constitution but from the firm of Cass 
Gilbert, the building’s architect.  In 1932, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and the United 
States Supreme Court Building Commission approved the text.  See Office of the Curator, The 
West Pediment, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
about/westpediment.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 49 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 388 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part) 
(“Courts are the central dispute-settling institutions in our society.  They are bound to do equal 
justice under law, to rich and poor alike.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 619 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“What kind of Equal Justice under Law is it that . . . gives as the basis for sparing one 
person from execution arguments explicitly rejected in refusing to spare another?”). 
 50 See generally Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Pub-
lic Sphere(s), 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1 (2011). 
 51 See JEREMY BENTHAM, Constitutional Code, in 9 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, 
supra note 35, at 41. 
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judge is, to paraphrase Bentham, on trial.52  The information forced 
into the public realm by court processes becomes part of iterative ex-
changes with other branches of government.  
Both federal and state constitutions entrenched this norm of public-
ity in courts by turning rituals of public attendance into rights.  The 
federal courts have repeatedly insisted that neither the Constitution 
nor the common law tolerates blanket closures of criminal or civil pro-
ceedings.53  Further, in 2011, in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,54 the 
Court reiterated that litigation, which facilitates “informed public par-
ticipation that is a cornerstone of democratic society,” is also protected 
under the First Amendment’s Petition Clause.55  As the Nebraska 
Constitution illustrates, state constitutions often directly express a 
substantive entitlement to “open courts” linked with rights to obtaining 
remedies without undue delay. 
Further, although the South Carolina Supreme Court in Turner 
adopted the minority position that civil contemnors had no right to 
counsel, several jurisdictions require counsel for indigent civil contem-
nors facing jail, and a few also provide lawyers for poor individuals in 
other civil proceedings.56  Impetus for expanding rights to counsel 
comes from firsthand experience with legions of lawyer-less litigants.  
In 2009, California tallied 4.3 million people in civil litigation without 
the assistance of lawyers.57  In 2010, New York counted 2.3 million 
civil litigants without lawyers — including almost all tenants in evic-
tion cases, debtors in consumer credit cases, and ninety-five percent of 
parents in child support matters.58 
These figures have sparked a national movement, dubbed “Civil 
Gideon,” championed by bench and bar leaders to facilitate court 
access through guaranteeing counsel rights for some impoverished liti-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 52 BENTHAM, Rationale of Evidence, supra note 35, at 355. 
 53 See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 722 (2010) (per curiam) (reversing a conviction 
because a “lone courtroom observer” was excluded from the voir dire). 
 54 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011). 
 55 Id. at 2500–01. 
 56 See Price v. Turner, 691 S.E.2d 470, 472 n.2 (S.C. 2010) (noting that eleven states and five 
federal courts had held that counsel is required for civil contemnors facing incarceration); see al-
so In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 283–86 (Alaska 1991) (holding that due process protections required 
appointed counsel for indigent parents facing loss of status as legal parents); In re D.L., 937 
N.E.2d 1042, 1046–47 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (holding that due process required appointed counsel 
for juveniles in civil protection order proceedings).  
 57 This figure was cited in support of the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, creating a pilot 
program for poor litigants to obtain counsel.  See Assemb. B. No. 590, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2009). 
 58 JONATHAN LIPPMAN, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 2011: PURSUING JUSTICE 4 (2011), 
available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/CTAPPS/news/SOJ-2011.pdf; see also S. Res. 6368, As-
semb. Res. 1621, 2010 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010) (applauding the Chief Judge’s efforts and 
requesting annual reports of findings, work, and recommendations of the Task Force to Expand 
Access to Civil Legal Services in New York). 
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gants.59  Evocative of Justice Brennan’s Boddie analysis, the American 
Bar Association argued in its Turner amicus brief that “counsel should 
be provided as a matter of right to low-income persons in adversarial 
proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, such as those in-
volving sustenance, safety, health, or child custody determinations.”60 
The challenges of providing access are at the core of AT&T, Wal-
Mart, and Turner.  All three cases are about the problem of generating 
legitimate decisions enforced by law in a world in which courts have 
limited funds, lawyers are expensive, and substantive rights are con-
tested.  In response, all nine Justices assessed what fairness requires, in 
resources and in process, in or out of public courts.  Couched in terms 
of the Constitution, the FAA, Title VII, and Rule 23, all three rulings 
are judge-made balances of procedural costs and benefits.  All three 
also invoke the resources of the opponent as a justification for limiting 
procedural rights for claimants. 
AT&T and Wal-Mart insisted on disaggregation, devolution, and 
privatization, while Turner rejected a bright-line right to counsel for 
civil contemnors sent to jail at the behest of opposing private litigants.  
Those results were predicated on Justices’ own impressionistic senses 
of both the costs and the benefits of using particular procedures.  Not 
much analyzed were constitutional stipulations of courts as constitu-
tional entitlements available to everyone, including litigants of limited 
means, or the remarkable success courts have had in attracting a high 
level of demand for and in obtaining a significant amount of public 
and private investment in their services, or courts’ role as contributors 
to democratic lawmaking.  The consequence of these rulings is that the 
substance of procedural due process thins.  To paraphrase Grant Gil-
more on contract’s being “swallowed up by tort,”61 procedure is being 
swallowed up by contract.62 
D.  Cast to Type: Litigants, Lawyers, and Judges 
Had the litigants appeared in a novel, reviewers would have pro-
tested that they were clichés.  Yet their profiles fit the doctrinal devel-
opments that their names will come to represent.  Petitioning the Su-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 59 See, e.g., Jonathan Lippman, Chief Judge, N.Y. Court of Appeals, Law in the 21st Century: 
Enduring Traditions, Emerging Challenges, Law Day 2010, at 2–7 (May 3, 2010) (transcript avail-
able at http://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnew/pdf/Law Day 2010.pdf). 
 60 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Ass’n in Support of Petitioner at 4, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 
2507 (No. 10-10), 2011 WL 118266 [hereinafter ABA Amicus for Turner] (citing ABA BASIC 
PRINCIPLES OF A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 1 (2010)) (also noting 
that counsel rights should apply to “extradition, mental competency, postconviction relief, and 
probation and parole revocation, regardless of the designation of the tribunal in which they occur 
or classification of the proceedings as civil in nature,” ABA Amicus for Turner, supra, at 3 n.8). 
 61 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 103 (1974). 
 62 See generally Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005). 
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preme Court in the three cases were two large corporations, AT&T 
and Wal-Mart (each iconic in its own right), and an indigent father 
who would be unknown were he not in a public court seeking the right 
to a lawyer because of a twelve-month jail sentence for civil contempt 
in South Carolina. 
Few under the age of thirty might know either that AT&T once 
stood for American Telephone and Telegraph, in reference to Alexan-
der Graham Bell’s 1870s patents, or that “Ma Bell” “owned, main-
tained, and controlled the nation’s basic phone network.”63  That mo-
nopoly was disassembled by court edict in the early 1980s.64  In the 
decade thereafter, AT&T seemed prosperous even as technologies de-
veloped by others were rendering its basic product — long-distance 
telephone lines — obsolete.  Acquired by more nimble companies, 
AT&T survived as a moniker because its initials better branded ser-
vices than did the names of its purchasers.  
Wal-Mart, in turn, is (as the Supreme Court described) “the Na-
tion’s largest private employer”65 and a corporation at the vanguard of 
transnational global retail services.  Its legendary founder, Sam Walton, 
and his enterprise are the subject of several books mining his invention of 
the megastore66 and puzzling about whether his business structure has 
helped or harmed his target customers, lower-income Americans.67 
Wal-Mart is a fitting heir to American Telephone, for both made 
fortunes on new technologies for communications.  Just as Theodore 
Vail succeeded in 1915 in building “the nation’s first transcontinental” 
telephone lines for Bell,68 Sam Walton realized in the 1980s that bar 
codes could collect information about product purchases and trans-
form the efficiencies of retail sales.69  And while journalists once called 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 STEVE COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T 6, 18 (1986). 
 64 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226–34 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub 
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1983).  Overviews of federal government 
antitrust claims, dating from 1912, against AT&T can be found in LESLIE CAULEY, END OF 
THE LINE: THE RISE AND FALL OF AT&T 28 (2005), and SONNY KLEINFELD, THE BIG-
GEST COMPANY ON EARTH: A PROFILE OF AT&T 8 (1981).  
 65 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.  See generally NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE RETAIL 
REVOLUTION: HOW WAL-MART CREATED A BRAVE NEW WORLD OF BUSINESS 8 (2009).   
 66 See SANDRA S. VANCE & ROY V. SCOTT, WAL-MART: A HISTORY OF SAM WALTON’S 
RETAIL PHENOMENON 8 (1994).  
 67 Compare Richard A. Epstein, On Wal-Mart: Doing Good by Doing Nothing, 39 CONN. L. 
REV. 1287, 1299 (2007), with Katharine B. Silbaugh, Wal-Mart’s Other Woman Problem: Sprawl 
and Work-Family Balance, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1713, 1715 (2007). 
 68 CAULEY, supra note 64, at 28–30. 
 69 The system is known as Uniform Bar Product Codes.  See VANCE & SCOTT, supra note 66, 
at 93.  In the late 1980s, Wal-Mart had the “world’s largest private, integrated satellite communi-
cation network,” beaming data to 1500 stores, and by the twenty-first century, Wal-Mart was a 
transnational retail pioneer that became the “largest private sector employer in the world.”  See 
LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 65, at 5, 40–43. 
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AT&T “the biggest company on earth” and the “wealthiest,”70 Wal-
Mart now lays claim to those accolades.71 
The third petitioner — Michael Turner — is an individual at the 
other end of the income spectrum.  Court records tell us that between 
2003 and 2005, Turner made episodic child support payments, some-
times in the face of or after brief jail time.72  By January 2008, he 
owed $5,728.76.73  Called to family court in South Carolina and ap-
pearing without a lawyer, Turner described his struggles with drugs 
and his efforts to obtain federal disability benefits.74 
All three of these petitioners encountered adversaries of limited 
economic means.  The two corporate defendants had been challenged 
by individuals proceeding as members of class actions that had, in the 
lower courts, been certified.  Pitted against AT&T were Vincent and 
Liza Concepcion, consumers about whom public records reveal rela-
tively little.  Residents of San Francisco, these siblings had — like 54 
million other customers — contracted for wireless services from Cingu-
lar, which was in 2006 “the largest provider of mobile wireless voice 
and data services in the United States”75 and which subsequently 
bought and adopted the name AT&T Mobility.  The Concepcions re-
ported themselves surprised at charges of $30.22 in sales tax for 
phones they thought came “free” with the two-year service contract.76 
The Concepcions filed a federal class action “on behalf of all cus-
tomers who entered into a transaction in California wherein they re-
ceived a cell phone for free or a discount . . . but were charged sales 
tax” in excess of that “payable [as] calculated on the actual discounted 
price.”77  They alleged that the providers had violated California’s 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 70 KLEINFELD, supra note 64, at 3, 4.  In that era, AT&T’s assets outstripped the “gross na-
tional product of all but some twenty countries.”  Id. at 4. 
 71 See ROBERT SLATER, THE WAL-MART DECADE: HOW A NEW GENERATION OF 
LEADERS TURNED SAM WALTON’S LEGACY INTO THE WORLD’S #1 COMPANY 12 (2003). 
 72 Turner was jailed for two- and three-day periods in 2004 and for four and a half months in 
2005.  Respondent[s]’ Brief in Opposition at 6–8, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10), 2010 WL 
5855419 [hereinafter Rogers Brief in Opposition]. 
 73 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2513. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See Complaint at para. 5, Concepcion v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 06 CV 0675 DMS 
(NLS) (S.D. Cal. March 27, 2006), 2006 WL 1194855 [hereinafter Concepcion Complaint]; First 
Amended Complaint at para. 5, Concepcion v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 06 CV 0675 DMS 
(NLS) (S.D. Cal. May 2, 2006), 2006 WL 1866797 [hereinafter Concepcion First Amended Com-
plaint]. 
 76 The Concepcions paid $149.99 for two cell phones, one “discounted by $100 and the second 
‘free’ . . . in connection with the purchase of a two-year cell phone service agreement.”  Concep-
cion First Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at para. 4.  They alleged that the $30.22 charge 
was the equal of 7.75% sales tax on a $399.98 phone, rather than the $11.62 that would have been 
the sales tax on $149.99.  See id. 
 77 Id. at para. 14. 
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1970s consumer protection laws78 by deceptive and false advertising to 
lure marginal consumers into purchases.79  The Concepcions’ theories 
were that the provider should have either absorbed the costs of the 
sales tax or not advertised that the phones were free80 and that the 
form waiver to class actions (in or out of court) that came with the 
phone was unenforceable because it enabled AT&T to extricate itself 
from California’s consumer protection laws. 
The next protagonist, Betty Dukes, is an African American woman 
from Tallulah, Louisiana, and the first-named plaintiff in the “largest 
Title VII class action in history” — filed against Wal-Mart.81  Like the 
Concepcions’ lawsuit, her claim stemmed from laws enacted in the 
second half of the twentieth century.  In Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Congress made discrimination on the basis of “race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin” a violation of federal law.82 
In 1994, Dukes took a part-time, five-dollar-an-hour job as a cash-
ier at Wal-Mart in Pittsburg, California.83  Dukes gained full-time em-
ployment and, by 1995, a “merit pay raise,” followed by a promotion to 
Customer Service Manager in 1997.84  After being demoted based on 
allegedly discriminatory grounds, Dukes went to California’s Depart-
ment of Fair Employment and Housing and, in 2001, to the EEOC, 
from which she received the statutorily required “right to sue” letter.85  
Then paid an hourly wage of $8.44,86 Dukes filed a federal lawsuit 
against the company.87 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 78 The Concepcions relied on the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, enacted in 1970 and to be 
construed liberally.  See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750–1784 (2011). 
 79 Concepcion First Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at para. 2.  The complaint sought 
“restitution in an amount greater than five million dollars” on behalf of a class numbering far in 
excess of 100.  Id. at para. 7.  Federal jurisdiction was predicated on the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)).  In-
voking Federal Trade Commission regulations that required  “extreme care” when offers adver-
tised “free” goods or services and that any obligations incurred needed to be explained “clearly 
and conspicuously at the outset,” the Concepcions argued that any footnote or asterisk references 
to special conditions were inadequate to prevent misunderstanding.  Concepcion First Amended 
Complaint, supra note 75, at paras. 23, 32 (citing 16 C.F.R. § 251.1 (2005)). 
 80 Concepcion First Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at para. 17(b). 
 81 Kirsten S.P. Rigney & Sally Welch, Symposium Introduction: Wal-Mart Matters, 39 CONN. 
L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2007). 
 82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 83 Declaration of Betty Dukes in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at paras. 
1, 3, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. 01-cv-02252) [hereinaf-
ter Dukes’s Declaration]. 
 84 Third Amended Complaint at para. 30, Dukes, 222 F.R.D. 137 [hereinafter Dukes 
Complaint].  
 85 Id. at paras. 40–41, exs. 1, 2. 
 86 Dukes’s Declaration, supra note 83, at para. 1. 
 87 See Dukes Complaint, supra note 84; LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: 
THE LANDMARK BATTLE FOR WORKERS’ RIGHTS AT WAL-MART 4 (2004). 
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In 2002, after connecting to lawyers focused on Wal-Mart, Dukes 
became the lead plaintiff in a lawsuit to certify a class on behalf of 
“[a]ll women employed at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store at any 
time since December 26, 1998 who have been or may be subjected to 
Wal-Mart’s challenged pay and management track promotions policies 
and practices.”88  The women claimed that Wal-Mart’s national policy 
of giving local managers discretion to make promotions and award 
merit pay increases within a two-dollar window, when coupled with an 
intensely monitored corporate culture rife with sex-stereotyped pre-
sumptions, resulted in a workplace in which women were “72% of the 
hourly sales employees, yet only one-third of management positions.”89  
The Dukes plaintiffs, arguing that Wal-Mart’s practices violated fed-
eral law, relied on two complex theories — that Wal-Mart had engaged 
in a pattern or practice of disparate treatment90 and that the compa-
ny’s policies had a disparate, discriminatory impact on women.91  As 
remedies, the Dukes plaintiffs requested much of what Title VII au-
thorized — injunctive and declaratory relief as well as back pay and 
punitive (but not compensatory) damages. 
Naming Michael Turner’s adversary is more complex.  Formally, 
his opponent was the child’s mother, Rebecca Rogers,92 and the major-
ity’s holding is predicated on the fact that it was the custodial parent 
seeking support and not the state itself.  Yet state and federal govern-
ment had obliged Rogers, as a recipient of government benefits, to 
pursue Turner.  Under a “comprehensive federal-state partnership,” 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 88 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141–42.  Seven women had been the lead plaintiffs initially, but by the 
Supreme Court decision, Dukes’s two named co-plaintiffs were Christine Kwapnoski and Edith 
Arana.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2548. 
 89 Dukes Complaint, supra note 84, at para. 1. 
 90 A disparate treatment claim requires that management knew that a policy, as implemented, 
disadvantaged qualified women.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
 91 The Dukes plaintiffs relied on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424 (1971), recognizing that policies neutral on their face can work disadvantages resulting in 
statistically significant disparities.  To succeed, the plaintiffs would have to show that “the com-
pany’s standard operating procedure [ — ] the regular rather than the unusual practice” — estab-
lished a pattern or practice of discrimination.  Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336.  Thereafter, Wal-Mart 
could rebut individual relief on the theory that a woman was “denied an employment opportunity 
for lawful reasons.”  Id. at 362. 
  Complex questions shadow the tasks of making meaning of Title VII rights and structuring 
the forms of proof required by statute, and the judicial interpretations reflect different theories of 
equality.  See generally George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially 
Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2006); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate 
Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911 (2005); Vicki 
Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the 
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 
(1990); George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 688 (1980).  
 92 By the time the case was in the Supreme Court, Rogers’s father was the child’s legal custo-
dian.  See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2513. 
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South Carolina was required to seek to recoup funds from delinquent 
parents,93 and since 1988, the federal government has encouraged 
states to develop a “centralized, automated approach to child-support,” 
focused on tracking delinquent parents through automated databases 
and attaching income.94  
Rogers had done so and continued to pursue Turner after her gov-
ernment funds ended and the South Carolina Attorney General’s Of-
fice classified the dispute as a “private domestic” matter in which it 
could take no position.95  Nonetheless, the state was an ongoing pres-
ence.  Court records reflect that, on at least one occasion, a lawyer 
employed by the state’s Department of Social Services was present at 
Turner’s child support hearing.96  Moreover, a study of such support 
proceedings reported that the appearance of a state representative was 
not unusual.97  Further, South Carolina was Turner’s custodian when 
detention was ordered. 
In 2003, Rogers obtained a court order that Turner make weekly 
payments of $51.73.  After more hearings and both short and longer 
detentions for contempt, Turner sometimes paid.98  In January 2008, a 
brief court hearing resulted in a sentence of twelve months, to be 
purged if Turner paid the almost $6,000 in child support he then 
owed.99  Although neither Turner nor Rogers mentioned a lack of 
counsel in family court,100 Turner argued on appeal that South Caroli-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 93 Brief of Senators DeMint, Graham, Johanns, and Rubio as Amici Curiae in Support of Res-
pondents at 1, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10) [hereinafter Senators’ Amici for Rogers] (citing 
the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984).  Proposals to involve the federal govern-
ment in child support collection date from 1949 when then-Representative Gerald Ford of Michi-
gan introduced the “Runaway Pappy Act,” which decades later was referred to as the “Deadbeat 
Dad Act,” and in 1992 was enacted in gender-neutral terms.  See Judith Resnik, Categorical Fede-
ralism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 650–53 (2001).  Since 1950, Con-
gress has required state enforcement programs for child support as a condition of federal funds.  
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 2, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 
(2011) (No. 10-10), 2011 WL 108380 [hereinafter U.S. Amicus, Turner].  By 1975, state plans had 
to have federal government approval, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) re-
cipients had to cooperate in enforcement efforts and assign recouped funds to states.  Id. at 3. 
 94 U.S. Amicus, Turner, supra note 93, at 5–6.  South Carolina’s noncompliant approach cost it 
in excess of $55 million in fines.  Id. at 6 n.4. 
 95 Rogers Brief in Opposition, supra note 72, at 9 n.2. 
 96 See Joint Appendix, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10), 2011 WL 50021, at *40a [hereinaf-
ter Joint Appendix, Turner]. 
 97 In more than 300 proceedings observed, “an attorney for DSS was present” and sometimes 
participated in the hearings.  Brief of Professor Elizabeth G. Patterson and South Carolina Apple-
seed Legal Justice Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14–15, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 
2507 (2011) (No. 10-10), 2011 WL 141223 [hereinafter Patterson Amici for Turner]. 
 98 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2513.   
 99 See Joint Appendix, Turner, supra note 96, at *60a–62a; Rogers Brief in Opposition, supra 
note 72, at 7–9. 
 100 Rogers Brief in Opposition, supra note 72, at 8. 
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na’s failure to provide him with a lawyer before ordering him to jail 
violated the Constitution. 
As Turner illustrates, accounts of litigation require discussion about 
lawyers, who have historically functioned as gatekeepers to courts.  In 
Turner’s case, lawyers’ absence was the central, if not unusual, point.  
As noted, the millions like him have prompted a national movement 
calling for Civil Gideon.  The importance of that legal question 
enabled Turner to gain local volunteer counsel, supported by a collec-
tion of six amici before the South Carolina Supreme Court,101 where 
Rebecca Rogers appeared unrepresented. 
The United States Supreme Court is its own lawyer magnet, with 
firms and law schools competing to participate in the eighty or so ar-
guments each year.  Hence, pro bono counsel enabled both Turner and 
Rogers to have expert help from members of the increasingly insular 
Supreme Court bar.102  Although, under the rubric of the Civil Gideon 
movement, Rogers might have argued that the problem was an ab-
sence of lawyers on both sides as well as for the child, she opposed a 
right to counsel for Turner.  With these sides drawn, amici joined in — 
seven for Turner (including the United States, arguing that his sen-
tence should be reversed)103 and three for Rogers (including thirteen 
states led by Texas, as well as a group of United States senators).104  
As has also become customary, law professors for each side explained 
the wisdom of their opposing positions.105 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 101 Derek Enderlin, of the two-person firm Ross & Enderlin, was joined by Kathrine Haggard 
Hudgins of the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense.  Several organizations filed in 
support.  See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, South Carolina National 
Office, the Brennan Center for Justice, the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Na-
tional Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n, and the South Carolina Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Price v. Turner, 691 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 2010) (No. 03-DR-37-472). 
 102 Former Solicitor General Seth Waxman, in private practice at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale 
& Dorr LLP, argued for Turner; Acting Principal Deputy Solicitor General Leondra Kruger pre-
sented the federal government’s position.  Stephanos Bibas, Director of the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law School Supreme Court Clinic, joined by lawyers from Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & 
Walker LLP, argued for Rogers. 
 103 As Justice Breyer noted, “the Federal Government believes that ‘the routine use of contempt 
for non-payment of child support is likely to be an ineffective strategy,’” yet the government ar-
gued “that ‘coercive enforcement remedies . . . have a role to play.’”  Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2517 
(quoting U.S. Amicus, Turner, supra note 93, at 21–22 & n.8). 
 104 Senators’ Amici for Rogers, supra note 93; see also Brief of Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Colo-
rado, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and 
Wyoming as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10), 2011 
WL 567494. 
 105 Brief for Law Professors Benjamin Barton and Darryl Brown as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondents, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10), 2011 WL 567493 [hereinafter Law Pro-
fessors’ Amici for Rogers]; Patterson Amici for Turner, supra note 97.  Barton directed the clinical 
programs at the University of Tennessee College of Law; Brown, a former public defender, taught 
at the University of Virginia Law School.  Patterson, a faculty member at the University of South 
Carolina School of Law, served as the director of South Carolina’s Department of Social Services. 
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Another lawyer magnet is the class action, and both Dukes and the 
Concepcions gained their counsel by means of that form.  Like Turner 
and Rogers, Betty Dukes had gone from the state and federal adminis-
trative agencies to federal court pro se — a status that is now some-
times termed “self-representation” to suggest that volition, rather than 
economics, prompts the decision to proceed without a lawyer.  Once 
folded into the class action as its first-named plaintiff,106 Dukes gained 
an assemblage of lawyers.  Equal Rights Advocates (founded in 1974 
to work on behalf of women)107 and the Impact Fund (begun in 1992 
“to achieve economic and social justice”)108 were part of a “coalition” 
of firms formed to finance and staff the complex litigation.109  When 
the case reached the Supreme Court, thirteen amici, representing nu-
merous organizations, joined on the plaintiffs’ behalf.110 
Like Dukes, the Concepcions became connected to lawyers who 
were in medias res — pursuing a parallel case against T-Mobile, Veri-
zon, and other wireless carriers.  (The anonymity and fungibility of 
their consumer status is underscored by the happenstance that Con-
cepcion, rather than the name Laster, the lead plaintiff in the other 
lawsuit, has become part of the Supreme Court’s annals.)  Two San 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 106 Dukes filed her pro se complaint, alleging diversity jurisdiction, on June 4, 2001.  Complaint 
at 1, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C01-2252 MJJ, 2001 WL 1902806 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 
2001). 
 107 EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES, http://www.equalrights.org/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 108 About Us, IMPACT FUND, http://www.impactfund.org/index.php?cat_id=4 (last visited Oct. 
2, 2011).  Featherstone reported that Stephanie Odle — “a white Texan woman Dukes’s junior by 
more than two decades” — filed an EEOC complaint against Wal-Mart in 1999.  Odle found law-
yers who enlisted Brad Seligman, who had founded the Impact Fund in 1992.  FEATHERSTONE, 
supra note 87, at 13, 20–24.  
 109 FEATHERSTONE, supra note 87, at 27.  The resulting roster also included the Public Jus-
tice Center, founded in 1985 in Baltimore to augment resources for structural litigation on behalf 
of the poor, and three private law firms: Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, of Washington, D.C., 
“which would end up bearing the greatest financial burden,” id. at 27; Davis, Cowell & Bowe, of 
San Francisco, which had litigated other cases against Wal-Mart; and Tinkler & Bennett.  Joseph 
Sellers, of Cohen Milstein, argued at the Supreme Court. 
 110 The amici briefs in support of the Dukes plaintiffs came from NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc., National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Leadership 
Conference on Civil and Human Rights, AARP, Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, 
Inc., LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Asian American Justice Center, Asian Law Caucus, and Lawyers’ 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; United Food and Commercial Workers International Un-
ion, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, and Change to 
Win; U.S. Women’s Chamber of Commerce, National Partnership for Women & Families, and 
California Women Lawyers; American Civil Liberties Union and National Women’s Law Center; 
Public Justice, P.C., National Association of Consumer Advocates, and National Consumers 
League; Consumers Union of United States, Inc., National Consumer Law Center, and Center for 
Constitutional Rights; Institute for Women’s Policy Research; Public Citizen, Inc.; National Em-
ployment Lawyers Association, Equal Justice Society, and Legal Aid Society–Employment Law 
Center; American Sociological Association and Law and Society Association; labor economists 
and statisticians; law and economics professors; and civil procedure professors.  See Docket, Wal-
Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277). 
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Diego firms, each with fewer than ten lawyers and describing them-
selves as experienced in consumer and securities class actions, filed the 
Concepcion lawsuit, consolidated with the pending litigation.111  In the 
Supreme Court, additional lawyers were at the fore — hailing from 
Public Citizen, founded as part of Ralph Nader’s consumer rights ef-
forts in 1971 and appearing with some regularity at the Court.112  Fif-
teen amici (including a combined filing on behalf of seven states and the 
District of Columbia) registered their support for the Concepcions.113 
The corporate defendants were, predictably, relying on a different 
market.  Each had in-house lawyers who enlisted major firms as the 
litigation unfolded.  Wal-Mart enjoyed the counsel of a law firm num-
bering more than 900 on several continents;114 its Supreme Court ar-
gument was made by a lawyer from another global firm counting 1000 
lawyers on its roster.115  At the trial level, the wireless service provid-
ers relied on a local 40-person San Diego firm, joined by a Seattle-
based firm with more than 500 attorneys.116  When in the Ninth Circuit 
and the Supreme Court, AT&T relied on a firm of some 1600 lawyers.117 
The roster of amici in Wal-Mart and AT&T overlapped, as the in-
terrelationship and stakes were well understood by repeat players in 
the Supreme Court.  For example, the Equal Employment Advisory 
Council (an employer association) filed in both cases, just as the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund sided with both the 
Dukes and the Concepcion classes.118 
All three petitioners argued procedural defects that affected sub-
stantive rights.  Both corporate defendants asserted that the proposed 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 111 Craig Nicholas and Matthew Butler, of the four-person firm Nicholas & Butler, filed Laster 
v. T-Mobile in 2005 in state court; the case was removed to federal court, and the Laster plaintiffs 
filed a revised complaint.  See Laster v. T-Mobile, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1186 (S.D. Cal. 2005).  In 
the Concepcion filing, the lead firm listed was Hulett Harper Stewart, followed by Nicholas & Butler. 
 112 See Accomplishments, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2313 (last vis-
ited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 113 Those filing included National Academy of Arbitrators; NAACP Legal Defense & Educa-
tional Fund, Inc.; groups of “arbitration professors,” “contracts professors,” “civil procedure and 
complex litigation professors,” and “federal jurisdiction professors”; American Antitrust Institute; 
Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia and national consumer advocacy organizations; Na-
tional Workrights Institute; and Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Tennessee, 
Vermont, and the District of Columbia.  See Docket, AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893). 
 114 Wal-Mart first retained Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP. 
 115 Theodore Boutrous of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP argued the case for Wal-Mart in the 
Supreme Court. 
 116 The San Diego firm was Solomon Ward Seidenwurm & Smith LLP; the Seattle firm was 
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP. 
 117 The firm was Mayer Brown, and the case was argued by Andrew Pincus.  
 118 In addition to the Equal Employment Advisory Council, the other four amici filing on be-
half of the corporations in both AT&T and Wal-Mart were DRI — The Voice of the Defense Bar, 
Pacific Legal Foundation, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and New England Legal Foundation.  In 
addition to the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Professor Arthur Miller filed on 
behalf of both the Concepcions and the Dukes plaintiffs. 
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class configurations were illegal and that each set of plaintiffs’ claims 
had to be heard individually to decide their merits fairly.  AT&T ar-
gued that the Concepcions ought neither to be in federal court as a 
class nor to be part of a class in private arbitration because they had 
waived their rights to do so when buying a bundle that included wire-
less services, phones, and another feature — a customized dispute reso-
lution system obliging them to proceed individually and exclusively 
through AT&T’s dispute resolution program.119 
AT&T designated the American Arbitration Association (AAA) to 
conduct arbitrations and permitted either party to use small claims 
courts but not to seek jury trials or participate in class actions.120  
AT&T argued that the 1925 FAA preempted both California’s con-
sumer statutes and its common law of contracts, and therefore the 
waiver provisions were enforceable.121  As law professors filing on 
AT&T’s behalf explained, the FAA, a kind of “equal protection clause” 
for contracts, prohibited California’s “discrimination” against arbitra-
tion clauses.122 
Wal-Mart likewise challenged the procedural form of the lawsuit in 
which it found itself, and again the fault lines were between individu-
alization and aggregation, and the focus was on unfairness.  Wal-Mart 
argued that its women employees, holding diverse jobs at different lo-
cations, had too little in common to proceed as a nationwide class.123  
Further, Wal-Mart objected to the form of the class action,124 the fail-
ure to provide notice to individual members,125 and the plan to use 
sampling or extrapolation for remedies.126 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 119 Given that the Ninth Circuit had also found a class waiver unconscionable in an earlier 
case, Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007), AT&T argued that 
its waiver was “substantively distinct” from that at issue in Shroyer.  See Laster v. T-Mobile USA 
Inc., No. 05CV1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008). 
 120 AT&T revised its arbitration provision in December 2006 and notified customers through 
inserts in their monthly bills.  See Notice of Improved Arbitration at 2–3 (Dec. 2006), Declaration 
of Neal S. Berinhout in Support of AT&T’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss Claims of 
Concepcion Plaintiffs, ex. 1, Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167 DMS (AJB), 2009 WL 
4842801 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2009). 
 121 See Brief for Petitioner, AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3017755, at *1, *23. 
 122 Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, AT&T, 131 S. 
Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3183856, at *1–2 [hereinafter Law Professors’ Amici for AT&T]; 
see also Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3167313, at *2 [hereinafter 
Chamber of Commerce Amicus for AT&T] (“Congress enacted the FAA to stop courts from dis-
criminating against arbitration agreements.”). 
 123 See Brief for Petitioner, Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277), 2011 WL 201045, at *1 
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner, Wal-Mart]. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at *14. 
 126 Id. at *23–31.  
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In both corporate litigations, lower court judges concluded that 
each set of plaintiffs could proceed in federal court and in the aggre-
gate.  In AT&T, the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA did not preempt 
California contract law and that state law rendered unenforceable the 
class action waiver.127  In Wal-Mart, the appellate court (en banc, 6–5) 
concluded that the trial court had generally exercised its discretion and 
tailored the proposed class so as to make it manageable and could, if need 
be on remand, “decertify the class should it become unmanageable.”128 
Returning to Turner and the procedural defects argued there, the 
record below reflects the limited resources not only of the parties but 
also of state courts.  As Turner’s amici detailed, the transcript of the 
“‘evidentiary’ hearing makes up three pages of the record,” Turner 
“spoke a total of 169 words,” and the entire proceeding took but a few 
minutes of the court’s time.129  In contrast to the detailed opinions by 
lower court judges in AT&T and Wal-Mart, no trial judge published a 
written opinion.  The many orders to pay and the findings of contempt 
were set forth through repeated use of a boilerplate form (“completed 
by typewriter or by hand,”130 but often incomplete) as well as short 
transcripts of two hearings published through the appendix filed in the 
United States Supreme Court.131 
The sole written opinion comes from the South Carolina Supreme 
Court, to which constitutional challenges can go, bypassing the inter-
mediate tier.132  That court “[d]isposed” of 1308 cases and had 920 
pending in 2010.133  The eight-paragraph ruling noted that of the 
courts addressing the issue, sixteen jurisdictions had held that a civil 
contemnor had a right to counsel before incarceration; South Carolina 
placed itself in the minority by ruling that no rights to counsel at-
tached “before being incarcerated for civil contempt for nonsup-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 127 See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 128 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 627 & nn.56–57, 628 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).  
Aspects of the district court’s ruling were rejected.  The dissent by Judge Ikuta disagreed.  Id. at 
628–29 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).  Chief Judge Kozinski joined the dissent and added that the plain-
tiffs had “little in common but their sex and this lawsuit.”  Id. at 652 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).  
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, shared those views.  See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555, 2557. 
 129 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 
2507 (No. 10-10), 2011 WL 108379, at *8.  Another amicus reported from observations of several 
dozen hearings that the hearings moved at an “assembly-line pace, lasting only about three min-
utes on average, with few hearings lasting more than six minutes.”  Patterson Amici for Turner, 
supra note 97, at 14. 
 130 See, e.g., Joint Appendix, Turner, supra note 96, at *17a, *20a, *26a–27a, *47a–48a, *60a–
63a, *85a–86a. 
 131 Id. at *40a–46a, *89a–91a.  On April 29, 2008, the notation indicated that Turner com-
mented “I can’t find no work” and that the judge found “the Defendant in willful contempt.”  Id. 
at *89a–90a. 
 132 See Price v. Turner, 691 S.E.2d 470, 471 (S.C. 2010); S.C. APP. CT. R. 204(b). 
 133 S.C. JUDICIAL DEP’T, ANNUAL ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 51–52 (2009–2010). 
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port.”134  When that decision was issued in March 2010, Turner had 
served the full twelve months of his contempt sentence.135 
Like the litigants and lawyers, the nine United States Supreme 
Court Justices rendering the three decisions acted true to type.  The 
five Justices finding for the corporate defendants in both cases had 
been nominated by Republican presidents; the four dissenters, arguing 
access to courts for consumers and employees, had been nominated by 
Democratic administrations.  Justice Kennedy played his crossover 
role, providing the fifth vote for the Turner holding that South Caroli-
na’s procedures had not provided the process due. 
E.  The Institutional Context of Complex State and Federal 
Judiciaries, Costly Process, and the Market of Private Dispute 
Resolution Providers 
The litigants, the legal rights at stake, and the legions of lawyers re-
flected the economic and technological transformations of the past cen-
tury.  The jurists were likewise part of institutions — the state and 
federal court systems — that had been reconfigured over the last cen-
turies.  Moreover, in the past decades, the private sector had, with the 
help of public policies, developed a market for ADR replete with its 
own organizations. 
Although today the federal courts loom large, their surroundings 
and import were once modest, and state courts dominated the litiga-
tion landscape.  The centrality of the states was not simply a historical 
artifact of a localized economy but also the product of political will.  
As exemplified by the Nebraska Constitution, state constitutions en-
shrined courts and gave litigants rights to use them.  Of the forty state 
constitutions that currently include “remedies clauses,” eighteen share 
language akin to that in the 1867 Nebraska Constitution and specify 
the entitlement that “all courts shall be open.”136  (South Carolina’s 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 134 Price, 691 S.E.2d at 472.  Turner’s count was that “seven federal circuit courts and fifteen 
state courts of last resort have held that indigent defendants in civil contempt proceedings have a 
right to appointed counsel if they face incarceration.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Turner, 131 
S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10), 2010 WL 2604155, at *12.  Five states had held no right to counsel, and 
three — Nevada, New Hampshire, and New Mexico — did case-by-case analyses.  Id. at *18–19.   
 135 All nine Justices rejected the argument that the case was moot, for the problem — failure to 
pay and contempt citations — was “‘capable of repetition’ while ‘evading review.’”  Turner, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2514–15 (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)); see id. at 2521 n.1 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).  As the majority noted, “[w]ithin months of his [Turner’s] release from 
the imprisonment here at issue he was again the subject of civil contempt proceedings.  And he 
was again imprisoned, this time for six months.”  Id. at 2515 (majority opinion).  Further, in De-
cember 2010, Turner, then $13,814.72 in arrears, was scheduled for another contempt hearing in 
May of 2011.  Id. 
 136 In addition to Nebraska, see ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“That all courts shall be open; and that 
every person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy 
by due process of law; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.”); 
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text reads: “All courts shall be public, and every person shall have 
speedy remedy therein for wrongs sustained.”137) 
The federal government has less express constitutional commit-
ments to civil litigants, and it was slower to populate its own lower 
courts.  Before 1850, no federal government building bore the name 
“United States Courthouse.”  Fewer than forty lower court federal 
judges were dispersed around the country, and they borrowed space in 
facilities dedicated to other purposes.  But after the Civil War, Con-
gress repeatedly turned to the federal courts to enforce newly minted 
national norms.  Congress endowed the courts with new jurisdiction, 
judgeships, and eventually buildings of their own.138  To support those 
efforts, lawyers were needed and, in 1870, Congress established the 
Department of Justice.139 
During the twentieth century, federal and state legislatures crafted 
statutes addressed to courts, including the consumer protection laws on 
which the Concepcions relied, Title VII invoked by the Dukes plain-
tiffs, and the FAA defense advanced by AT&T.  Turner represents 
another signature development.  As women gained stature as equal 
persons, state and federal laws governing families burgeoned to deal 
with rights to divorce, child custody, and support.  Moreover, both 
state and federal statutes authorized governments, individuals, and 
groups to bring claims and created both procedures and incentives to 
do so, such as the treble damage provisions of the antitrust laws, the 
1966 class action rule, and the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“All courts shall be open; and every person for an injury done him or her 
in his or her reputation, person, movable or immovable possessions, shall have remedy by the due 
course of law, and justice administered according to the very right of the cause and the law of the 
land, without sale, denial, or unreasonable delay or expense.”); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“All 
courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his person, property or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or 
delay.”).  See also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; KY. CONST. § 14; LA. 
CONST. art. I, § 22; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 24; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; N.D. CONST. art. I, 
§ 9; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; PA. CONST. art. I, § 11; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20; TENN. CONST. 
art. I, § 17; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 8; Phil-
lips, supra note 43, at 1310 & n.6. 
 137 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
 138 In 1867, Congress gave federal courts authority to hear habeas corpus petitions from indi-
viduals held in state custody.  Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)).  In 1871, Congress authorized federal courts to hear cases alleging depri-
vations of civil rights.  Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).  In 1875, Congress gave the federal courts “general federal question juris-
diction” to hear claims (if the amount in controversy sufficed) alleging violations of rights arising 
under federal law.  Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 (2006)).  
 139 An Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870). 
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Awards Act.140  The market in lawyers responded, as the plaintiffs’ 
bar gained skills and resources.141 
Data on dockets capture some of the success of last century’s politi-
cal aspirations that government and private litigants turn to the feder-
al courts.142  In 1901, fewer than 30,000 cases were filed in the federal 
courts, and the majority were criminal cases.143  By 2001, more than 
317,000 cases were brought, with civil filings outstripping criminal fil-
ings four to one.144  In 1901, some 100 life-tenured judges staffed the 
federal judiciary.  A century later, Congress had authorized some 850 
judgeships assigned to more than 550 federal courthouses and aided by 
magistrate and bankruptcy judges, creatures of statute whose numbers 
were almost equal to the numbers of their Article III counterparts.145 
These statistics are but small indicators of the impact of the novel 
precept that all persons — regardless of their demographics — have 
become eligible to pursue rights.  According to the National Center for 
State Courts, some 50 million criminal and civil cases (traffic cases 
aside) are filed annually in state courts,146 which report acute problems 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 140 See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) 
(2006)); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1966); Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)). 
 141 See Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 205–17 
(2001). 
 142 See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, The Dynamic Quality of Law: The Role of Judicial Incen-
tives and Legal Human Capital in the Adaptation of Law, 79 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 80 (2011); 
Gillian K. Hadfield, The Levers of Legal Design: Institutional Determinants of the Quality of Law, 
36 J. COMP. ECON. 43 (2008). 
 143 The numbers are 16,734 criminal cases and 11,971 civil filings, extrapolated by subtracting 
the number of cases pending at the end of 1900 from the sum of the cases terminated in and pend-
ing at the end of 1901.  See 1 AM. LAW INST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 107 (1934) (data on criminal cases); 2 AM. LAW INST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 111 (1934) (civil cases). 
 144 Civil filings numbered 254,523; criminal filings numbered 63,473.  See ADMIN. OF-
FICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 6 (2001), avail-
able at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2001/ 
front/highlights.pdf.  In 2010, some 360,000 cases and more than 1.5 million bankruptcy peti-
tions were filed in the lower federal courts.  JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2010 YEAR-END REPORT 
ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/ 
2010year-endreport.pdf [hereinafter ROBERTS, 2010 FEDERAL JUDICIARY REPORT]. 
 145 The federal courts in 2010 had 179 authorized courts of appeals judgeships, 678 authorized dis-
trict court judgeships, 352 authorized bankruptcy judgeships, and 571 authorized magistrate judge-
ships.  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 39–41 (2011), available at http://www 
.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.  In 2001, the 
courts had 179 courts of appeals judgeships, 665 district court judgeships, 324 bankruptcy judge-
ships, and 533 magistrate judgeships.  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2002 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 34–35 
(2003), available at http://host4.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/front/jdbusiness.pdf.  
 146 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 20 (2010), available at http://www.ncsconline 
.org/D_Research/csp/2008_files/EWSC-2008-Online Version v2.pdf (noting that, in 2008, state 
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of financing (as Turner documents) for both litigants and the courts 
themselves.147  California runs more than 450 trial facilities,148 and its 
seven supreme court justices consider about 250 matters each week.149  
Massachusetts clocked some 42,000 people entering its courts each day 
in 2009, even as budgets necessitated staff cuts of about ten percent.150  
(By way of contrast, the United States Supreme Court received about 
8100 certiorari petitions, heard argument in 82 cases, and issued 73 
signed opinions in 2010.151) 
Indeed, literally keeping doors open is a problem for state courts.  
In 2009, New Hampshire, lacking funds, episodically suspended civil 
jury trials.152  Margaret Marshall, when Chief Justice of Massachu-
setts, warned that, like other important institutions, state courts were 
at risk and called for federal support.153  By July 2011, California 
budget cuts resulted in a proposed layoff of forty percent of staff and 
the closing of many courtrooms in San Francisco Superior Court; ac-
cording to the court’s presiding judge, the “civil justice system in San 
Francisco is collapsing.”154 
In contrast, AT&T’s “courts” are thriving, and its “judges” and em-
ployees reportedly better paid as part of an industry that the 1925 FAA 
helped to spark.155  Before sketching the contours of the private dispute 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
courts had 21.3 million criminal, 19.4 million civil, 5.7 million domestic relations, and 2.1 million 
juvenile incoming cases — totaling 48.5 million). 
 147 See Editorial, An Impending Crisis in State Court Funding, 92 JUDICATURE 52 (2008). 
 148 Ray McDevitt, Introduction to COURTHOUSES OF CALIFORNIA: AN ILLUSTRATED 
HISTORY, at xvii (Ray McDevitt ed., 2001). 
 149 Brief for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice and the California Academy of Appellate 
Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 8–9, Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 
(2011) (No. 09-587), 2010 WL 2826986. 
 150 Margaret H. Marshall, Testimony Before the Joint Comm. on Ways and Means 1–2 (Mar. 1, 
2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/fy2011-marshall-testimony.pdf.  That number did 
not include staff or jurors.  Id. at 2. 
 151 ROBERTS, 2010 FEDERAL JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 144, at 9–10 (noting that, of 
the 8159 certiorari petitions, 6576 were in forma pauperis). 
 152 James Podgers, Witnesses Describe State and Local Courts Reeling from Budget Cutbacks, 
ABA J., Mar. 1, 2011, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/beggaring_justice_witnesses_ 
describe_state_and_local_courts_reeling_aba/. 
 153 Margaret H. Marshall, Chief Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., At the Tipping 
Point: State Courts and the Balance of Power, Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, New York City Bar 
Ass’n 11–12 (Nov. 10, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/Cardozo_post_final.pdf). 
 154 Associated Press, California: Huge Cuts for Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2011, at A15 (quot-
ing Judge Katherine Feinstein). 
 155 Some arbitrators were reported to charge up to $10,000 per day.  See Eric Berkowitz, Is Jus-
tice Served?, L.A. TIMES, WEST MAGAZINE, Oct. 22, 2006, at 20, available at http://articles 
.latimes.com/2006/oct/22/magazine/tm-arbitrate43.  In 2008, the head of the AAA received com-
pensation of about $1.2 million.  GuideStar, Premium Report Generated for American Arbitration 
Association, Inc. 10 (July 12, 2011, 10:04 AM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  In 
that year, federal district judges were paid $169,300.  Judicial Salaries Since 1968, ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/ 
JudicialSalarieschart.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
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resolution market, a caveat is in order.  The constitutional obligations of 
“open courts” have produced a wealth of data on judges’ salaries, court 
budgets, case proceedings, and outcomes.  In contrast, private dispute 
resolvers are left to do as they wish, subject only in a few jurisdictions, 
such as California, to requirements that arbitration providers “collect, 
publish . . . , and make available to the public” information about par-
ties, categories of disputes, time to disposition, and outcomes.156  Aside 
from those data as well as several case studies, corporate disclosure 
statements, and thousands of anecdotes, the public face of private dis-
pute resolution largely depends on what providers decide to put forth.157 
Two institutions assert their dominance in a global market.  The non-
profit American Arbitration Association, founded within a year of the 
1925 FAA, calls itself “the world’s leading provider of conflict man-
agement and dispute resolution services.”158  Its roster of 8000 “neu-
trals” (an umbrella term) deals with 150,000 cases yearly,159 mostly 
from contracts naming it as the provider.160  A small fraction — 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
   The salary level has been a persistent source of concern.  Chief Justices have repeatedly 
called for judicial pay raises in their annual reports.  See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2000 
YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, available at http://www.supremecourt 
.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2000year-endreport.aspx; WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2002 YEAR-END 
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/ 
year-end/2002year-endreport.aspx; JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006year-
endreport.pdf. 
 156 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (2011).  After this 2002 enactment, the AAA complies 
by providing quarterly reports including nationwide data.  See also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW 
§ 14-3903 (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (2010); D.C. CODE § 16-4430 (2008). 
Providers do not, however, provide comprehensive data.  See CAL. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
INST., CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: A REVIEW OF WEB-
SITE DATA POSTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 1281.96 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 
(2004), available at http://www.mediate.com/cdri/cdri_print_Aug_6.pdf. 
 157 Other than as required by California’s statute and those of a few other jurisdictions, 
no government agency . . . collects statistics on the number of employees covered by em-
ployer-promulgated arbitration programs or the outcomes of arbitration cases filed un-
der these programs.  What research has been done is based on data made available to 
individual researchers by arbitration service providers, most notably the American Arbi-
tration Association (AAA) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). 
Alexander J.S. Colvin, Employment Arbitration: Empirical Findings and Research Needs, DISP. 
RESOL. J., Aug.–Oct. 2009, at 6–7.  Public records as well as contracts offered to purchasers have 
given researchers other windows into arbitration use.  See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. 
Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration 
Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008). 
 158 Press Release, Am. Arbitration Ass’n, American Arbitration Association Elects New Board 
of Directors (May 5, 2011), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=6533.  
 159 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, STATEMENT OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE AMERI-
CAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, AN ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATION (2007), available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22036. 
 160 Id. 
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1500 — are consumer arbitrations.161  The for-profit provider JAMS — 
letters that once stood for “Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services 
Inc.” — was founded in 1979 by a former state court judge.162  JAMS 
describes itself as the “largest private alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) provider,” dealing with about 10,000 cases a year and employ-
ing more than 270 full-time experts in “mediating and arbitrating 
complex, multi-party business/commercial cases.”163  
The work, both domestic and international, is framed by rules and 
manuals that set forth structures for proceedings in which the ideology 
of fairness is regularly invoked.164  For example, the AAA’s website of-
fers a “Consumer Due Process Protocol” that it signed (along with sev-
eral other organizations) in 1998; stated are principles about “a fun-
damentally-fair ADR process” and parameters, such as competent and 
independent “neutrals,” as well as the qualities of ADR, such as priva-
cy and confidentiality.165  In addition, repeat players have a measure of 
control by being able to custom-tailor rules to some extent.  
 The institutional participants in the dispute resolution market are 
(like some judiciaries) not free from controversy.  One service provider, 
the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), founded in 1986 and specializ-
ing in consumer debt, has become the focus of state and federal inves-
tigations.  Concerns about NAF’s impartiality emerged with reports 
that companies won virtually all the cases,166 and NAF then withdrew 
from that market.167 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 161 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIA-
TION’S CONSUMER ARBITRATION CASELOAD (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id 
=5027 [hereinafter AAA, ANALYSIS OF CASELOAD]. 
 162 STACY LEE BURNS, MAKING SETTLEMENT WORK 18 (2000).  
 163 About JAMS, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/aboutus_overview (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).  
 164 See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIA-
TION PROCEDURES (2010), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440. 
 165 See NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., CONSUMER DUE PROCESS 
PROTOCOL (1998), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 [hereinafter CONSUMER 
DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL]. 
 166 In 2008, San Francisco’s city attorney sued the NAF and accused it of running an “arbitra-
tion mill” favoring credit card companies; of 18,075 credit card cases heard over several years, 
consumers won thirty times.  Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Civil Penalties for Violations of 
Business and Professions Code Section 17200 at 2, 9, California v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., 
No. 08-473569 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2008), available at http://www.sfcityattorney.org/ 
Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=257.  See generally Arbitration or Arbitrary: The Mi-
suse of Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Consumer Debts, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Do-
mestic Policy of the H. Oversight & Gov’t Reform Comm., 111th Cong. (2009); PUB. CITIZEN, 
THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS 13–27 
(2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/arbitrationtrap.pdf. 
 167 See Legal Alert: NAF Announces That It Will No Longer Arbitrate Consumer Disputes, and 
AAA Comes Tumbling After, SUTHERLAND (July 27, 2009), http://www.sutherland.com/files/News/ 
354b68eb-9ece-41eb-8da2-42c50fd46e52/Presentation/NewsAttachment/316a4627-5b50-4dd3-a16f-
41cb2bb60fe3/NAFAnnouncesThat.pdf. 
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Who pays for private courts? As an amicus filing in support of 
AT&T noted, the process is “hardly cost-free for consumer businesses.”168  
Given the lack of public budgets, full accounts are not available, but 
some information on payment sources is.  T-Mobile reported it paid 
“all filing, administration and arbitrator fees for claims that total less 
than $75,000.”169  Further, while high-end users offer large sums to the 
private judges they select,170 the AAA permits consumers to pay no 
more than $125 in arbitrator fees for claims under $10,000 and, in Cal-
ifornia, provides fee waivers for consumers below the poverty line.171 
Data on usage rates are similarly incomplete.  Court records in the 
AT&T litigation include a report from the AAA that, from 2003 to 
2007, 170 consumers used its system to arbitrate against AT&T Mobility, 
AT&T Wireless, and Cingular Wireless.172  What number either in-
voked the pre-arbitration processes that AT&T offered or pursued the 
small-claims court option is not clear.  The trial court noted that 
AT&T had tallied 570 customers in arbitration but had “failed to iden-
tify the nature or amount of these claims” or whether any involved de-
ceptive advertising.173  The AAA’s searchable class arbitration docket 
listed 224 such proceedings against various companies in 2007.174 
Assessing whether a few hundred claims is a high, low, or reason-
able rate of use requires a baseline.  Socio-legal studies have identified 
relevant variables, including the number of people exposed to a poten-
tial harm, how individuals learn to “name, blame, and claim,”175 the 
availability of relief from alternative sources such as insurance, and 
the capacity of dispute resolution systems to handle claimants.176  For 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 168 Brief of CTIA — The Wireless Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 21, 
AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3183858 [hereinafter CTIA Amicus for AT&T].  
 169 Id. at 21 n.4. 
 170 See, e.g., Michael Hiltzik, Private Justice Can Be Yours If You’re Rich, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 
16, 2006, at C1; Aaron Glantz, Drastic Court Cuts Could Be a Boon to Private Judges, BAY CITI-
ZEN (July 21, 2011), http://www.baycitizen.org/courts/story/drastic-court-cuts-could-be-boon-private.   
 171 See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES SUPPLEMENTARY 
PROCEDURES C-8 (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014#C8. 
 172 See Brief of Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation Professors as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondents at 20, AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3934621 [hereinafter Civil 
Procedure Amici for Concepcion]. 
 173 Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *13 (S.D. 
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008).  
 174 See Searchable Class Arbitration Docket, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/sp 
.asp?id=25562 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 175 See generally William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980–
1981). 
 176 Decades ago, efforts were undertaken in England and the United States to identify forms of 
injury and sources of remedies.  See generally DONALD HARRIS, MAVIS MACLEAN, HAZEL 
GENN, SALLY LLOYD-BOSTOCK, PAUL FENN, PETER CORFIELD & YVONNE BRITTAN, 
COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY (1984); DEBORAH R. HENSLER, 
M. SUSAN MARQUIS, ALLAN F. ABRAHAMSE, SANDRA H. BERRY, PATRICIA A. EBENER, 
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example, one analysis from the 1980s concluded that of 100 injuries, 
about 10 resulted in pursuit of court remedies.177 
The Concepcions’ complaint alleged that more than 54 million 
people had cell phones,178 and the district court reported that AT&T 
paid $1.3 billion to settle billing problems in 2007 by giving “manual 
credits to resolve customer concerns and complaints.”179  Did the dol-
lars paid capture the success of informal resolutions provided through 
AT&T’s responsiveness or the tip of a volume of consumer claims nev-
er pursued?  Does the demand on courts (in 2008, more than 25 million 
civil cases were filed — about 0.08 per capita given a population of 
about 300 million) predict rights-claiming in other venues?  And what 
role do the rules of private arbitration play in prompting or deflecting 
claims?  Unlike courts, third parties can neither attend nor inspect 
records (if made) of proceedings, opinions are not published, and par-
ties may be subject to admonitions of confidentiality.180 
In terms of the ease of using the procedures, the trial court in AT&T 
had found the waiver provisions unenforceable under California law, 
even as the judge noted that the arbitration process was “quick [and] 
easy to use,”181 because class arbitration “could take months, if not 
years, and . . . may merely yield an opportunity to submit a claim for 
recovery of a small percentage of a few dollars.”182  Yet few consumers 
invoked the process. 
Return then to Turner’s plea for counsel and consider its parallels 
in thinking about the Concepcion and Dukes plaintiffs’ interest in us-
ing group-based procedures.  The economic stakes in all three individ-
uals’ cases were too small to attract privately paid lawyers.  Indeed, as 
Justice Breyer’s dissent noted in AT&T, the stakes were so small that 
the Concepcions were unlikely to spend their own time “for the has-
sle.”183  Further, few would pay the $125-capped AAA filing fee for a 
$30 claim.  Moreover, given the costs of investigation and of counter-
ing legal arguments, and the resources of their opponents, even if 
Dukes and the Concepcions were wealthy or had high-value claims, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ELIZABETH G. LEWIS, E. ALLAN LIND, ROBERT J. MACCOUN, WILLARD G. MANNING, 
JEANNETTE A. ROGOWSKI & MARY E. VAIANA, COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJU-
RIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1991). 
 177 See David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel B. 
Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 86 (1983).  
 178 Concepcion Complaint, supra note 75, at para. 5. 
 179 Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 
Aug. 11, 2008). 
 180 See CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 165, at princ. 12. 
 181 Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *11. 
 182 Id. at *12.  See also AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 183 AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1760 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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lawyers would have little reason to sign on unless other disputants 
were added to build the potential for a larger recovery.184 
In short, nineteenth- and twentieth-century political will — embod-
ied in state and federal constitutions, legislation, and common law — 
opened courthouse doors for diverse kinds of litigants, but that will did 
not extend to devising systematic methods of financing access to litiga-
tion.185  The ability to use courts turns in large measure on the private 
bar, a smattering of public legal aid programs, third-party insurance 
companies, and chronically underfunded agencies.  The EEOC, con-
structed to serve as both an ADR provider and a gateway to court, is 
the example relevant here.  In 2010, the EEOC received 99,222 re-
quests for assistance186 and filed 250 federal lawsuits.187  Thus, the 
questions for the twenty-first century, illuminated by AT&T, Wal-Mart, 
and Turner, are whether and how to enable the use of courts and to 
provide resources for them to handle the resulting volume — or, as 
was argued in these cases, whether leaving people to their own devices 
to find their way into court or leaving courts behind is the wiser 
course. 
II.  MAKING MEANING OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT:  
FROM WILKO V. SWAN TO AT&T V. CONCEPCION 
[I]n a consumer contract of adhesion [when] . . . disputes . . . involve small 
amounts of damages . . . the waiver [of a class action] becomes in practice 
the exemption of the party “from responsibility for [its] own fraud.” 
— Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005)188 
AT&T holds that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law 
and that AT&T’s boilerplate bundle, permitting no opt-outs from its 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 184 See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We Paid For, 
and Not Liking What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943 
(2004).  As Yeazell and others have analyzed, the system is focused on settlement.  See Marc Ga-
lanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State 
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 483 (2004); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, 
Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 319, 320 (1991); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the 
Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 926 (2000). 
 185 Tracking public and private investments in justice systems is difficult.  Exemplary efforts 
include Hadfield, Higher Demand, supra note 39, and EUROPEAN COMM’N FOR THE EFFI-
CIENCY OF JUSTICE, EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS: EFFICIENCY AND QUALITY OF JUS-
TICE (2010). 
 186 Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2010, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/ 
enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).  The budget for 2010 was about $370 million.  
EEOC Budget and Staffing History 1980 to Present, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/ 
budgetandstaffing.cfm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 187 EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2010, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 188 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668). 
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individualized mandatory dispute resolution program, is enforce-
able.189  To reach this conclusion, the Court interpreted the 1925 FAA 
as requiring bilateral arbitrations in the absence of bilateral negotiations.190 
Text alone could not produce that result.  Required are the forms of 
fairness analyses outlined above, comparing the quality of procedures 
in arbitration and in courts, evaluating the relevance of asymmetrical 
resources when forming contracts or classes and of the likelihood of in-
tra-litigant equal treatment, and assessing the importance of publicity 
to facilitate access and discipline decisionmaking.  To understand the 
interpretative choices made, a history of prior FAA rulings is required, 
for as Justice O’Connor explained in 1984, the Court has been “build-
ing . . . , case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”191 
 Through its doctrine, the Court has moved the FAA from a limited 
role to a major source of regulation of both state and federal judges 
and, to a lesser degree, of arbitrators.  The Court has taken this early-
twentieth-century provision, modeled for negotiated contracts, and ap-
plied it to the anonymous transactions recorded in boilerplate clauses.  
In addition to preempting state constitutional remedy provisions, state 
legislation on employee and consumer protection, the state common 
law of contracts, and state debates about the relationship between 
rights to court and ADR, the long arm of the FAA overrides many 
other federal statutory schemes that assign roles for rights enforcement 
to courts.  If we inhabit a “Republic of Statutes,”192 the Court’s pur-
poseful interpretation of the FAA has turned it into a new pillar.  The 
building blocks are outlined below. 
A.  Scoping Out the 1925 FAA’s Reach 
As is familiar, voluntary arbitration has a long history, in and out-
side the United States.193  But during the nineteenth century, courts 
protected their own jurisdiction by concluding that public policy did 
not permit the enforcement of an ex ante arbitration agreement over 
the objection of one side.  Despite the then-reigning ideology of free-
dom of contract, courts “jealously” guarded their monopoly on judg-
ment.194  The FAA aimed to revise that attitude through its injunction 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 189 See AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 190 See id. at 1750–51. 
 191 Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 192 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STAT-
UTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010).  
 193 See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION — NA-
TIONALIZATION — INTERNATIONALIZATION 15–100 (1992); Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding 
Against Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a European Transplant and the Rise of 
a Distinctively American Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
423 (2009).  
 194 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924). 
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that an arbitration provision “written . . . in any maritime transaction 
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” was “val-
id, irrevocable, and enforceable”195 — subject to “such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,”196 and exclud-
ing “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any 
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”197 
As is also familiar, the 1925 statute preceded the contemporary un-
derstanding of the reach of the Commerce Clause — raising questions 
about to which contracts and transactions, and in what jurisdictions, 
the FAA applied.  In the decisions debating the FAA’s meaning, ques-
tions about its intended scope interacted with the Justices’ views of the 
relevance of differently resourced parties entering into contracts and 
about the utility of the arbitral form. 
In 1953, the FAA’s applicability to one set of consumer contracts 
was decided in Wilko v. Swan.198  A customer sued a brokerage firm 
for allegedly violating 1933 federal securities laws by making false rep-
resentations about a merger.199  The question was the enforceability of 
an agreement that suits would be stayed, at the behest of either party, 
in favor of arbitration.200  Writing for the Court, Justice Reed con-
cluded that even if some buyers and sellers dealt at “arm’s length on 
equal terms,” the federal securities laws were “drafted with an eye to 
the disadvantages under which buyers labor” and therefore precluded 
application of the FAA.201 
When rejecting the adjudication waiver, the Court discussed the 
differences between courts and arbitration.202  As Justice Scalia would 
later note in AT&T, arbitration was informal and unreviewable, mak-
ing it ill suited for a class.203  In 1953, those qualities were also unac-
ceptable for a “bilateral arbitration” (as the AT&T Court named it)204 
when a party objected.  As the Wilko Court described the problems, 
arbitrators’ awards “may be made without explanation of [arbitrators’] 
reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings”; hence, one 
could not examine “arbitrators’ conception of the legal meaning of such 
statutory requirements as ‘burden of proof,’ ‘reasonable care’ or ‘materi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 195 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 196 Id.  Congress took as its model a New York law of 1920.  See MACNEIL, supra note 193, at 68. 
 197 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 198 346 U.S. 427 (1953).  
 199 Id. at 428–29. 
 200 Id. at 430. 
 201 Id. at 435. 
 202 Id. at 433–38.  The holding was premised on the interpretation that the arbitration consti-
tuted a “condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive 
compliance” with the 1933 Act, which Congress had prevented parties from doing.  Id. at 430 & 
n.6 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77n). 
 203 AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1751–52.  
 204 Id. at 1745. 
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al fact.’”205  In contrast, adjudication performed its regulatory role in 
monitoring adherence to congressional mandates protecting purchasers 
of stock.206  Those views shaped three decades of decisions.  Between 
1953 and 1983, the Court heard fifteen cases in which arbitration was 
at issue,207 and in the four in which an individual (as contrasted with a 
corporation) objected, the Court declined to require arbitration.208 
But thereafter, the Court revisited the FAA and, between 1985 and 
1989, overruled Wilko.209  Specifically rejecting the 1953 Court’s con-
cerns that arbitration was a “method of weakening the protections af-
forded in the substantive law to would-be complainants,”210 new ma-
jorities reread both the FAA and other statutes to require or permit 
arbitration for various legal claims and between parties of different 
bargaining capacities.211  The Court, as a matter of either statutory in-
terpretation or common law elaborations of textual lacunae,212 re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 205 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436; see also Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 211, 223 (1995). 
 206 Justice Jackson concurred.  Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438–39 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Justice 
Frankfurter in dissent, joined by Justice Minton, argued that no evidence had been presented that 
“the arbitral system as practiced in the City of New York . . . would not afford the [purchaser] the 
rights to which he [was] entitled,” as contrasted with the “tortuous course of litigation, especially 
in the City of New York.”  Id. at 439–40 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  Another critique of arbitra-
tion followed in 1956.  See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (“Arbitrators do 
not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give their reasons for their 
results; the record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial re-
view of an award is more limited . . . .”). 
 207 Wilko, 346 U.S. 427; Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955), overruled by 
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988); Bernhardt, 350 U.S. 
198; Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. 
United Textile Workers, A.F.L. Local 1802, 353 U.S. 550 (1957); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United 
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 353 U.S. 547 (1957); Moseley v. Elec. & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 
U.S. 167 (1963); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 
(1967); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968); U.S. Bulk Carri-
ers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351 (1971); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 
414 U.S. 117 (1973); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Gen. Atomic Co. v. Fel-
ter, 436 U.S. 493 (1978); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981); Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 208 See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438; Moseley, 374 U.S. at 169; U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc., 400 U.S. at 
357; Merrill Lynch, 414 U.S. at 138–39. 
 209 Wilko was directly overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 
490 U.S. 477 (1989), which built on Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614 (1985), and Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).  See Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp., 473 U.S. at 640 (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate antitrust claims); Dean Witter 
Reynolds Inc., 470 U.S. at 218 (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate claims brought under the Se-
curities Exchange Act related to an investment account); see also Shearson/American Express, 
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987) (holding that claims under the Securities Ex-
change Act and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act were arbitrable). 
 210 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481. 
 211 See, e.g., id. at 485–86. 
 212 See D’Antuono v. Serv. Rd. Corp., No. 3:11CV33 (MRK), 2011 WL 2175932, at *21–31 (D. 
Conn. May 25, 2011) (reading Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), and 
 
078-170 RESNIK.DOC 10/02/11 – 5:46 PM 
116 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:78 
quired enforcement unless objectors could meet their burden of dem-
onstrating that Congress had directed otherwise in another statute,213 
that an “inherent conflict” existed between the other statutory right 
and arbitration,214 or that the alternative dispute program was inade-
quate to “vindicate” statutory rights.215 
In 1984, the Supreme Court applied the FAA to state courts.  Chief 
Justice Burger (himself an ardent proponent of ADR)216 wrote in 
Southland Corp. v. Keating that the FAA preempted California’s 
Franchise Investment Law,217 which required “judicial consideration 
of claims brought under” it.218  That decision met with objections by 
Justice Stevens that Congress had not “intended entirely to displace 
state authority”219 and with sharper disagreement from Justice 
O’Connor and then-Justice Rehnquist.  Given the statute’s specific 
reference to “the courts of the United States” in other provisions, Jus-
tices O’Connor and Rehnquist read the “facial silence” of the general 
mandate to arbitrate as a direction that the FAA applied only to the 
federal judiciary.220  A decade thereafter, Justice Scalia agreed, stating 
he stood “ready to join four other Justices in overruling” Southland.221  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Second Circuit law as developing a common law evaluating whether arbitration expenses under-
cut its effectiveness as a method of vindicating federal statutory rights). 
 213 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
 214 Id.  The question of whether the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2006), 
is one such statute is before the Court in the 2011 Term in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 615 
F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 2874 (2011). 
 215 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala., 531 U.S. at 90 (quoting Gilmer, 500 
U.S. at 28). 
 216 See Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers 
and the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575, 1603–04 (2006).  
 217 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31,000–31,516 (West 1977). 
 218 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).  The Chief Justice’s position was in tension with his general prefer-
ence for state adjudication.  The decision is a relatively early example of preemption as a major 
route for federalization.  See generally Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law 
in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (2011). 
 219 Southland, 465 U.S. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice 
Stevens argued that interpretation of § 2 was federal contract common law and that California 
law could be applied without “impairing the basic purposes of the federal statute.”  Id. at 21. 
 220 Id. at 22–23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor faulted the Court’s application of 
the FAA as creating a “newly discovered federal right.”  Id. at 35.  In addition, the “unambiguous” 
legislative history supported this textual interpretation because Congress had relied on its power 
“to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts” to create a new procedural remedy rather than a 
new federal substantive right enforceable in state courts.  Id. at 25.  “Today’s decision is unfaith-
ful to congressional intent, unnecessary, and . . . inexplicable.”  Id. at 36; see also Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (acquiescing in not 
overturning Southland but arguing it created a “faulty foundation”). 
 221 Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 285 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Thomas has likewise recorded his view that the FAA should 
not be applied to state courts.222 
Yet as the details of the AT&T opinion illuminate, the Court be-
came committed to arbitration as a process in addition to being a fed-
erally enforceable contractual clause.  In 1985, the Court had rejected 
“the suggestion that the overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was to 
promote the expeditious resolution of claims.”223  But, by 2011, the 
Court read “bilateral” arbitration’s perceived advantages over adjudi-
cation to have been a part of the 1925 statute’s agenda.  Arbitration’s 
attributed utilities — speed, low cost, and informality — became more 
important as the Court lost interest in power imbalances and in the 
idea that enforcement required negotiation and actual consent.  In the 
1960s, the Court referenced the “amicable and trusting atmosphere” 
and “frankness” of a mutually selected arbitral forum,224 but its subse-
quent application of the FAA to consumers and employees deempha-
sized mutuality and choice and discounted asymmetrical resources. 
That movement is mapped over decisions of the last two decades.  
In 1991, the Court enforced arbitration obligations over the objections 
of a financial services manager bringing a claim under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act.225  “Mere inequality in bargaining 
power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements 
are never enforceable in the employment context.”226  But that em-
ployee had the protection of New York Stock Exchange arbitration 
procedures approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission.227  
Thus, some argued that the FAA should be read to exempt employees 
in general, given that the text specifically excludes the only workers 
(those “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”)228 whom Congress 
had the clear authority to regulate in 1925.  Although four Justices 
were persuaded that the statute was best read not to apply to em-
ployees, in 2001, a five-person majority held otherwise,229 and the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 222 Id. at 285 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 
U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 460 
(2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 223 Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985). 
 224 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (White, J., concurring). 
 225 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).  
 226 Id. at 33. 
 227 See id. at 31 (citing Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock Ex-
change Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 21,144 (May 16, 1989)).  
 228 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 229 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).  The Court’s 5–4 Circuit City split 
debated which canons of construction governed and the question of inter-disputant inequality.  
Justice Stevens’s dissent argued that, while it was not “necessarily wrong for the Court to put its 
own imprint on a statute,” the legislative history made plain that the “potential disparity in bar-
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Court has enforced arbitration clauses even when they appeared on 
job applications and when employees alleged violations of state anti-
discrimination laws.230 
Thereafter, the Court continued enlarging the FAA’s scope when ad-
dressing the quality of consent,231 the impact of the costs of arbitration,232 
and the allocation of authority between arbitrator and judge about con-
tract interpretation.233  The many decisions, often 5–4, regularly relied on  
the Court’s own assessment of arbitration as preferable to adjudica-
tion.  As the AT&T majority explained, enforcement of “privately 
made agreements to arbitrate”234 was only one purpose of the FAA; the 
other was to eliminate “costliness and delays of litigation”235 by pro-
moting arbitration — a conclusion predicated on “our cases.”236 
B.  The Fairness of Bilateralism, Boilerplate, and Class Arbitrations 
Figure 1 is a photocopy of my own cell phone contract, which I 
published in a law review in 2006 to illustrate that essay’s title, Whith-
er and Whether Adjudication?237  Upon receiving this unilateral 
amendment to my prior service contract, I was unsuccessful in a tele-
phone effort to negate it. 
Whatever the fairness of either the underlying clause or the method 
of its amendment, the refusal to vary the terms for any one individual 
could well be described as “fair” in that, were I able to renegotiate, I 
would have used my superior legal knowledge and resources to strike a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
gaining power” between “large employers” and their employees “underlay Congress’ exemption of 
contracts of employment from mandatory arbitration.”  Id. at 132–33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 230 See, e.g., id. at 109 (majority opinion); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Waffle House, 
Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). 
 231 For example, in 2009, the Court concluded (5–4) that because of a union collective bargain-
ing arbitration agreement, individual employees had lost rights to have courts decide their age 
discrimination claims.  See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1464–65 (2009). 
 232 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000). 
 233 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446 (2006), rev’g Cardegna v. 
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 862–64 (Fla. 2005).  Further, even when state law 
would send an issue to an administrative forum, federal law requires arbitration.  See Preston v. 
Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 984–87 (2008).  In 2010, the Court held (again 5–4) that a challenge to the 
enforceability of an entire agreement (which the Ninth Circuit had held unconscionable because 
of a lack of meaningful consent) was for the arbitrator to decide.  See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. 
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010).  However, in Granite Rock Co. v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010), the Court held that the district court, and not the arbi-
trator, was to decide whether a collective bargaining agreement with a no-strike provision had 
been “validly formed during the strike period.”  Id. at 2853. 
 234 AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 
(1985)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 235 Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 220 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 
(1924))) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 236 Id. 
 237 See Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1134–35 
(2006); see also RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 37, at 319 fig.201. 
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deal that other cell phone customers could not.238  Such provisions, 
central to “standard-form, nonnegotiated contracts,”239 are justified not 
only by installing identical treatment across a class of one-shot play-
ers240 but also by providing economies of scale through controlling sel-
lers’ agents241 and thereby stabilizing and lowering the costs of trans-
actions across diverse participants.242  Boilerplate can also be recycled.  
The increasingly ubiquitous court/class waiver provisions at issue in 
AT&T can, like prefabricated housing modules, move from context to 
context.243  Lawyers are a major source of their manufacture,244 and 
digital technology magnifies the potential for both replication and 
modification.245 
The net effects of reliance on boilerplate clauses of various kinds 
are contested.  Some commentators praise the overall managerial effi-
ciency in promoting stability and agency control and argue that pur-
veyors’ reputational interests will result in relaxed enforcement (and, 
hence, some individualization) when appropriate.246  Critics, pointing 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 238 In some contexts, differential dealing can prompt legal challenges.  The alleged illegality of 
special prices for preferred customers is at the heart of the complaint against the securities trading 
firms that produced the Supreme Court’s famous class action ruling in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-
lin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).  Eisen’s interpretation of Rule 23, that plaintiffs bear the cost of indivi-
dualized notice for classes certified under 23(b)(3), see id. at 177–79, was one of the reasons that 
plaintiffs such as the Dukes class would hope to gain the status of a (b)(2) class.  See infra notes 
383–386 and accompanying text. 
 239 Omri Ben-Shahar, Preface; or, A Boilerplate Introduction, in BOILERPLATE, supra note 1, 
at ix [hereinafter Ben-Shahar, Preface]. 
 240 Boilerplate can also enable some consumers to differentiate themselves.  See David Gilo & 
Ariel Porat, The Unconventional Uses of Transaction Costs, in BOILERPLATE, supra note 1, at 66, 
69 (explaining how terms such as best-price guarantees and rebates enable price discrimination if 
acted upon by energetic consumers obtaining differential benefits). 
 241 See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1173, 1222–23 (1983). 
 242 Id. at 1221.  In this classic article, Todd Rakoff argued for the presumptive unenforceability 
by judges of what he termed “invisible” adhesive clauses that were not the product of actual bar-
gaining or of shopping.  Id. at 1250–55; see also Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 
supra note 1, at 200–02.  
 243 See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, in BOI-
LERPLATE, supra note 1, at 163, 164, 171.  For example, one review of 161 businesses in home 
repair, hospitals, airlines, and grocery stories found that 35% included arbitration clauses in their 
consumer contracts.  See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate 
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter–Spring 2004, at 55, 62–63, 67–70. 
 244 See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, in 
BOILERPLATE, supra note 1, at 176, 176–77 (tracing the development and the “common law of 
common boilerplate”). 
 245 See Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of 
Consent, in BOILERPLATE, supra note 1, at 189, 190–92. 
 246 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive 
Consumer Markets, in BOILERPLATE, supra note 1, at 3, 3–11.  They posited a “large number of 
cases in which sellers dependably treat consumers much better than their contracts require them 
to do.”  Id. at 9.  Their examples focused on publication, hotel, and airline contracts, id. at 10, and 
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Fig. 1. Cellular phone contract 
to resource asymmetries, worry that boilerplate could enable “informal 
implementation of apparent rules as standards [to] exacerbate wealth 
disparities.”247 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
their analysis was “limited to . . . repetitive selling . . . under conditions of good consumer infor-
mation about sellers,” id. at 11.  Rakoff criticized that essay for lacking a model of reputation or 
of the transaction costs of sorting the merits of consumers’ claims.  Rakoff, The Law and Sociolo-
gy of Boilerplate, supra note 1, at 200, 201.  Others argued the validity of arbitration clauses based 
on the “manifested intention to be legally bound.”  Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Con-
tracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 627, 639 (2002); see also Stephen Ware, The Case for Enforcing 
Adhesive Arbitration Agreements — With Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitra-
tion Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 264–69 (2006). 
 247 See Radin, supra note 245, at 193.  Radin also noted the potential efficiency trade-offs.  Id. 
at 192–94.  Additional criticism comes from PUB. CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW 
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The poor visual quality of the cell phone contract reproduced in 
figure 1 makes another point.  Just as readers of these pages are un-
likely to delve into its provisions, those who find these clauses in pack-
aging (or on job applications) are similarly unlikely to read the 
terms.248  The unreadability embodies their “unreadness,” which is of 
course also economical.  Reading is a waste of time because the provi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/ 
documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf. 
 248 One review found that 31% of arbitration clauses did not explain who would conduct the 
arbitration, 73% did not detail how the arbitrator would be selected, and 42% gave no informa-
tion regarding the division of costs and fees.  See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 243, at 67–70. 
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sion is a “take it or leave it” clause, avoided only by not buying that 
phone service. 
In this instance, the options are narrower.  Consumers either accept 
similar terms or do not have cell phones.  According to AT&T’s amicus 
CTIA — The Wireless Association, “[m]ost of the 240 million mobile 
telephone subscribers in the United States have service agreements 
that expressly provide for arbitration and specify that the arbitration 
must proceed on an individual basis.”249  That neither shopping nor 
bargaining is available is underscored by the odd symmetry that my 
cell phone provision proffers.  Both the provider and I agree to waive 
our rights to proceed in a class, as if providers relied on class actions to 
pursue claims against customers.  This facet exemplifies Omri Ben-
Shahar’s point that boilerplate terms can “appear objective, but they 
are often one-sided . . . .  Disguised by ‘legalese,’ they are often unba-
lanced, favoring their drafter.”250  In short, enforcing boilerplate class 
waivers raises problems of equipage, equality, and fairness, as do deci-
sions about when to permit class actions and to provide rights to counsel. 
The gravamen of the Concepcions’ complaint was that AT&T had 
violated state deceptive advertising laws by charging sales tax on 
phones’ retail prices while describing them as “free.”  But reaching 
that issue turned on the legality of another AT&T provision — that a 
consumer pursue arbitration only as an “individual,” rather than “as a 
plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative pro-
ceeding,”251 and that “the arbitrator may not consolidate more than 
one person’s claims, and may not otherwise preside over any form of a 
representative or class proceeding.”252  Before I turn to the Court’s de-
cision, the idea of a “class arbitration” needs explication. 
That procedural form is a by-product of the interaction between 
arbitration policies and courts.  In the early 1980s, California was one 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 249 CTIA Amicus for AT&T, supra note 168, at 2.  As of July 2011, T-Mobile distinguished itself 
by permitting an opt-out of that provision within thirty days if the customer did so in writing or 
via a phone call — rewarding customers who read and then act.  See Service Agreement, T-
MOBILE (2009), available at http://www.t-mobile.com/company/pdf/english/Manual Service 
Agreement.pdf; T-Mobile Terms & Conditions, T-MOBILE, http://www.t-mobile.com/Templates/ 
Popup.aspx?PAsset=Ftr_Ftr_TermsAndConditions (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 250 Ben-Shahar, Preface, supra note 239, at ix, x.  As he explained, boilerplate is “a legal phe-
nomenon different from contract” that is often deployed in contracts.  Id. at xiv; see also Douglas 
G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, in BOILERPLATE, supra note 1, at 131, 133–34.  Baird, general-
ly critical of case law invalidating some boilerplate clauses, argued that adhesion clauses them-
selves were not problematic but their content could be.  See id. at 142.  His examples included the 
Writers Guild of America, West’s arbitration provision, in which the “arbiters themselves do not 
meet” or “even know each other’s names,” and thus “undercut[] process rights that the law regards 
as particularly important.”  Id. at 141. 
 251 AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 61a, AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 
1740 (No. 09-893)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 252 Id. at 1744 n.2 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, AT&T, supra note 251, at 61a) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
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of the pioneers of class arbitrations, designed to meld pro-arbitration 
policies with classwide claims of injury.253  An oft-cited example was a 
challenge by some 800 franchisees to their franchisor’s accounting 
practices.254  Rather than having claimants proceed single file, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court concluded that a class arbitration could “offer a 
better, more efficient, and fairer solution.”255 
But because absentees may not know they are part of a group 
committed to a private arbitrator rendering unreviewable decisions, 
that court outlined what some call a “hybrid class”: arbitrators resolve 
the merits and judges deal with issues of certification, notice to absen-
tees, and distributions of damages256 so as to safeguard absentees’ 
rights.257  Thereafter, a trickle of law responded,258 as some state and 
federal courts held they lacked power to authorize class arbitrations,259 
and others found them permissible if judges supervised arbitrators 
through the kinds of procedures California had sketched.260 
Assuming arbitration’s economies, one could find class arbitration 
attractive not only because of its potential to deal equally with similar-
ly situated disputants but also because it might respond to another fa-
cet of fairness: asymmetries between disputants.  If one models arbitra-
tion as a substitute for adjudication as well as a means of filling 
contract gaps in instances when contracts are negotiated expressions of 
the parties’ intentions,261 class arbitrations may do that work more 
successfully than individual arbitrations and provide outcomes that 
supply missing terms.  Moreover, the hybrid method serves to force in-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 253 An earlier example is Coleman v. National Movie-Dine, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 
1978), which found arbitrable a class action because, if not, “adding persons to a civil action . . . would 
thwart the federal policy in favor of arbitration.”  Id. at 948; see also 1977 Mass. Acts 518 (codi-
fied at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 2A) (recognizing consolidation in arbitration). Further, 
as the Court noted in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the New York 
Stock Exchange rules provided for “collective proceedings” in arbitration.  Id. at 32. 
 254 See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1208–10 (Cal. 1982).  The decision was over-
turned in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).  See supra notes 216–222 and accompa-
nying text; see also Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); 
Carole J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitral Paradigm of Classwide Arbitration: Arbitral Power 
and Federal Preemption, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 301 (2004). 
 255 Keating, 645 P.2d at 1192; see also Lewis v. Prudential Bache Sec., 225 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 322 & n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986) (holding that courts may reserve “due process review”). 
 256 See Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1166–67 (Cal. 2003). 
 257 See Lewis, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 75. 
 258 See generally 2 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FED-
ERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 18.9 (1999) (“Classwide Arbitrations”).  
 259 See, e.g., Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 1995); Dominium Austin 
Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 728–29 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 260 See Buckner, supra note 254, at 322. 
 261 See Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudica-
tion and Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 486–88 (2010). 
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formation about the process into the public realm, producing some of 
the publicity that accompanies adjudication. 
In 2003, the Supreme Court appeared to lend support to the con-
cept of class arbitrations when, in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Baz-
zle, it held that the question of whether a contract precluded class arbi-
tration was to be determined initially by an arbitrator rather than a 
judge.262  The marketplace responded, as the AAA and JAMS fa-
shioned rules along the lines of Rule 23 for class arbitrations.263  By 
2009, as AT&T recounted, the AAA’s searchable class arbitration 
docket listed 283 class arbitrations, of which 121 were active and 162 
were “settled, withdrawn, or dismissed” without merits rulings.264  By 
2011, the number tallied on the AAA docket had grown to 307.265  
That database may not account for all such proceedings, for it depends 
on arbitrators to forward information.266  But the AAA docket does 
make public a roster of cases, complaints, and in some instances, mate-
rials noting settlements or decisions.267  Court-based class actions, 
however, cannot be dismissed or compromised without judicial ap-
proval and appellate rights and, hence, produce public records of the 
alleged merits of claims, parties’ accommodations, and judicial rul-
ings.268  In contrast, a full account of process and outcomes for class 
arbitrations remains elusive. 
Further, as my cell phone provision and the debate in AT&T illus-
trate, many businesses wrote clauses imposing “the express condition 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 262 539 U.S. 444, 452–54 (2003) (plurality opinion).  Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Scalia, 
Souter, and Ginsburg, with Justice Stevens concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part.  
Some also read the Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 
1758 (2010), that arbitrators could not permit a class arbitration if a contract did not expressly 
authorize it, as further evidence that class arbitrations were viable.  Id. at 1775–76. 
 263 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 
(2007), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936; JAMS, CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES 
(2009), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Class_ 
Action_Procedures-2009.pdf.  The AAA included provisions for hybrids, as well.  Buckner, supra 
note 254, at 333–34.  For a brief time, JAMS took the position that it would not enforce waivers of 
class rights but then retreated.  See Press Release, JAMS, JAMS Takes Steps to Ensure Fairness 
in Consumer Arbitrations (Nov. 12, 2004) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); Press 
Release, JAMS, JAMS Reaffirms Commitment to Neutrality Through Withdrawal of Class Ac-
tion Arbitration Waiver Policy (Mar. 10, 2005) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (ex-
plaining that, as a neutral, it would take no position on class action waivers); Buckner, supra note 
254, at 303 n.20. 
 264 AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (citing Brief of American Arbitration Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Neither Party at 22–24, Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (No. 08-1198), 2009 WL 
2896309). 
 265 See Searchable Class Arbitration Docket, supra note 174. 
 266 See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CCP SECTION 1281.96 DATA COLLECTION REQUIRE-
MENTS (2011), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=6488. 
 267 Searchable Class Action Docket, supra note 174; see, e.g., Brown v. Cellco P’ship, AM. AR-
BITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29384 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).  
 268 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
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that arbitration be individualized.”269  In the Court’s ruling, all Justic-
es agreed that enforcement turned on what meaning to give to the 
FAA direction that arbitration contracts were “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable,” subject to “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.”270  All also agreed that California con-
tract law governed, unless preempted. 
The relevant state decision, Discover Bank v. Superior Court, in-
terpreting a California statute, turned on asymmetries of bargaining 
power.271  California refused to enforce class waivers if (a) they were in 
a “consumer contract of adhesion,” (b) predictably small damage dis-
putes could arise between the parties, and (c) the “party with the supe-
rior bargaining power” was alleged to have “carried out a scheme to 
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually 
small sums of money.”272  When those criteria were met, enforcing 
class waivers would effectively permit the proffering party to exempt 
itself from responsibility for the allegedly willful injury inflicted.273 
While California law had judged the AT&T clause to be unfair, 
AT&T’s lawyer specifically told the Supreme Court that it was “fair” 
to apply the terms, and the reasons were twofold, engaging the ideas of 
intentionality and discrimination.  First, the Concepcions had signed a 
contract, and holding persons to their promises was “fair.”  Second, 
California law itself was unfair, for it discriminated against the feder-
ally protected right to insist, once contracts were signed, on arbitration 
as the forum for dispute resolution.274 
The majority adopted those terms in framing its holding; given that 
arbitration, “a matter of contract,”275 had been placed on “an equal 
footing with other contracts”276 by the FAA, the issue was whether the 
California rule was hostile to the “overarching purpose”277 of ensuring 
“the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so 
as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”278  Built into that description 
was the outcome.  The California prohibition on waivers of class arbi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 269 CTIA Amicus for AT&T, supra note 168, at 18; see also Edward Wood Dunham, Operations 
Manual: The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE L.J. 141, 141 (1997). 
 270 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 271 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005). 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id.  The court relied on a statutory prohibition on exempting oneself from responsibility for 
one’s own fraud or for willful injury.  Id.; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (2011). 
 274 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12:7–10, 21:13–22, AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893) (ar-
gument by AT&T’s attorney Andrew Pincus), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_ 
arguments/argument_transcripts/09-893.pdf. 
 275 AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (quoting Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 
(2010)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. at 1748. 
 278 Id.  
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tration “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress” and was thus 
preempted.279 
Disagreeing with the characterizations of both the California rule 
and the FAA, Justice Breyer’s dissent (joined by Justices Ginsburg, So-
tomayor, and Kagan) objected to the lack of “honor” paid to “federalist 
principles.”280  For the dissenters, California’s Discover Bank holding 
applied “equally” to class waivers in and out of court; the FAA’s pur-
pose was to create “no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an 
agreement in commercial contracts and in admiralty contracts.”281  
Thus, “[l]inguistically speaking,” California’s rule fit “directly within 
the scope” of the Act’s recognition of state law’s governance of con-
tract revocation.282 
The divide also turned on disagreements about whether the FAA 
provided substantive directions on the virtues or vices of individual 
versus class arbitrations and, hence, the discussion sounded in due 
process–like assessments of the quality of decisionmaking and the im-
pact of procedural rights on the power relationships of adversaries.  
The majority described “bilateral” arbitration as embodying “the prin-
cipal advantage of arbitration — its informality.”283  (That informality, 
with its potential for lawlessness, was what, in 1953, made arbitration 
unenforceable in Wilko.)  Further, the AT&T majority characterized 
bilateral arbitrations as speedy and relatively low cost, whereas class 
arbitrations were slow.284  
How did the Court know about the trade-offs?  California was a 
source, for, as noted, the state requires arbitration organizations to re-
port some data.285  The majority thus turned to an AAA report that 
“the average consumer arbitration between January and August 2007 
resulted in a disposition on the merits in six months, four months if the 
arbitration was conducted by documents only.”286  In contrast, in the 
283 class arbitrations “opened” by the AAA, the “median time from fil-
ing to settlement, withdrawal, or dismissal — not judgment on the me-
rits — was 583 days, and the mean was 630 days.”287  On the majori-
ty’s reading of the numbers, class arbitrations were “more likely to 
generate procedural morass than final judgment.”288  In addition, class 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 279 Id. at 1753. 
 280 Id. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 281 Id. at 1757 (quoting 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. at 1751 (majority opinion) (noting that “class arbitration requires procedural formality”).  
 284 Id.  
 285 See supra note 156. 
 286 AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (citing AAA, ANALYSIS OF CASELOAD, supra note 161). 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. 
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arbitrations rendered confidentiality and protection of absent parties 
“more difficult.”289  Lurking, but unexplored, were due process ques-
tions about whether such decisions could legally be preclusive of new 
claims filed by absentees.290  The majority also did not analyze wheth-
er “hybrid classes,” where judges supervised the procedural structure, 
might mitigate some of the concerns. 
 The majority concluded that class arbitrations gave plaintiffs too 
much power, creating the risk of “in terrorem” settlements, putting the 
defendant into the posture of having (in the Court’s words) to “bet the 
company with no effective means of review.”291  The informal, extra-
legal nature of class arbitrations “greatly increase[d] risks to defen-
dants,” and such risks were at “unacceptable” levels because of the li-
mited role for court oversight.292  Why was so little court oversight 
involved?  Under the FAA, judges were to consider only whether an 
award was “procured by ‘corruption,’ ‘fraud,’ or ‘undue means,’” and 
parties could not, per the Court’s 2008 ruling in Hall Street Associates, 
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., confer additional authority on courts to widen 
grounds for review.293  Not in the majority’s calculations were the fac-
tors of which process facilitated access for more people, which ad-
dressed intra-litigant disparities, and which produced public informa-
tion and control over decisionmakers.  Further, the majority’s 
insistence that contract terms had to be enforced could, depending on 
the clauses written, be in tension with its view that the FAA imposed 
the rule of bilateral arbitrations.  The counterfactual hypothetical is, of 
course, that a provider might oblige class arbitrations. 
Justice Breyer’s dissent argued the benefits of aggregation to right, 
rather than tilt, the power equilibrium.  In 1925, he commented, arbi-
tration was nascent, and therefore the FAA could have neither man-
dated nor codified particular procedures such as bilateral arbitra-
tion.294  Moreover, as the FAA’s history focused on opponents of 
“roughly equivalent bargaining power,” the development of aggregate 
arbitrations was consistent with what Congress had in mind for its sta-
tute’s users and beneficiaries.295  Further, while the majority had com-
pared class and individual arbitrations, the dissent compared class ac-
tions in court and in arbitration.  Drawing on data from a study of 
class actions in California, Justice Breyer noted that “class arbitrations 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 289 Id. at 1750. 
 290 See CTIA Amicus for AT&T, supra note 168, at 14, 17–18 (objecting as well to the hybrid 
form). 
 291 AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1752. 
 292 Id. 
 293 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2006)). 
 294 AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 295 Id. 
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can take considerably less time than in-court proceedings in which 
class certification is sought.”296  A single class action would be “surely 
more efficient than thousands of separate proceedings for identical 
claims.”297 
But that efficiency depended on individuals who opted to use the 
procedures.  Unmentioned in either AT&T opinion were the data cited 
by Concepcion amici and by the district court on use of the arbitration 
program.  Between 2003 and 2007 (when the market of cell phone users 
exceeded 50 million), the AAA recorded 170 consumer arbitrations 
against AT&T Mobility, AT&T Wireless, and Cingular Wireless; AT&T 
reported a higher number — 570 arbitrations.298  “Thousands of separate 
proceedings for identical claims” were not the alternative.299  The few 
customers using the procedures made individualization very economical 
for the providers.  As Justice Breyer — quoting Judge Posner — pointed 
out, even if the process provided were easy to use, the “‘realistic alterna-
tive to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero indi-
vidual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.’”300 
The larger question, unaddressed by all the Justices, was the one 
that Arthur Leff posed in 1970: “why would one . . . characterize those 
pieces of paper which pass between [these] parties as ‘contracts’?”301  
While the documents used the word “contract,” they departed from 
that model, which entailed “not only a deal, but dealing” that could, 
across a set, “lessen the possibility of monolithic one-sidedness.”302  
The consumer materials at issue in AT&T demonstrated, instead, a 
“monolithic one-sidedness.”  Unilateral change — without a hint of 
negotiation — was what AT&T repeatedly imposed.  During the pen-
dency of the litigation, AT&T changed its dispute resolution rules to be 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 296 Id. (citing JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, CLASS 
CERTIFICATION IN CALIFORNIA: SECOND INTERIM REPORT FROM THE STUDY OF CALI-
FORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 18 (2010)). 
 297 Id. 
 298 See Civil Procedure Amici for Concepcion, supra note 172, at 20 (citing Declaration of 
Bruce L. Simon in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Amended Motion to Compel 
Arbitration, Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (No. 06-944) (detail-
ing statistics on the AAA’s website and noting that consumers were self-represented in 122 of 140 
cases against AT&T)); Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 
5216255, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008) (noting that between December 2006 and February 
2008, AT&T received 570 Notices of Dispute and Demands for Arbitration). 
 299 AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 300 Id. at 1761 (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
 301 Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 132 (1970); see also Radin, 
supra note 245, at 189–99. 
 302 Leff, supra note 301, at 138, 140.  In a study of contracts when bargaining existed, fewer 
than one in ten mandated arbitration.  See Eisenberg, Miller, & Sherwin, supra note 157, at 876. 
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more consumer friendly,303 and AT&T is free unilaterally to amend its 
rules again.304 
Leff admired the “analytic device” of “contracts of adhesion” that 
1940s theorists and jurists had developed.305  But what flowed from 
that category was a fixation by courts on righting the deal,306 when no 
deal had taken place.  Thus, Leff concluded that the idea of a contract 
of adhesion, while “elegant,” was a practical “disaster.”307  The doc-
trine invited courts to undo various contracts through “public policy,” 
“unconscionability,” or other doctrines308 (as California, as well as Ne-
braska, New Jersey, Missouri, and South Carolina, had done when 
evaluating class action waivers309).  But Leff thought ideas of uncon-
scionability, duress, and fraud were “beside the point.”310  Instead of 
putting such boilerplate provisions into the category of contract, Leff 
argued that “products of non-bargaining” were “unilaterally manufac-
tured commodities.”311  Papers like those that passed between AT&T 
and the Concepcions were a product, a “thing,” and if the “thing” had 
quality control problems, the law ought to regulate it. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 303 As the majority put it, AT&T’s agreement “authorized AT&T to make unilateral amend-
ments, which it did to the arbitration provision on several occasions.”  AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
 304 Two caveats, one imposed by the state and one by the market, are in order.  First, the ma-
jority concluded that states could “take steps addressing the concerns that attend contracts of ad-
hesion — for example, requiring class-action-waiver provisions in adhesive agreements to be high-
lighted.”  Id. at 1750 n.6.  Second, the AAA has independent reputational stakes and hence has its 
own procedures for consumer arbitrations, which would constrain AT&T unless it selected anoth-
er dispute resolution provider.  See, e.g., AAA Consumer Procedures, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
http://www.adr.org/consumer_arbitration (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).  But the institutional partici-
pants have leverage, as illustrated by the decision of JAMS, which initially refused to enforce class 
waivers, to retreat in the face of protests from its corporate customers.  See supra note 263. 
 305 Leff, supra note 301, at 142. 
 306 Justice Thomas’s concurrence in AT&T likewise focused on dealmaking.  See 131 S. Ct. at 
1753 (Thomas, J., concurring).  He read the FAA requirement of “enforcement of an agreement to 
arbitrate unless a party successfully asserts a defense concerning the formation of the agreement 
to arbitrate, such as fraud, duress, or mutual mistake” to dictate that revocation based on the Dis-
cover Bank rule was invalid because a state’s public policy objection had no relation to the forma-
tion of the contract.  Id. at 1755.  He noted the possibility of other defenses based on contract 
formation.  Id. 
 307 Leff, supra note 301, at 142. 
 308 Id. at 142–43. 
 309 Decisions doing so were vacated and remanded in light of AT&T.  See Affiliated Computer 
Servs., Inc. v. Fensterstock, 131 S. Ct. 2989 (2011) (applying California law); Cellco P’ship v. Lit-
man, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011) (applying New Jersey law); Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2873 
(2011) (same); Mo. Title Loans, Inc. v. Brewer, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011) (applying Missouri law); 
Sonic Auto., Inc. v. Watts, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011) (applying South Carolina law).  
 310 Leff, supra note 301, at 148. 
 311 Id. at 147.  See also Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, supra note 1, at 202–03.  
Unconscionability law embraced the language of manufacturing.  For instance, in 1962, the Su-
preme Court of California held that a “mass-made contract” — in that case, a life insurance policy 
sold in an airport vending machine — could not be “equate[d] [with] the bargaining table, where 
each clause is the subject of debate.”  Steven v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 377 P.2d 284, 293, 298 
(1962). 
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By failing to regulate, as Margaret Jane Radin has charted, the law 
moved from enforcing provisions that were the output of the voluntary 
meeting of minds (“bespoke,” to borrow the English term for custom-
tailored clothes) to relying on a fictive assent; the result is the “rear-
rangement of entitlements without any consent or assent.”312  To inter-
vene usefully requires (to borrow from Todd Rakoff) a focus on “the 
particular institutional location of the parties involved”313 — that is, 
consideration of resource and knowledge asymmetries that undermine 
the fairness of enforcing provisions in contracts.  Absent such regula-
tion, Radin warned, “sovereign functions” move from the state to the 
firm.314  
The Court’s reading of the FAA has shifted those functions by di-
vesting states of the potential to tailor arbitration obligations to ad-
dress fairness concerns.  Nebraska, evoked at the outset, provides the 
example.  In 1987, its legislature enacted a version of the Uniform Ar-
bitration Act whose words track parts of the FAA.315  But Nebraska 
imposed both more constraints (such as that contracts be “entered into 
voluntarily and willingly”) and more exemptions (such as those arising 
under the state’s Fair Employment Practice Act).316  In 1991, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court held that the arbitration statute violated the 
state constitution’s open court/rights-to-remedy clause.317 
In response, various businesses, the state’s Chamber of Commerce, 
and others sought a constitutional amendment that, although opposed 
by a group including trial lawyers,318 was enacted in 1996.  Added to 
the mandates that courts be open and “every person shall have a re-
medy” was the constitutional proviso that the legislature could “pro-
vide for the enforcement of mediation, binding arbitration agreements, 
and other forms of dispute resolution which are entered into voluntari-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 312 Radin, supra note 245, at 196; see also Daniel Markovits, Market Solidarity: Price as Com-
mensuration, Contract as Integration 201 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Har-
vard Law School Library) (arguing that “contracts of adhesion allow term-makers to behave un-
fairly and inefficiently against term-takers, whom they render unfree”). 
 313 Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, supra note 1, at 204. 
 314 Radin, supra note 245, at 199; see also David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 437, 441 (2011) (arguing that the Court’s interpretation of the FAA permits unconstitu-
tional delegation of lawmaking powers to the private sector). 
 315 Compare L.B. 71, 90th Leg., 1st Sess., 1987 Neb. Laws 259 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 25-2602 (1995) (repealed and reenacted in 1997)), with the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2006). 
 316 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602.  Other states have also imposed limits.  See, e.g., MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 27-5-114(2) (2009).  In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996), the Su-
preme Court held Montana’s special notice provision in the prior version of its arbitration statute 
to be preempted by the FAA.  Id. at 683. 
 317 State v. Neb. Ass’n of Pub. Emps., Local 61, 477 N.W.2d 577, 581–82 (Neb. 1991) (citing 
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13).  
 318 See, e.g., Editorial, 1996 Field of Amendments Contains Two Worthy of a Yes, OMAHA 
WORLD-HERALD (Neb.), May 7, 1996, at 10; Leslie Boellstorff, Amendments May Be “Innocent 
Bystanders,” OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Neb.), May 12, 1996, at 4B. 
078-170 RESNIK.DOC 10/02/11 – 5:46 PM 
2011] THE SUPREME COURT — COMMENT 131 
 
ly and which are not revocable other than upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”319  Yet the Ne-
braska courts’ interpretative authority over that constitutional text has 
now been eclipsed by FAA preemption,320 as has the authority of the 
several other state courts holding waivers unconscionable.321  
Return then to the facets of fairness analyses engaged when the 
Supreme Court made its interpretative choices.  The Concepcions and 
their amici argued that the federal structure of the United States gave 
rein to state contract law, including decisions such as California’s that 
leaving consumers to individualized procedures was profoundly un-
fair.322  The providers insisted that they could tolerate no variations 
across state lines; they required not only a “uniform contract to govern 
customer relationships across the country”323 but one that permitted no 
arbitration aggregation.324  The providers threatened that if the waiv-
ers were not upheld, they would abandon arbitration altogether and 
force their customers into litigation325 — extracting rents not only from 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 319 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13 (amended 1996).  Thereafter, the legislature reenacted the statute.  
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602.01 (2010).  See generally John M. Gradwohl, Arbitrability Under 
Nebraska Contracts: Relatively Clarified at Last, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 207 (1997). 
 320 See Cornhusker Int’l Trucks, Inc. v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 637 N.W.2d 876 (Neb. 2002); 
Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel, Inc. v. Hunan, Inc., 757 N.W.2d 205 (Neb. 2008). 
 321 See supra note 309. 
 322 Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 13, AT&T, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 
1725601. 
 323 CTIA Amicus for AT&T, supra note 168, at 22 (noting also that California was a key mar-
ket space, id. at 23). 
 324 The efficiencies and legalities of uniformity are important to parse.  The economic impact of 
variation in waiver clauses that could result from different state laws depends in part on whether 
class actions filed in states permitting them produce positive or negative externalities.  Two states, 
filing on behalf of AT&T and therefore for the preemption of state law, argued individual arbitra-
tions were “consumer-friendly” and class actions problematic.  Brief for Amici Curiae the States of 
South Carolina and Utah in Support of Petitioner, AT&T, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 
3198844, at *8 [hereinafter South Carolina & Utah Amici for AT&T].  Several other states and the 
District of Columbia, filing in support of the Concepcions, praised consumer class actions as “an 
important complement to government efforts at safeguarding consumers against fraudulent and 
deceitful practices.”  Brief for the States of Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, 
Tennessee, and Vermont and the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 
at 1, AT&T, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3973890 [hereinafter Illinois et al. Amici for 
Concepcion]. 
 325 As noted, AT&T provided a “small claims” court option — albeit without much detail in its 
agreement.  See supra p. 102.  In contrast, the Sprint contract explained that if a class arbitration 
clause were held unenforceable, Sprint would insist that disputes “must be brought in court.”  
CTIA Amicus for AT&T, supra note 168, at 19.  Further, the Chamber of Commerce noted that 
Comcast, “the nation’s largest cable services provider,” had “abandon[ed] arbitration,” as had 
American Express, which informed its credit card holders that if restrictions on arbitration were 
“deemed invalid,” the arbitration provisions were inapplicable.  See Chamber of Commerce Ami-
cus for AT&T, supra note 122, at *4–5, *16.  Yet class waiver forms were prohibited by the pri-
vate association governing the securities industry.  See Catherine M. Foti & David C. Austin, How 
“AT&T Mobility” Changes the Course of Securities Class Actions, Arbitrations, N.Y. L.J., June 
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purchasers but, if customers pursued claims, also from other court users 
and the judicial system itself. 
While the debate in AT&T took place under the rubric of the FAA, 
a good deal of the substantive discussion sounded in differing assess-
ments of the qualities of arbitration and adjudication, singular and ag-
gregated.  The Justices did not use the phrase “due process,” for that 
constitutional mandate runs to governments,326 yet their judgments 
and disagreements entailed considering the quality of procedures, the 
asymmetries between disputants and the risks of intra-litigant dispari-
ties, and the relevance of access and publicity, all of which are dimen-
sions of the due process analyses set forth at the outset. 
Indeed, private providers of dispute resolution services themselves 
specifically invoke aspects of what they label due process.  The AAA 
joined in the development of a “Consumer Due Process Protocol,” 
whose first principle is that “[a]ll parties are entitled to a fundamental-
ly-fair ADR process.”327  Detailed thereafter are provisions familiar 
from the law on fair procedures, such as “notice of hearings and an 
opportunity to be heard,” the impartiality of “neutrals,” opportunities 
to include lawyers if disputants retain them, and access to information 
from opponents.328 
Yet a central feature of these voluntarily adopted  “rights” is “con-
fidentiality,” making hearings private.329  Thus, holding aside state at-
torneys general (many reporting themselves strapped for resources)330 
or action by the Federal Trade Commission, the Court’s FAA juris-
prudence provides no mechanism for fairness generated by publicity, 
which would force information into the public about the kinds of 
claims that the millions of ordinary customers of AT&T and other 
providers may have.  Lost is the ability to assess the qualities of the 
procedures and of decisionmakers and to evaluate whether asymme-
tries between disputants are taken into account.  Also lost are oppor-
tunities for private initiatives to check government enforcement and to 
remedy illegalities that, if widespread, could generate the kind of “re-
call” for which the automobile industry has become famous. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
24, 2011, at 2 (discussing Rule 12,204(d) of the FINRA code of arbitration procedures, which forbids 
member firms from enforcing arbitration agreements against certified or putative classes). 
 326 Some commentators have argued that arbitration in some forms ought to be subject to due 
process constraints.  See Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 
185, 249–55 (2006); Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 
117 (1992); see also Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbi-
tration, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter–Spring 2004, at 279, 302. 
 327 CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 165, at princ. 1.  
 328 Id. at princs. 3, 12(1), 9, 13. 
 329 Id. at princ. 12(2). 
 330 Illinois et al. Amici for Concepcion, supra note 324, at 6.  But see South Carolina & Utah 
Amici for AT&T, supra note 324, at *7–8. 
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Moreover, under the Court’s ruling, AT&T can assert its “sover-
eignty” to hail unwilling opponents into its dispute resolution system 
more readily than can state courts.  The power differential comes from 
another piece of the Court’s due process jurisprudence — its substan-
tive due process constraint on courts’ jurisdictional authority to com-
mand absent litigants to come before them.  In the 2010 Term, the 
Court decided J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, raising the is-
sue of when an absent defendant can be required by a state court to 
submit to its jurisdiction.331  The Court concluded that the decision of 
a defendant to put a product into the stream of commerce did not suf-
fice to authorize a state to require that a party come to its courts.  In-
stead, evidence was needed of genuine volition, that a defendant had 
“purposefully” availed itself of a forum so as to legitimate the sover-
eignty of a state court.332 
Consumers, however, are left without the possibility of that form of 
purposefulness.  Nor is theirs the kind of consent implied by the rheto-
ric of contracts entailing “dealing” (pace Leff) that produces mutual 
agreements.  The providers won the power to impose a mandatory, no-
opt-out system in their own private “courts” designed to preclude ag-
gregate litigation.333  At the same time, as detailed below, Wal-Mart 
limited aggregate options in courts, as it also expanded obligations to 
give individuals opt-out rights to reflect an autonomy said to enhance 
their control over their property interests. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 331 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).  
 332 Id. at 2788–89.  This opinion did not deploy the word “fairness,” while the other personal 
jurisdiction ruling of the Term did.  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. 
Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011) (discussing “fair play”).  Both decisions stem from International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), in which the Court held that the state of Washington could exer-
cise jurisdiction over an absent defendant because to do so was “fair,” given that the litigant had 
“systematic and continuous” contacts with the state and that the conflict — whether it owed con-
tributions to a fund for unemployment — “arose out of those very activities.”  Id. at 320.  That 
fairness inquiry is predicated on a substantive due process entitlement.  See Wendy Collins Per-
due, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsi-
dered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1987).  
 333 The role judges have played in licensing competitors to undercut the once-unique service 
provided by courts is analyzed by Bryant Garth in From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal 
Practice at War with the Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931 (1993). 
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III.  THE LOGIC OF AGGREGATION: FROM CONSOLIDATION TO  
CLASS ACTIONS AND WAL-MART V. DUKES 
Wal-Mart is entitled to individualized determinations of each employee’s 
eligibility for backpay. 
— Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (2011)334 
A.  Shifting the Presumption Toward Grouping 
The 1966 class action rule was drafted with people like the Con-
cepcions in mind.  One of the rule drafters’ express goals was to facili-
tate access to courts for those who lacked the resources or the know-
ledge that they had possibly been harmed.  The method was to attract 
lawyers to bring cases to court and to put judges in charge of supervis-
ing the parameters of the groups and of overseeing the loyalty of their 
representatives.335 
These aims were ambitious (and arguably naïve).  The challenges 
posed in legitimating representational structures (in politics and business 
as well as in courts) have produced a vast literature aiming to assess the 
degree to which agents bond to their principals, the levels of coherence 
within groups, and how groups can inform, monitor, and control their 
agents.  As legions of commentators have modeled and theorized, diffi-
culties abound in constraining representatives, assessing their work, val-
uing individuality, and avoiding free riders in dynamic and strategically 
fraught interactions so as to obtain optimal outputs.336  Fairness haunts 
the enterprise, both in terms of fairness to those within the group and to 
their opponents. 
Nonetheless, the market and political forces that generated a “soci-
ology of boilerplate”337 have spawned a multitude of efforts to produce 
groupwide outcomes through courts.  Impetus comes not only from 
those seeking to facilitate rights-claiming but also from those looking 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 334 131 S. Ct. at 2560. 
 335 I detail the archival sources in Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 6–15.  See also Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil 
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 
386–400 (1967).  Thanks to Arthur Miller, who served as a Reporter on the Committee and worked 
with Kaplan, for reviewing my reflections on Rule 23’s drafting. 
 336 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 21 (1996); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 418–25 (2000); Samuel Issacha-
roff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Action, 77 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1057 (2002); David Betson & Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and “Indi-
visible” Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542, 570 (2011).  
 337 See Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, supra note 1, at 202. 
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for resolution, closure, and predictability (“global peace”), as well as 
from governments trying to deal with an avalanche of claims.  Aggre-
gation can simultaneously be a form of Civil Gideon for plaintiffs and 
a means of insurance for defendants seeking to circumscribe their lia-
bility.  Vivid current examples include the oil spill off the Louisiana 
coast and injuries of 9/11.  Negotiations between British Petroleum 
and President Obama resulted in that company’s commitment of some 
$20 billion to an ad hoc aggregator, Ken Feinberg, who had played a 
similar role for a set of 9/11 claimants, themselves collected in part by 
a federal statute that structured the options and that permitted pursuit 
of claims through the Victim Compensation Fund or pursuit of indi-
vidual remedies exclusively in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York.338 
Thus, although the Wal-Mart opinion prefaces its analysis of Rule 
23 with the statement that the “class action is ‘an exception to the 
usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individ-
ual named parties only,’”339 that description has long since ceased to be 
apt.  Indeed, that quotation comes from a case in which a class action 
was permitted — reflecting that, for decades, the public and private 
sectors have endorsed forms of aggregation to address the fairness 
problems of intra-litigant equality, the disparate resources of oppo-
nents, and the equipage that a group can provide.  The mix of new 
substantive and procedural rights modified the background premises of 
the individual model invoked by the Wal-Mart majority: that the author-
ity of courts came from personal consent to their jurisdiction volunteered 
by autonomous individual plaintiffs stepping forth to participate person-
ally or through lawyers retained by contract. 
Above, I delineated discrete, interrelated strands of fairness analy-
ses.  Aggregation is likewise an umbrella, in this instance for different 
practices enabling the grouping of claims, and, hence, a sketch of the 
development of various forms is in order before turning to the conflict 
in Wal-Mart.  A first example is administrative adjudication, a proce-
dural intervention to segregate groups to treat similarly situated claim-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 338 See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 
230 (2001) (establishing a compensation fund for 9/11 victims); In re Sept. 11 Litig., 600 F. Supp. 
2d 549, 552–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing the “coordinated management” of ninety-five suits and 
“procedural rules to govern settlements” to enable “distributive fairness”); In re Sept. 11 Litig., 723 
F. Supp. 2d 534, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (approving settlements of eighteen of twenty-one property 
damage cases).  See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the 
Courthouse: Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645 
(2008). 
 339 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979) 
(upholding a nationwide class certification on behalf of old age and disability benefits recipients 
challenging a recoupment effort)).  
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ants comparably.340  Political will generates the creation of administra-
tive regimes, as the history of workers’ compensation laws illustrates.  
In the late 1890s, institutional participants — railroad lawyers, bar as-
sociations, judges, and insurance companies — came together to deal 
with negligence claims, perceived as “blocking our calendars with a 
mass of litigation so great as to impede administration in all other 
branches of law.”341  Those efforts modified legal commitments to 
freedom of contract and redistributed the costs of injuries.  New 
York’s 1910 Worker’s Compensation Act, upheld over objections of 
Fourteenth Amendment deprivations, changed common law rules that 
employees contracting with employers had accepted the risk of co-
workers’ negligence.342  As John Witt has chronicled, rights to proceed 
in tort “swallowed up” contract,343 and then administrative regimes 
“swallowed up” aspects of tort, often by quid pro quos in which em-
ployer liability was limited as employees gained rights to capped 
amounts of compensation.344  Thereafter, management personnel sys-
tems shaped insurance settlement systems for injuries with monetary 
relief outlined through guidelines in lieu of individualized appraisals.345 
Guidelines have also become a feature of sentencing, as they aim to 
rationalize judgments across a set yet engender debates about trade-
offs between presumptive categories and individual circumstances.  
Sophisticated members of the criminal bar understand when “depar-
tures” from guidelines can be sought,346 just as personal injury lawyers 
know the going rates for particular kinds of injuries in the active mar-
ketplace of claims and settlement.347 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 340 See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foun-
dations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006); Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal 
Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636 
(2007). 
 341 Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Insti-
tutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1580 (2004) (quoting a member 
of the New York State Bar Association).  
 342 After the New York Court of Appeals invalidated the statute in 1911, see Ives v. S. Buffalo 
Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 448 (N.Y. 1911), the state’s constitution was amended, and in 1917, the Su-
preme Court held the change constitutional, see New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 
(1917). 
 343 As I have, Witt also cited Grant Gilmore for this metaphor.  See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE 
ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 17 (2004). 
 344 “By 1917, [workers’] compensation programs covered 13.5 million American wage earn-
ers, . . . 69 percent of the paid workforce.”  Id. at 190.  Efforts in the 1930s to create administra-
tive remedies for automobile accidents met with “organized interest” group opposition, by then 
protective of the status quo of car accident litigation.  See id. at 195. 
 345 Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 341, at 1588–89. 
 346 For authority to seek such departures, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), and 
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 347 Some call for making such information public.  See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, Transpar-
ency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for Lawsuits?, in TRANSPARENCY IN THE CIVIL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (Joseph Doherty & Robert Reville eds., forthcoming 2011). 
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These administrative adjudication programs encompass various 
goals, including accommodating volume, lowering the price per 
process, reducing the need for lawyers, educating and controlling deci-
sionmakers, and achieving legitimacy.  But unlike ADR mechanisms 
such as arbitration, administrative adjudication aims specifically to 
create intra-litigant equity for disputants proceeding single file, and it 
builds in public oversight by way of obligatory recordkeeping, some 
third-party access to administrative adjudication,348 and limited court 
review.  The result has been public debate about the quantity and 
quality of the judgments rendered, and judicial reversal of some out-
comes349 — again in contrast to a closed private arbitration process 
like that licensed by AT&T. 
Repeatedly, those subjected to various aggregation methods have 
challenged the systems by invoking the Due Process Clause.  In re-
sponse, courts have assessed the capacities of individual disputants, the 
underlying aims of the aggregative regime, and the qualities of the 
procedures proffered.  In addition to the substantive due process claim 
advanced against the 1910 New York Worker’s Compensation Act, a 
classic example of a procedural attack on aggregation prompted the 
1950 decision of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.350  The 
case arose from inventiveness stemming not from judicial interpreta-
tions of Rule 23 and Title VII (to which the Wal-Mart Court ob-
jected)351 but from the New York State Legislature’s effort in 1937 to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 348 See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, WIRELESS INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 
24 (2009), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22010 (providing that the “arbitrator shall 
ensure the privacy of the hearings”).  The Better Business Bureau’s Arbitration Rule 11 permits 
its staff and “volunteers from its pool of arbitrators or government representatives” to attend arbi-
tration hearings.  BETTER BUS. BUREAU OF THE SOUTHLAND, UNIFORM RULES FOR BIND-
ING ARBITRATION, Rule 11 (2009), available at http://www.la.bbb.org/ArbitrationBinding 
Rules.aspx.  “For any other observer . . . to attend a hearing,” the Bureau makes a determination 
as to whether “reasonable accommodations exist and that neither the parties nor the arbitrator 
objects.”  Id.  Regulations on public access vary among administrative agencies: EEOC hearings 
have limited access for those with information relevant to the complaint, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(e) 
(2010); some kinds of immigration hearings are open, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(b) (2011); and Social Se-
curity hearings are open to the public unless the administrative law judge, based on “good cause,” 
chooses to close a hearing, 20 C.F.R. § 498.215(d) (2010).  
  Obligations to provide open proceedings come in part from the application of constitutional 
rights of third-party access to administrative adjudication.  For example, the Second Circuit held 
that the New York Transit Authority had wrongly closed to the public its decisionmaking on low-
level crime in subways; in 2008, some 19,000 people so accused were in the administrative proce-
dure that had barred third parties.  See N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 
10-0372-cv, 2011 WL 2852412, at *1–2 (2d Cir. July 20, 2011).   
 349 A ready example comes from federal appellate judges’ distress at immigration judges’ deci-
sions.  See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005).  See generally Jaya 
Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asy-
lum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007). 
 350 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
 351 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554–55. 
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attract business for banks.  The state adopted a practice that had de-
veloped elsewhere to permit asset pooling in common trusts.352  New 
York offered these relatively new kinds of transactions and, by creat-
ing a kind of class action, provided a method to insulate banks from 
the potential of many beneficiaries’ bringing challenges to the invest-
ment decisions.353 
New York authorized banks to pool trust assets of beneficiaries 
from across the United States, thereby enabling modest investors to 
have the benefit of corporate fiduciaries.354  To give the banks insur-
ance against undue liability, the statute instructed them to bring, pe-
riodically, a kind of declaratory action to obtain judicial affirmation of 
the proper discharge of fiduciary duties; the law of res judicata thereafter 
precluded unhappy beneficiaries from alleging imprudent investments.355 
But how were the thousands of beneficiaries to know that their 
rights were being adjudicated and to participate?  The New York 
State Legislature required that notice about the process be put in the 
initial trust documents (akin to what AT&T now provides by giving 
notice of class and court waivers when one opens an account).  In ad-
dition, under the New York statute, when banks filed their actions 
“settling accounts,” notice was also given through newspaper publica-
tion and directly to two court-appointed lawyers, acting as guardians 
ad litem for what were functionally two subclasses, the inter vivos 
trustees and the testamentary beneficiaries.356 
In 1950, the Supreme Court upheld the state statute’s grant of na-
tionwide jurisdiction to its courts over the trusts but ruled the statuto-
ry provisions of notice unconstitutional.357  As in the three cases in the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 352 See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. Laws, Uniform Common Trust Fund Act 3 
(1938) (approved 1939), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/ 
uctf3852.pdf (noting that its Uniform Act reflected what “approximately twenty states” had un-
dertaken, albeit “in a different form”). 
 353 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 307–09; N.Y. BANKING § 100-c (repealed 1986; codified as revised at 
N.Y. BANKING § 100-c (2008)). 
 354 As Justice Jackson explained, “[m]ounting overheads have made administration of small 
trusts undesirable to corporate trustees.”  Mullane, 339 U.S. at 307.  By 1949, ten banks, 
representing “by far the largest volume of trust business in New York State,” had established 
common trust funds.  Brief of New York State Bankers Ass’n at 1–2, Mullane, 339 U.S. 306 (No. 
378). 
 355 N.Y. BANKING § 100-c.  In Mullane, the trust was established in 1946 and a first account-
ing brought in 1947, 339 U.S. at 309; under the current provisions, accountings are to be brought 
“[a]t least once every ten years.”  N.Y. BANKING § 100-c(6).  The revised statute details obliga-
tions of mailing as well as publishing notice.  Id. 
 356 N.Y. BANKING 100-c(12).  Kenneth J. Mullane, guardian ad litem for the income beneficia-
ries, argued that without notice sent directly to more beneficiaries, a bank would use pooled trusts 
“‘as a dumping ground for its own shaky and depreciated securities.’”  Appellant’s Brief at 26, 
Mullane, 339 U.S. 306 (No. 378), 1950 WL 78701 (quoting Robert W. Bogue, Common Trust Fund 
Legislation, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 430, 435 (1938)). 
 357 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312–13, 320.  
078-170 RESNIK.DOC 10/02/11 – 5:46 PM 
2011] THE SUPREME COURT — COMMENT 139 
 
2010 Term, the Mullane Court made a fairness assessment, in this in-
stance by endorsing the utility of pooling for private investors and the 
commercial interests of the banks (and their host states) to achieve ab-
solution from claims, while insisting on the need for regulatory over-
sight of both the banks and the state-appointed representatives for the 
beneficiaries.358  Justice Jackson read due process as not imposing 
“impossible or impractical obstacles” to producing a decision about the 
banks’ prudence while also as requiring an “opportunity” for those af-
fected by this private dispute to be heard.359 
Mullane held that publication notice could suffice in some circum-
stances, but not when names of beneficiaries were “at hand” and “easi-
ly” found on the bank’s books.360  Yet personalizing notice was not to 
impose too great an economic burden on the underlying activity.361  
Therefore, a form of sampling could be used, for the “individual inter-
est does not stand alone but is identical with that of a class.”362  Notice 
“reasonably certain to reach most of those interested” sufficed, for 
those notified would “safeguard the interests of all.”363 
The New York banking law is one of several examples of legislative 
aggregates.  Another comes from Congress, which in 1938 enacted the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), requiring minimum wages and 
overtime payments and authorizing the Secretary of Labor to bring ac-
tions for the benefit of employees.364  Congress also welcomed both in-
dividual employees and their designated “agent or representative” 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 358 Id. at 312–15. 
 359 Id. at 313–14. 
 360 Id. at 319. 
 361 As James Vaughan, the guardian for the principal beneficiaries, argued, “the objective 
which the legislation had in view consists in avoidance of such notice requirements as would tend 
to make the common trust fund uneconomical or unworkable.”  Brief of Respondent Special 
Guardian and Attorney for Infants, Etc. Having an Interest in Trust Principal at 9, Mullane, 339 
U.S. 309 (No. 378), 1950 WL 78532.  The Court agreed that the “expense of keeping informed 
from day to day of substitutions among even current income beneficiaries . . . to say nothing of the 
far greater number  of contingent beneficiaries, would impose a severe burden on the plan, and 
would likely dissipate its advantages.”  Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318.  
 362 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319 (“Now and then an extraordinary case may turn up, but constitu-
tional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances, and in the great majority of 
instances, no doubt, justice will be done.” (quoting Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1, 7 (1911)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 363 Id.  Mullane’s brief reported that the trusts had more than 2000 beneficiaries but that none 
had appeared in any of the five accountings.  Appellant’s Brief, Mullane, supra note 356, at 45.  
The Court’s ruling affected not only the many states with pooled trusts but also states’ general 
notice provisions.  See John Wilson Perry, The Mullane Doctrine — A Reappraisal of Statutory 
Notice Requirements, in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 32, 33–39 (1952). 
 364 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), Pub. L. No. 75-718, §§ 6, 7, 15, 17, 52 Stat. 1060, 
1062–64, 1068–69 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).  The FLSA was 
enacted after the Court upheld Washington state’s minimum wage, hour, and working conditions 
law for women and children.  See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 386–87, 400 
(1937). 
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(such as a union) to bring suit on behalf of “other employees similarly 
situated.”365  Those provisions were cut back in 1947, when Congress 
limited initiation of private damage actions to employees and required 
that employees who were joined also had to “opt in” (in contemporary 
parlance) by filing written consent in court.366  Like New York’s bank-
ing law, which authorized court-appointed guardians ad litem paid 
from trust overhead, the FLSA built in equipage incentives; courts 
could award “a reasonable attorney’s fee” and costs paid to plaintiffs 
by defendants.367  Further, akin to the New York statute and Rule 23, 
judges likewise oversaw outcomes; the Supreme Court interpreted the 
FLSA to prohibit settlements that had employers pay less than the law 
required.368 
The more famous aggregate technique, at issue in Wal-Mart, comes 
from another legal source — federal procedural rules.  Within months 
of the FLSA’s enactment, the Supreme Court promulgated the 1938 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the first national provisions span-
ning law and equity, which had been drafted, under Charles Clark 
(then Yale Law School’s Dean), by a committee of lawyers.369  These 
liberal rules of pleading and joinder permitted different kinds of claims 
and various parties to be brought together in a single lawsuit.  Over time 
(and with other doctrinal developments), these procedures widened the 
parameters of lawsuits.  Unlike workers’ compensation, the New York 
banking law, and the FLSA, the 1930s Federal Rules crafted a transsub-
stantive set of procedures to be applied regardless of the kind of lawsuit 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 365 FLSA § 16(b). 
 366 See Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006)).  The Supreme Court addressed the mechanisms in Hoffmann-La Roche, 
Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989), and committed to district courts the discretion to facilitate 
notice to employees who might be interested in joining.  Id. at 169.  Since then, district judges 
have developed techniques to review and in some sense certify a collective action, subject to de-
certification.  See generally David Borgen & Laura L. Ho, Litigation of Wage and Hour Collective 
Actions Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 129 (2003). 
 367 FLSA § 16(b).  The FLSA’s collective action mechanism has been criticized as  less effective  
than Rule 23.  See, e.g., Craig Becker & Paul Strauss, Representing Low-Wage Workers in the Ab-
sence of a Class: The Peculiar Case of Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Under-
enforcement of Minimum Labor Standards, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1325–46 (2008). 
 368 D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 108 (1946).  Some lower courts thereafter held that 
settlements require the supervision of the Department of Labor or the federal courts.  See, e.g., 
Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 1982); Dees v. Hydra-
dry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1237 (M.D. Fla. 2010).  Court assessment resembles the inquiry 
under Rule 23(e) for approval of class action settlements with an added criterion of whether a 
compromise “frustrates implementation of the FLSA.”  Dees, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.  Although 
courts have also upheld mandatory arbitration requirements precluding FLSA filings, some have 
held that outcomes cannot be kept private, given the FLSA’s purposes.  See, e.g., id. at 1245–47. 
 369 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 
(1982); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 
(1986).  
078-170 RESNIK.DOC 10/02/11 – 5:46 PM 
2011] THE SUPREME COURT — COMMENT 141 
 
(contract, tort, patent, federal statutory right) or the form of relief (dam-
ages or injunction). 
The 1938 rules also provided for class actions, but with limited fi-
nality of judgments.  Only something found to be a “true” class action 
(and not a “spurious” or “hybrid” class) could bind absentees, and that 
typology was rooted in conceptualizing the underlying right as indivis-
ible or as a collection of rights, each held individually by different 
people.370  (The holding in Wal-Mart can be read as a return to such 
disaggregation.371)  By the 1960s, the 1938 class action rule’s distinc-
tions were seen as arcane, scrambled, and too confining for the modern 
state.  Thus, when Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed an ad hoc 
committee, chaired by Dean Acheson with Harvard Law School’s Ben-
jamin Kaplan as its Reporter, to review the rules,372 the group worked 
on revisions to Rule 23 in conjunction with other third-party practice 
provisions.  Between 1962 and 1964, that group produced the class ac-
tion rule debated in Wal-Mart and rejected as an option in AT&T. 
The 1966 version of Rule 23 attenuated individual consent and par-
ticipation so as to produce final and binding outcomes.  The drafters 
read the Due Process Clause to permit law to take people who were not 
otherwise in a relationship (indeed, not only strangers but potentially 
unaware of their rights, each other, or a pending claim) and turn them 
into a juridical entity.  How this innovation nets out in autonomy terms 
is unclear; classes reduce personal participation yet enable individuals 
who would not otherwise be able to pursue rights to do so.  This en-
abling function is what defendants object to, and some, such as Wal-
Mart, act as if they are spokespersons for absent class members and ar-
gue that, if certified, a class would impinge on the autonomy interests of 
absentees in pursuing individual claims.373 
The due process concerns of access, intra-litigant equity, and re-
source asymmetry were at the 1966 rule’s core.374  As Kaplan later ex-
plained, the class action rule “was not neutral: it did not escape attention 
at the time that it would open the way to the assertion of many, many 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 370 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(3) (1938) (describing rights as “joint, or common, or secondary” 
and “several”).  
 371 Cf. David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and as Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 913, 917–19 (1998) (arguing that class actions ought to be understood as entities rather than 
aggregations of individual claims).  
 372 See Announcement of the Chief Justice of the United States, Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure, Apr. 4, 1960, in 28 U.S.C.A. at xvii (FED. R. CIV. P. (1966)); Earl Warren, 
Chief Justice of the U.S., Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute (May 18, 
1960), in 25 F.R.D. 213, 216 (1960). 
 373 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Wal-Mart, supra note 123, at *34–38. 
 374 See generally Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” supra note 335; Judith Resnik, Dennis 
E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, 
and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296 (1996). 
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claims that otherwise would not be pressed; so the rule would stick in 
the throats of establishment defendants.”375  To do its work, the rule was 
less than transsubstantive, for its subparts were (as Wal-Mart de-
tailed376) crafted with discrete sets of plaintiffs in mind. 
In terms of those claims “that otherwise would not be pressed,” 
school desegregation cases were one concern; after children graduated, 
individual plaintiffs could not pursue enforcement of injunctions.377  The 
drafters therefore shaped Rule 23(b)(2) as a mandatory class action 
(meaning that co-plaintiffs cannot exit) when the “party opposing the 
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the 
class” and injunctive relief is appropriate.  This innovation ensured the 
authority of judges to oversee long-term school desegregation decrees 
and paved the way for parallel structural remedies addressing jails, pris-
ons, mental hospitals, and employment.378  When Rule 23(b)(2) was 
coupled with the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 (as 
well as the fee-shifting provisions of other statutes, including Title VII), 
novel sets of plaintiffs made their way into the federal courts. 
The Concepcions are paradigmatic of another group of claimants 
whom the rule drafters sought to help: consumers with low-value claims.  
A 1941 article by Harry Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield explained: 
“Modern society seems increasingly to expose men to . . . group injuries 
for which individually they are in a poor position to seek legal redress, 
either because they do not know enough or because such redress is dis-
proportionately expensive.”379  Although administrative agencies offered 
some redress, they too had limits (as the details of the EEOC, noted 
above — a budget of about $370 million and complaints numbering 1 
million380 — exemplify).  
But if private lawyers could bundle claimants, or if the costs of ad-
versarial litigation were lower, incentives to file would exist as long as 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 375 Benjamin Kaplan, Comment on Carrington, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2126–27 (1989).  Thanks 
to Stephen Subrin for pointing me to this commentary. 
 376 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556–57. 
 377 See Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 69, 
102 (1966) (proposed Rule 23 advisory committee’s note) (explaining that civil rights actions were 
“[i]llustrative” of the purpose of Rule 23(b)(2) and listing school desegregation cases as examples).  
See generally David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for 
the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011). 
 378 See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordi-
nary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980). 
 379 Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941).  Examples included the “single and isolated security hold-
er . . . helpless in protecting his own interests or pleading his own cause.”  Id. at 684 (quoting 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, 
ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION 
COMMITTEES, PART II, at 1 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 380 See EEOC Budget and Staffing History 1980 to Present, supra note 186. 
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lawyers could be paid from the money garnered.  An equitable doc-
trine that developed early in the twentieth century provided the route.  
Lawyers could be understood to confer a “common benefit” on a group 
and then be compensated from a percentage of the fund recouped.381  
Thus, if procedures permitted small claims to become large, lucrative 
classes, lawyers would take the risk of serving as “champions of semi-
public rights,” and class actions could augment administrative regula-
tory oversight.382 
The drafters of Rule 23 therefore crafted a subdivision — (b)(3) — 
that was, as Kaplan explained, designed so that individuals “without ef-
fective strength to bring their opponents into court at all” could do so,383 
subject to judicial approval of proposed classes.  This provision required  
a district judge to decide whether a proposed class met the four prereq-
uisites of Rule 23(a) — numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequa-
cy.  Thereafter, the rule required the judge to assess whether and what 
kind of class action to certify.  If no limited fund (called, in the trade, a 
“(b)(1) class”) was at hand,384 and if no classwide injunctive relief (a 
“(b)(2) class”) was sought, a judge could authorize a “(b)(3)” class — but 
only upon findings that common issues predominated and that proceed-
ing as a class was superior to individual litigation.  To do so, the judge 
was to consider the feasibility and fact of individualized litigation and 
whether a class could “fairly and efficiently” enable adjudication of the 
controversy.385  The rule gave (b)(3) class members rights to notice and to 
opt out, whereas those in mandatory classes had no such option.386 
The 1966 rule gave judges additional work.  Before a class action 
could be dismissed or compromised, a judge had to approve the outcome 
as “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”387  Analytically, that charter is in 
some tension with the idea that, at certification, the judge found the 
named representatives adequate.  Not only does that built-in redundancy 
reflect that information (about the underlying claims and the lawyers 
pursuing the class action) changes over time, but the reassessment un-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 381 Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, supra note 374, at 304, 337–38. 
 382 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 379, at 717.  
 383 Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969). 
 384 The criteria are explored in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).  See id. at 821. 
 385 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (1966). 
 386 Id. at 23(c).  The Court later held that plaintiffs had to bear the cost of notice and that the 
“best notice practical under the circumstances” language of Rule 23 required mailings to those 
whose addresses could be found.  Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974).  In 2003, 
amendments to the rule expressly authorized district judges to use their discretion to require no-
tice for (b)(1) and (b)(2) class members.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (2003 rule).  
 387 Before the 2003 amendments, these criteria were developed by case law and then, in those 
amendments, put into the text of Rule 23(e)(2). 
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derscores the special monitoring role assigned to judges, who in 2003 al-
so gained authority to appoint class counsel and oversee fee awards.388 
Class actions were not the only method of aggregation that became 
familiar to federal judges, who themselves became promoters of some 
forms of aggregation.  In 1968, the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, which makes policies for the federal judiciary, proposed a statute 
authorizing consolidation across districts if related cases were pend-
ing.389  Now commonplace, multidistrict litigation (MDL) serves to 
group tens, hundreds, or thousands of technically independent cases 
into a joint pretrial proceeding.390  The presumptive barrier between 
aggregation and mass torts toppled in the years thereafter, when A.H. 
Robins (faced with a volume of claims arising out of harms from its 
Dalkon Shield) and Johns-Manville (defending an avalanche of asbes-
tos claims) filed for bankruptcy.391 
Other groups, albeit often with less judicial superintendence, made 
their way into federal court.  After judges embraced a managerial role 
and an individual calendar system, case assignments placed them at 
the hub, and they could coordinate sub-rule and sub-statutory aggrega-
tions.392  Lawyers could also amass clients through crafting ad hoc law 
firms (“plaintiffs’ steering committees”) or bundling clients and nego-
tiating for them as a set,393 a process commended, if structured along 
the lines it proposed, by the American Law Institute (ALI) in its 2009 
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.394  Federal and state leg-
islatures likewise supported the idea of group processing.  Since 1966, 
Congress has repeatedly noted the availability of class actions in various 
consumer protection statutes,395 as do many states.396 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 388 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)–(h) (2003 rule). 
 389 See Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, § 1, 82 Stat. 109 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006)). 
 390 See generally Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi–Class Action Method of Man-
aging Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010). 
 391 See Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” supra note 335, at 28–29.  See generally Mark J. 
Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984). 
 392 See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).  
 393 See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of 
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 385 n.1, 390 (2000).  See 
generally Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733 (1997). 
 394 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2009) [herein-
after ALI 2009 AGGREGATION PRINCIPLES].  This range of variations for aggregate litigation 
prompted an interest in regularization that produced several versions of the Manual for Complex 
Litigation, now in its fourth edition, which provides advice to judges and lawyers.  See MANUAL 
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004). 
 395 One example is the Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code, Title I of which is known as the Truth 
in Lending Act), as amended in the Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 
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In sum, despite the Wal-Mart Court’s invocation of the individual 
adjudication model, that option is not widely available.397  Even an 
ordinary car crash case centers on insurance companies, supporting the 
litigation by virtue of contracts with the individuals involved.  And 
without such insurance, the costs of litigation have — for individuals, 
if not for corporations of AT&T and Wal-Mart’s size — made obsolete 
the Court’s premise that the “usual rule [is] that litigation is conducted 
by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.”398  The debate 
had, before last Term, been shifting away from asking whether to ag-
gregate to examining which mechanisms and what groupings are pref-
erable means of reaching fair dispositions,399 and what forms of third-
party funding to license.400 
B.  Class Wars 
To describe policymakers as unmitigatedly enthusiastic about what 
group litigation produces is to miss Benjamin Kaplan’s point that “the 
rule would stick in the throats of establishment defendants.”401  While 
multiple forms of aggregation exist, class actions have proved specially 
attractive vehicles for bringing cases to courts.  Opponents of Rule 23 
are committed to its cabining and press their views in various venues,402 
as the AT&T waivers illustrate. 
In the last few decades, “establishment defendants” — both public 
and private — persuaded Congress to impose limits on class action op-
portunities.  Congress has banned the Legal Services Corporation from 
representing classes, constrained classes in securities litigation (in part by 
interposing judges to decide what entities qualify as lead plaintiffs), and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
1511.  The legislation authorizes individual and class actions for damages against creditors failing 
to comply with its regulations.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1)(2)(A)(B) (2006). 
 396 Examples of states permitting class actions for deceptive advertising claims, such as that at 
issue in AT&T, were provided by Illinois et al. Amici for Concepcion, supra note 324, at 34 & n.8.  
Noted were fourteen jurisdictions, including California, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (2011), and 
Connecticut, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(b) (2010).  Six states’ consumer provisions 
prohibit class actions.  Illinois et al. Amici for Concepcion, supra note 324, at 35 & n.10. 
 397 See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, Socializing Law, Privatizing Law, Monopolizing Law, Ac-
cessing Law, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 691 (2006). 
 398 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550.  
 399 See generally Symposium, Aggregate Litigation: Critical Perspectives, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 293–772 (2011). 
 400 See Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-
Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 320–23 (2011). 
 401 Kaplan, Comment on Carrington, supra note 375, at 2127.  
 402 Efforts included having rule drafters make Rule 23 more restrictive.  See, e.g., Minutes of 
Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure (Jan. 22–23, 2002), available at http://www 
.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CRAC0102.pdf; see also Judith Resnik, 
Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 
300–02 (2003). 
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required that state-based claims involving sufficient stakes be removed 
to federal courts (as in the Concepcions’ case).403 
In the debates surrounding these statutory alterations, the questions 
of resource (im)balance and social utility that undergird policymaking 
about aggregation have been at the fore, and those issues were argued to 
the Court in both AT&T and Wal-Mart.  Proponents detailed class ac-
tion virtues — enabling compensation, deterring misbehavior, and equal-
izing resources between disputants.404  They argued the utility of attract-
ing the private investment of resources to complement public 
enforcement by increasing the numbers able to bring actions and gener-
ating enforcement competition that could inhibit agency capture.405  
Class action advocates also laid claim to economies of scale for dispu-
tants and courts and argued that the use of Rule 23 for decades has 
rendered its procedures relatively transparent, stable, and simple.406 
Further, advocates claimed that aggregation provided courts not only 
with more information (because of the resources made available) but also 
with better and different information, engendering more accurate deci-
sions about claims than could a single-file processing system.  This point, 
related to the ideas in a famous economics essay about the analytic dis-
tortions produced by owning one product that was a “lemon” and by the 
asymmetries of marketplace information,407 had been extant for some 
time in the law review literature,408 and the idea gained a place in the 
Wal-Mart briefing.  The argument is that, for certain claims, outcomes 
across a comprehensive set can identify, with greater accuracy, the meri-
torious claims than can individual decisions, which produce “noise” and 
distortions obscuring “obvious patterns.”409 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 403 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (cod-
ified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); 45 C.F.R. § 1617 
(2010). 
 404 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae, Labor Economists and Statisticians in Support of Respon-
dents, Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277), 2011 WL 719643, at *4 [hereinafter Labor Econo-
mists & Statisticians Amici for Dukes]; Civil Procedure Amici for Concepcion, supra note 172, at 
4–14. 
 405 Civil Procedure Amici for Concepcion, supra note 172, at 13; see also Kalven & Rosenfield, 
supra note 379, at 687. 
 406 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Civil Procedure Professors in Support of Respondents, 
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277), 2011 WL 794121, at *4–5. 
 407 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 408 See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass 
Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing 
Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987). 
 409 Labor Economists & Statisticians Amici for Dukes, supra note 404, at *11–12.  See generally 
Joshua P. Davis, Class-Wide Recoveries (Feb. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1768148. 
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As economists and statisticians told the Court, for a pattern-and-
practice discrimination claim such as that advanced by the Dukes plain-
tiffs, “a statistical model is more likely than a series of individual adjudi-
cations to identify with appropriate accuracy the persons injured by a 
proven pattern or practice of discrimination and the amount of their 
awards, . . . mak[ing] a statistical model a more ‘just’ procedure.”410  
The argument ran further that because statistical models can weed out 
those who have not been injured, the accuracy of remedial awards im-
proves — making them fairer for defendants as well as for plaintiffs.411  
In addition, through the law of claim preclusion, binding the entire 
group results in consistency of outcomes across a set of similarly situated 
individuals. 
Opponents of class actions argued that the form itself produced 
“lemons” — distorting decisions on the merits by giving unfair advan-
tages to its users or, more aptly, the lawyers who file suit.  As the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce informed the Court, classes enable “a few hun-
dred dollars” to “instantly metastasize into a potentially catastrophic 
judgment of hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars of dam-
ages,”412 producing “blackmail settlements”413 that “can cripple a busi-
ness with a gargantuan judgment.”414  Moreover, the Chamber argued 
that “[l]ogic and empirical evidence make clear that class actions do not 
deter unlawful behavior.”415 
Although each side invoked empiricism, the bits of data extant are 
limited.  Studying litigation is hugely expensive, and lawyers working on 
aggregation are a moving target, shifting their methods in response to 
changes in the market and the law.  Data go stale quickly.  Moreover, 
absent class action certification efforts, many methods of aggregation 
take place out of public sight.  Small slices of information — such as a 
study from the Federal Judicial Center (FJC),416 research forays into 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 410 Labor Economists & Statisticians Amici for Dukes, supra note 404, at *20. 
 411 See id. at *22–25 (arguing that the result of using statistical models would be more “just” 
outcomes).  Further, since some would sue and some would not, a formula would be more just 
across a set.  Id. at *29. 
 412 Chamber of Commerce Amicus for AT&T, supra note 122, at *7. 
 413 Id. at 8 n.2 (quoting In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(Posner, J.)).  
 414 Id. at 14; see also Brief of DRI — The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 19, Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277), 2011 WL 288903 (arguing that, “if 
affirmed, the decision . . . would trigger an explosion of meritless class actions filed solely to force 
settlements”). 
 415 Chamber of Commerce Amicus for AT&T, supra note 122, at *4.  
 416 THOMAS E. WILLGING, LAURAL L. HOOPER & ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FI-
NAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (1996), available at 
http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/rule23.pdf [hereinafter FJC, CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR DIS-
TRICTS 1996]. 
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dockets,417 and a RAND review from 2000418 — have looked at filings, 
certifications, and outcomes in particular districts and cases.  For exam-
ple, the FJC examined dockets in a few federal districts and found that 
the majority of proposed classes were not certified, that certified class ac-
tions went to adjudication at rates akin to those of other cases, and that 
class members’ recovery rates from class funds varied widely.419 
Do class actions produce net benefits?  Do they treat class members 
fairly and optimize enforcement or unfairly endow small claimants with 
too much power (as the majority in AT&T opined)?  Do class actions 
have peripheral benefits, such as prompting changes in policy,420 or does 
the publicity put defendants in unfair positions?  The issues are plain.  
But like the claims about the utility and the justice of boilerplate and of 
arbitration, available data offer limited support for grand conclusions.421  
Instead, normative views of the desirability or undesirability of enabling 
ready use of courts drive the results. 
C.  Commonality, Individuality, and Access to Courts 
The Wal-Mart Court thus faced a host of arguments about the merits 
of class actions.  Amid these policy claims, the company framed its chal-
lenge to the certified class based on Rule 23’s text and two alleged due 
process defects, intertwined with the parameters of Title VII.  First, 
Wal-Mart relied on its corporate rights of personhood422 to assert that 
due process as well as Title VII’s directions on back pay determina-
tions entitled it to individualized findings about whether the company 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 417 See, e.g., Nicholas M. Pace & William B. Rubenstein, How Transparent Are Class Action 
Outcomes? Empirical Research on the Availability of Class Action Claims Data 32 (RAND Work-
ing Paper Series, Paper No. WR-599-ICJ, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1206315. 
 418 DEBORAH R. HENSLER, NICHOLAS M. PACE, BONITA DOMBEY-MOORE, BETH GID-
DENS, JENNIFER GROSS & ERIK K. MOLLER, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUB-
LIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000). 
 419 FJC, CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR DISTRICTS 1996, supra note 416, at 9 (finding that thirty-
seven percent of cases filed as class actions were certified); id. at 66 (finding that the trial rate in 
class actions was “not notably different” from that in nonclass civil actions); id. at 69–78 (discuss-
ing varying rates of recovery).  Another study found certification rates in cases removed from 
state court to run at under twenty-five percent.  See THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. 
WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS’ CHOICE 
OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 35 n.49 (2005), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/ 
pdf.nsf/lookup/clact05.pdf/$file/clact05.pdf. 
 420 See Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Asks Supreme Court to Hear Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 26, 2010, at B1; Press Release, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Cole Brown Named Chief Diversity 
Officer, Walmart U.S. (June 22, 2009), available at http://walmartstores.com/pressroom/news/ 
9215.aspx. 
 421 Recovery rates found in a small sample of class actions ranged from under five percent to 
over eighty percent.  Pace & Rubenstein, supra note 417, at 32. 
 422 See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 
876, 899–900 (2010). 
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had nondiscriminatory reasons for its treatment of each female em-
ployee.423  Second, as if a fiduciary for the absent plaintiffs, Wal-Mart 
insisted that plaintiffs’ injunctive requests were dwarfed by the 
amount of back pay424 and therefore that the lower court’s certification 
of a (b)(2) class violated absent class members’ due process rights to no-
tice and the opportunity to opt out.425 
The Wal-Mart class had attracted much concern because of its am-
bition.  The Court’s holding, written by Justice Scalia, is likewise am-
bitious.  When granting certiorari, the Court added the question of 
whether the women had enough in common to meet the prerequisites 
of Rule 23.426  A majority of five answered in the negative.  This part 
of the Court’s ruling imposed a heightened standard of proof at the 
certification stage that undercut the Court’s prior law, which had been 
read to instruct trial judges not to go deeply into the merits when rul-
ing on certification.427 
But even as that 5–4 divide mirrored AT&T, all nine agreed in one 
respect: back pay claims of the kind advanced by the plaintiffs could 
not be part of a mandatory class action under 23(b)(2)428 but could be 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 423 Brief for Petitioner, Wal-Mart, supra note 123, at *36–43 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-
5(g)(2) (2006)).  Wal-Mart argued that the “‘right to litigate the issues raised’ . . . includes the right 
‘to present every available defense.’”  Id. at *43 (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 
673, 682 (1971); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972)). 
 424 Id. at *50.  Wal-Mart relied on the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23(b)(2).  See 39 
F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966) (“The subdivision does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final 
relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages.”).  The concept of “incidental” 
monetary claims grew out of this comment, and many courts had used 23(b)(2) to certify Title VII 
classes, including those seeking back pay.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., “You Just Can’t Get There 
From Here”: A Primer on Wal-Mart v. Dukes, U.S. L. WK., July 19, 2011, at 93 [hereinafter Cof-
fee, A Primer on Wal-Mart]. 
 425 Brief for Petitioner, Wal-Mart, supra note 123, at *1 (arguing that the structure of the class 
“abrogate[d] the substantive and procedural rights of both Wal-Mart and absent class members”).  
Unless certification was reversed, the class representatives would be allowed to “extinguish the 
rights of millions of absent class members without even telling them about it.”  Id. at *2.  Because 
they could not opt out, “[a]bsent class members are powerless to extricate themselves from the 
class even though their interests squarely conflict with those of the named plaintiffs purporting to 
represent them.”  Id. at *37. 
 426 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010) (mem.) (granting petition for certiorari 
and adding the question “[w]hether the class certification ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was consis-
tent with Rule 23(a)” to the one posed, “[w]hether claims for monetary relief can be certified under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) . . . and, if so, under what circumstances,” Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at i, Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277), 2010 WL 3355820). 
 427 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), had been read to disapprove of that ap-
proach.  See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 n.6.  See generally Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial 
Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 324 (2011); Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Mer-
its, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251 (2002). 
 428 As John Coffee commented shortly after the Wal-Mart decision came down, the Court’s unan-
imous agreement on the presumptive unavailability of (b)(2) classes was a blow to Title VII plain-
tiffs.  Coffee, A Primer on Wal-Mart, supra note 424, at 610–11.  Lower courts had long proceeded 
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pursued only through a (b)(3) class action, requiring the “best notice 
that is practicable” to plaintiffs so that they could exclude themselves 
from the class.429  Why?  The Court’s reasons were twofold. 
Plaintiffs’ autonomy and liberty were a first concern.  Justice Sca-
lia’s opinion explained that those with money at stake had a right to 
decide “for themselves whether to tie their fates to the class representa-
tives’ or go it alone.”430  But the Court did not explore the prospects for 
exercising that option.  Betty Dukes had tried to “go it alone” against 
Wal-Mart.  Her pro se complaint, while impressive given her lack of le-
gal training, had little chance of prevailing absent the assistance of law-
yers.  Professionals, however, would not likely invest in individual efforts 
to seek the small amount of back pay owed (at two dollars an hour, even 
if over several years) because the “hassle” (to borrow from Justice Brey-
er’s AT&T dissent)431 of investigation and litigation, as well as the re-
sources of the opponent, make illusory the use of the courts by such 
one-shot players. 
The Court’s second reason for disaggregating was Wal-Mart’s “en-
title[ment] to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims”432 un-
der Title VII, which the Court translated to mean that the company 
had court-based rights to “individualized determinations of each em-
ployee’s eligibility for backpay.”433  The Court also mentioned the Due 
Process Clause434 in reference to its decision that a state’s personal ju-
risdiction over absent plaintiffs with damage claims depended on their 
consent, inferred by offering them opt-out rights.435  But the Wal-Mart 
Court offered no explanation of why rights to raise defenses could be 
instantiated only through single-file procedures. 
Given that Justice Scalia, who authored the opinion, is well known 
for using historical analyses436 to illuminate the “cryptic and abstract” 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
to certify classes under (b)(2) because, while common issues existed that permitted decisions on 
certain aspects en masse, plaintiffs could rarely demonstrate the “predominance” of those common 
issues for purposes of the (b)(3) certification.  Id.  Further, given Title VII’s reference to “back 
pay” in the context of “other equitable relief,” some courts have understood that remedy as falling 
under (b)(2)’s parameters.  For discussions of back pay as equitable restitution and the degree of 
discretion judges had to award it, see Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196–97 (1974), and Albe-
marle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).  See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the power to provide back pay without a jury trial).  
 429 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558. 
 430 Id. at 2559. 
 431 AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1760 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Laster v. AT&T, 584 F.3d 849, 856 
(9th Cir. 2009)).  
 432 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. 
 433 Id. at 2560. 
 434 Id. at 2559–60. 
 435 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985), cited with approval in Wal-Mart, 
131 S. Ct. at 2559.  See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion 
Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148 (1998). 
 436 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 609–19 (1990). 
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commands of the Due Process Clause,437 one answer might have come 
from history, implicitly evoked through his comment that class actions 
were the exception to the “usual rule” that litigation was conducted by 
“individual named parties only.”438  Autonomy expressed through per-
sonal participation has great appeal and deep roots in the American 
political and legal narrative.439 
Yet history alone cannot justify individualization.  As Stephen Yea-
zell and others have documented, group litigation also has a long and 
complex lineage dating back to medieval parishes (“a world of collec-
tivity”) and moving through the creation of corporate personalities to 
the transformations occasioned in the “modern” class action.440  Re-
peatedly, group litigation did work for the state, as “the king and bar-
ons . . . called” groups into existence via incorporation so as to govern 
them, and group solidarity emerged from sharing conditions on the 
ground (literally and metaphorically).441  While, as the 1950 Mullane 
decision illustrates, the state still seeks decisions that embrace large 
numbers of people, the social conditions for doing so have changed.  
Thus, when groups “became anomalous” in practice,442 courts and leg-
islatures “called” them into being. 
But what people ought to be bundled in groups?  The 1966 class 
action rule, coupled with new statutory rights and a widening circle of 
persons recognized as rights holders, introduced the challenges that the 
debate about the Dukes plaintiffs’ commonality tracks.  What level of 
identity of interests, as contrasted with forms of delegation through ac-
tual or inferred consent, should authorize representatives to proceed 
for absentees, and how does Rule 23 guide that judgment?443  As  Ar-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 437 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).   
 438 See supra p. 135. 
 439 See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOC-
RACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009).  Redish argued that class 
actions are an unconstitutional encroachment on liberal democratic autonomy values. 
 440 See YEAZELL, MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION, supra note 26, at 25–41, 57–71. 
 441 Id. at 83, 96. 
 442 Id. at 99. 
 443 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, argued that the text of 
Rule 23(a) required only “questions of law or fact common to the class.”  See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2562 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Looking to the dictionary (as 
some of her colleagues have done in the past), Justice Ginsburg then offered the definition of a 
“question of fact” as “[a] disputed issue to be resolved . . . [at] trial.”  Id. (alterations in original) 
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1366 (9th ed. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
What the record showed was that women were “70 percent of the hourly jobs” but “only ‘33 per-
cent of management employees.’”  Id. at 2563 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 
137, 146 (N.D. Cal. 2004)).  Further, the statistics identified both wage gaps and “disparities with-
in stores.”  Id. at 2564 n.5.  Given the policies of the company (a “tap on the shoulder” promotion 
process; a systemwide discretionary “$2 band for every position’s hourly pay rate”; and an obliga-
tion that, “as a condition of promotion to management jobs, . . . employees be willing to relocate” 
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thur Leff put it decades ago, the answer depends on disaggregating 
factors to choose which are relevant.  “[T]here is no such thing as a 
thoroughly homogeneous class. . . . The minute you shift your atten-
tion from the common element upon which your classification is based 
to some other, previously ignored, your classification explodes.  Or at 
least it ought to.”444 
Recognition of that point has generated a host of decisions identify-
ing subclasses or issue classes, for which judges have done microanaly-
ses to determine that members of a group have enough in common as 
to a particular aspect of a litigation, such as an “issues” or a “liability” 
class.  Further, judges have devised methods to test claims through 
“bellwethers” — a form of purposive sampling that identifies individu-
al instances as representative of a set and relies on trials of those cases 
to extrapolate judgments for others.445  Judges and commentators jus-
tify such procedures on the view that, across a set, these methods pro-
duce more “fair” and “just” results for both plaintiffs and defendants 
than would individual decisionmaking.446  In addition, by publicly ac-
counting for how distinctions are drawn among claimants, these sam-
pling devices enable forms of accountability that enhance the private 
bargaining “in the shadow of the law” for which trial verdicts provide 
benchmarks.447 
These extrapolation methods can be analogized to the procedure 
endorsed in the 1950 Mullane decision, also seeking to be due process 
compliant while focused on enabling the underlying economic transac-
tion of pooling trusts and the regulatory goals of oversight.  Individual 
notice was required, but only in a form that was not so burdensome as 
to undo either goal.  And sampling was licensed on the theory that, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
to preserve “uniformity throughout the company,” id. at 2563), enough commonality existed for a 
preliminary showing required by Rule 23(a).  Id. at 2565.  
  The dissent made another linguistic point, that if the question of “differences between class 
members” is subsumed under the analysis of commonality, “no mission remains for Rule 23(b)(3)” 
with its textual direction to evaluate whether common issues “predominate” over individual ones.  
Id. at 2566.  The dissent and majority also disagreed about the relationship between the merits 
and certification questions, and both opinions cited Richard A. Nagareda’s essay Class Certifica-
tion in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97 (2009).  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct at 2551, 
2557 (majority opinion); id. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 444 Leff, supra note 301, at 132–33. 
 445 See Alexandra D. LaHav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 637 (2008) (ar-
guing that such procedures bring “public, democratic decisionmaking” into arenas “dominated by 
private settlement”). 
 446 An oft-cited example of extrapolation is Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 
649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), which relied on sampling in asbestos litigation by using 160 cases to deter-
mine compensatory damages for 2300 cases.  See id. at 652–54.  See generally Robert G. Bone, 
Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 561 (1993).   
 447 See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
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given sufficiently shared interests, notice to some could suffice to produce 
the desired level of information to and control over representatives. 
Moreover, payments are routinely made under settlement decrees 
through categorizing individuals on a few dimensions (as administra-
tive systems do) and distributing funds.  Indeed, that method has been 
proposed for the settlement of an EEOC action on behalf of a “class of 
females” seeking to be hired in “open order-filler positions” at a Wal-
Mart distribution center in London, Kentucky.448  Without admitting 
liability, Wal-Mart made various concessions on hiring and deposited 
$11.7 million in back pay and compensatory damages, to be allocated 
to 1380 women who had sought employment at the center between 
1998 and 2005.449 
These various innovations meld aggregation (often on liability) 
with forms of structured disaggregation to provide remedies.  Wal-
Mart sideswiped such efforts by, in dicta, disapproving of what the 
Court called “Trial by Formula,” and specifically chastising a lower 
court effort to do so through its evaluation of several dozens of indi-
vidual claims used to extrapolate values for a class of several thou-
sand.450  That hostility built on the rejection, by the majority of five, 
of the claim by the Dukes class that it met Rule 23(a)’s commonality 
requirement.  This aspect of the holding precluded a remand to ex-
plore the wisdom of subdivisions into clusters of claimants for certain 
issues or by geography or kind of job.  Further, the decision by all nine 
Justices to prohibit the use of a mandatory class for back-pay claims 
limited access to courts for the construction of remedies predicated on 
grids to distribute funds across large numbers of claimants seeking re-
lief based on structurally parallel liability arguments. 
These Wal-Mart rulings crafted new impediments to the congres-
sional charter authorizing private enforcement of Title VII as well as 
to Rule 23’s recognition of different kinds of relatedness (the (b)(1), 
(b)(2), and (b)(3) classes) as a predicate for aggregation under judicial 
supervision.  (Soon after the decision was announced, one program for 
lawyers asked whether the ruling sounded the “Death of Complex 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 448 Consent Decree at 1, EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01-339-KKC (E.D. Ky. Mar. 1, 
2010). 
 449 Id. at 3–7; Revised Notice of Proposed Distribution, EEOC v. Wal-Mart, No. 6:01-cv-00339 
(E.D. Ky. Feb. 15, 2011).  Awards, ranging from $2000 to $42,000, were to depend on information 
provided by claimants on forms soliciting facts about whether a person met the established criteria. 
 450 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.  Mentioned was Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th 
Cir. 1996), cited with approval by the Ninth Circuit in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.  See 603 
F.3d 571, 625–27 (9th Cir. 2010).  The district court in Hilao calculated compensatory damages for 
9541 class members by having a special master value 137 claims, from which compensatory dam-
ages were extrapolated for the class.  See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 782–83. 
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Class Actions.”451)  Akin to the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, 
focused on a defendant’s intentionality rather than the impact on plain-
tiffs of patterns of behavior,452 the Court took the large-scale interactions 
of Wal-Mart and its workforce and flipped them into individualized ex-
changes.  In contrast, the four dissenters suggested in Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion that the wiser course was to return the case to the trial court for 
consideration of whether a class could be certified under (b)(3).453 
With the aegis of the class action reduced, individuals are remitted 
to the power of either their adversaries or their lawyers.  Given the 
limits on class certification, plaintiff lawyers who remain in the aggre-
gate market have new incentives to bundle clients into “aggregate set-
tlements,” a method the ALI proposed to structure in 2009 by calling 
for legislatures to permit lawyers to obtain ex ante agreements from 
clients asked to consent in advance to private settlements negotiated 
thereafter.  The settlements would, if approved by a majority of the 
client cohort formed by the lawyer, bind all without obliging anyone  
to go to court to disclose or justify publicly the terms that were set.454  
Moreover, providers like AT&T and employers like Wal-Mart can ab-
ort public inquiries altogether by binding their customers and em-
ployees through boilerplate forms waiving access to court. 
IV.  THE SUBSTANCE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: 
BALANCING DISPARATE RESOURCES AND ADJUDICATING 
LEGITIMACY IN TURNER V. ROGERS 
A requirement that the State provide counsel to the noncustodial parent 
[when the custodial parent lacks counsel] . . . could make the proceeding 
less fair overall . . . . 
— Turner v. Rogers (2011)455  
At the outset, I sketched five kinds of fairness analyses — evaluat-
ing the quality of specific procedures, the resources of adversaries, the 
disparities of capacities within a set of similarly situated litigants, the 
ability to access court, and the role of publicity in ensuring the demo-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 451 The decision’s breadth prompted the ALI and American Bar Association to host a discus-
sion titled “Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Death of Complex Class Actions?”  See ALI-ABA, http://www.ali-
aba.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=courses.course&course_code=TSTI05 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 452 See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of De-
cision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protec-
tion, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011). 
 453 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 454 ALI 2009 AGGREGATION PRINCIPLES, supra note 394, at 264–89.  This process has paral-
lels to the class action waivers discussed above.  See Judith Resnik, Compared to What? ALI Ag-
gregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Process and of Lawyers’ Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 628, 681–83 (2011).  
 455 131 S. Ct. at 2519. 
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cratic character of law application and generation.  All inform Turner 
v. Rogers. 
Michael Turner advanced a positive right — that the state had the 
obligation to provide him with counsel when seeking to impose the 
sanction of confinement.  He lost that claim.  Turner holds that the 
Due Process Clause “does not automatically require the provision of 
counsel at civil contempt proceedings” for an indigent facing incarcera-
tion of up to one year because of an unpaid child support order owed 
to a child’s custodian, who, the Court noted, was also likely to lack 
counsel.456  Resource asymmetries drove that result, as the Court con-
cluded that mandating counsel for a noncustodial parent when the cus-
todial parent lacked counsel “could make the proceeding less fair over-
all.”457  Thus, and despite the degree to which South Carolina was 
implicated in the pursuit of debtor parents, the majority specifically 
limited its no-lawyer rule to cases in which the opposing party is a pri-
vate, not a public, actor.458 
Although Turner lost his right-to-counsel claim, his civil contempt 
sentence was reversed because he won recognition of two other en-
titlements, both moored in a substantive understanding of procedural 
due process’s import.459  If a contemnor facing an unrepresented pri-
vate opponent lacks a lawyer, the Due Process Clause requires “substi-
tute procedural safeguards,”460 including clear notice that the legal 
question to be decided is the ability to pay and a method “to elicit in-
formation about his financial circumstances.”461  Further, as a predi-
cate to detention for violation of child support payments due, the 
judge must make an express evidentiary finding that the debtor “was 
able to pay his arrearage.”462  Absent such “alternative procedures that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 456 Id. at 2520.  All members of the Court agreed that civil contemnors’ rights did not rest on 
the Sixth Amendment, which they limited to criminal defendants.  Id. at 2516; id. at 2521 (Tho-
mas, J., dissenting).  The majority relied instead on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.  Id. at 2520 (majority opinion).  
 457 Id. at 2519. 
 458 Id. at 2520.  
 459 Both entitlements were also suggested by the Solicitor General of the United States in its 
amicus filing.  U.S. Amicus, Turner, supra note 93, at 19–23. 
 460 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518. 
 461 Id. at 2520.  
 462 Id.  The majority was ambiguous as to whether judges are required to make such a finding 
whether or not a debtor has counsel, for as the dissent noted, the Court drew much of its ruling 
requiring “alternatives” to the counsel right that Turner pressed from the Solicitor General’s brief.  
See id. at 2521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Support for an independent right to a finding of willful 
incapacity to pay could be analogized to the right to an evidentiary finding predicated on due 
process that has been recognized in the criminal context.  See generally Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U.S. 307 (1979). 
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assure a fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-
related question,”463 a state cannot send a debtor to jail. 
Five Justices centered their ruling on a shared understanding of 
what was “fair.”  That word is so often equated with due process, and 
the terms “fair hearing” and “fairness” are so commonplace in doctrine 
and statutes that one might expect to be able to trace fairness’s long 
pedigree in constitutional texts and case law.  Indeed, the entailments 
of what modern constitutional law has brought within the rubric of 
due process reflect a set of concerns about justice that date back to 
Thomas Aquinas and invite discussions of the relationship between 
fairness and commutative and distributive justice.464 
While fairness is now commonplace (for example, the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005465 and Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights),466 the term “fair” is absent from both federal and state 
constitutions of the founding era.467  Indeed, the word was relatively 
rarely invoked in case law before the twentieth century.468  Rather, as 
Justice Thomas discussed in his Turner dissent, due process once was 
viewed through the lens of customary practice.469  Procedures that ac-
corded with “the law of the land” were all that the Constitution re-
quired.470  Thus, Justice Thomas argued that because “an original un-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 463 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2512. 
 464 See generally DANIEL MARK NELSON, THE PRIORITY OF PRUDENCE: VIRTUE AND 
NATURE LAW IN THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN ETHICS (1992); 
Quentin Skinner, Ambrogio Lorenzetti: The Artist as Political Philosopher, 72 PROC. BRIT-
ISH ACAD. 1 (1987). 
 465 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)).  See gener-
ally Symposium, Fairness to Whom? Perspectives on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008). 
 466 ECHR, supra note 2, art. 6.1 (“fair and public hearing”). 
 467 See generally Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The Original Understanding, 4 
CONST. COMMENT. 339 (1987); Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Ori-
gins of Due Process of Law, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265 (1975); Miller, Due Process, supra note 
38.  The term “fair” was not commonly invoked in published decisions by nineteenth-century 
English judges.  Ian Langford, Fair Trial: The History of an Idea, 8 J. HUM. RTS. 37 (2009).  Fur-
ther, the word “fair” once referenced how one looked (fair as in “beautiful”) and then came to be 
read in law as “free from blemish.”  Id. at 38, 40–46. 
 468 A search of a Supreme Court online database through 2008 found that the phrase “opportu-
nity to be heard” gained currency after the Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment, with 554 
of the 556 opinions using the phrase issued after 1866.  The Court did not often deploy the phrase 
“fundamental fairness” until the 1940s.  See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) 
(concluding that the “denial of due process” in a criminal trial “is the failure to observe that fun-
damental fairness essential to the very concept of justice”).  After the 1960s, “fundamental fair-
ness” was a more frequent referent, with 212 of 235 opinions invoking the phrase issued since 
1960.  
 469 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas was joined in full by 
Justice Scalia and in some respects by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.  
 470 See Eberle, supra note 467, at 341–42.  Eberle noted that the South Carolina Constitution of 
1778 provided such protection and that none of the early state constitutions used the term “due 
process.”  Id.  His analysis of pre–Civil War case law focused on how often courts looked to “set-
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derstanding of the Constitution” gave no right to counsel in civil cases 
and only a right to “employ counsel” under the Sixth Amendment, that 
Amendment had no role to play.  Instead, due process governed Turn-
er’s claim and, for Justice Thomas, required consideration only of 
processes sanctioned by “settled usage.”471  Since civil contemnors had 
historically not been afforded appointed counsel, Justice Thomas con-
cluded that Turner had no right to a lawyer.472 
Yet, as the Turner majority reflects, the Court has repeatedly re-
jected that analysis.  Instead, over the last several decades, the Court 
developed a test for procedural adequacy through a formula by which 
to decide the quantum of process “due.”473  The balancing test (known 
by the name of the case, Mathews v. Eldridge, that detailed it) identi-
fies as factors to consider the “private interest that will be affected,” 
the government interest in the procedures provided, and the instru-
mental benefits and costs — in terms of the risk of error — of addi-
tional procedures argued to be constitutionally required.474 
This utilitarian calculation, absent from the Wal-Mart opinion, 
provides insight into how judges reason about what fairness entails.  
For example, had Wal-Mart deployed Mathews v. Eldridge to consider 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
tled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England” to de-
termine the adequacy of procedures provided.  Id. at 359 (quoting Murray v. Hoboken Land & 
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 277 (1855)) (internal quotation mark omitted).  Further, since jury 
rights were customary, the concept of what process was due was often linked to civil jury rights.  
See id. at 362.  
 471 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 
163, 197 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation 
mark omitted). 
 472 Id. at 2521–22.  This portion of Justice Thomas’s dissent was joined by Justice Scalia but 
not by Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito. 
 473 When doing so in the early twentieth century, the Court relied on a formulation that the 
“essential elements of due process of law” were “notice and opportunity to defend.”  Simon v. 
Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436 (1901) (emphasis added).  Within a few decades, the Supreme Court set-
tled on the description that the “fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to 
be heard.”  Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank 
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).  
 474 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  While Mathews v. Eldridge is regularly invoked — including in 
cases evaluating procedures provided to detainees at Guantanamo, see, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
542 U.S. 507, 529–35 (2004) — it is not the only test deployed by the Supreme Court to assess pro-
cedural adequacy.  As noted, historical practice is the metric that some Justices have repeatedly 
embraced.  See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 608–19, 622–23 (1990).  Another line of 
cases, involving burdens of proof in state criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings, is exemplified 
by Medina v. California, which defers to states on criminal procedures unless they “offend[] some 
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fun-
damental.”  505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (quoting, inter alia, Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 
(1977)) (internal quotation mark omitted).  Before Turner, one could also have identified a special 
test for rights to counsel for civil litigants: the 1981 decision of Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services cited the Mathews v. Eldridge formulation as creating a presumption against counsel for 
civil litigants, to be balanced in the individual case against the utility of providing a lawyer.  452 
U.S. 18, 31 (1981).  
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the merits of the competing claims about the impact of class certification 
on accuracy, economy, and justice, the factors to consider would have in-
cluded the degree of commonality among co-plaintiffs and the nature of 
the claims to be decided, the level of alleged lack of compliance with the 
law in the marketplace, and the resources and incentives available for 
alternative forms of enforcement, as contrasted to the complexity of the 
alternative processes available, their costs, the risk and nature of the er-
rors made by individual and group procedures, and which side ought to 
bear the risks of error. 
Yet even as Mathews v. Eldridge prompts a judicial accounting of 
the bases for a due process ruling, its veneer of scientific constraints on 
judicial judgment can serve to mask the lack of genuine empiricism.  
Neither judges nor litigants can identify with any rigor the actual costs 
of various procedures, let alone model (or know) the impact in terms of 
false positives and negatives produced by the same, more, or different 
processes.  In Wal-Mart, the sides offered warring hyperbole about the 
impact of class actions.  In AT&T, the parties disagreed about the effi-
cacy and accuracy of class arbitrations, and in Turner, the disputants 
debated whether lawyers slowed or facilitated decisionmaking and 
whether adding lawyers would enhance accuracy or produce more 
misguided results.475  While one can state the equation, one cannot do 
the math because the data are missing.  Interpretative choices abound. 
Moreover, the Mathews v. Eldridge formulation, focused on accu-
racy, does not take other goals that can be assigned to due process into 
account.  As Jerry Mashaw explained, Mathews v. Eldridge addressed 
procedures for determining an individual’s continuing eligibility for 
disability benefits.  Recipients had various interests as part of a class 
of claimants, all entitled by federal legislation to benefits if eligible.  
Mashaw argued that the due process prohibition against arbitrary 
state action encompassed values he catalogued as accuracy, dignity, 
and equality.476  Mashaw suggested that a trial-like proceeding might 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 475 For example, according to an amicus brief submitted in Turner, one “2010 observational 
study” of 326 parent/debtor contempt hearings found that 98% of the contemnors were unrepre-
sented by counsel, 95% were sentenced to jail for an average of three months, 75% testified about 
problems of obtaining income and lacking the ability to pay, and parents without counsel were 
held in contempt “more than twice as often as” those represented by counsel.  Patterson Amici for 
Turner, supra note 97, at 3.  The study also recorded clerical errors and noted that “purge 
amounts” were not “tailored to” particular contemnors’ circumstances.  Id. at 16, 19.  As for the 
costs of error, in addition to wrongful incarceration, the state paid some $143 million to run its 
jails in 2009, and about 13% of those in jail came from family court.  Id. at 25–27; infra note 482.  
But as Rogers’s law professor amici countered, the observational data were limited, and correla-
tions were not necessarily evidence of causation.  See Law Professors’ Amici for Rogers, supra 
note 105, at 7–8. 
 476 Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudica-
tion in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 
46 (1976) [hereinafter Mashaw, Due Process Calculus].  As Mashaw also noted, the formulation in 
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be less useful to effectuate those interests than would be management 
mechanisms, such as oversight, audits, and sanctions, to render consis-
tent and correct decisions across the group.477  From that vantage 
point, administration and management could be a better way to pro-
duce fairness than adversarial adjudication. 
Given the numbers of family members who are in courts but lack 
lawyers, the temptation to remove those issues from courts and take 
up the managerial approach Mashaw advocated could be powerful.  In 
the Turner context of family support collection procedures, for exam-
ple, the federal government has looked to national databases to enable 
property and income attachments rather than court sanctions of con-
tempt.478  Yet what Turner reveals are the risks of moving to a com-
pletely bureaucratic or privatized regime. 
Turner’s volunteer lawyer made an argument to the Court that the 
majority ignored when framing the problem as one of fact (did Turner 
have or could he get the money to pay?).  Turner’s lawyer had asked 
the Court to recognize the embedded legal question of what constitutes 
an “ability to pay”479 and hence the need to explore the problems of 
when and how to impute income earning capacities to individuals.  
Administrative agencies, as currently constituted, are generally di-
rected to apply facts to statutory criteria and not to interrogate those 
criteria.  Further, whether in court or in administrative or private set-
tings, resource asymmetries would remain a challenge; individuals 
would be faced with repeat-player adversaries, be they social welfare 
staff or lawyers employed by social services departments. 
Several state and federal courts had drawn the line at liberty and 
held that jail time required that counsel be afforded to civil contem-
nors.480  Turner’s regulation of judges instead is a disquieting retrench-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Mathews v. Eldridge marked a cut back from plaintiffs’ perspectives, in that the test was often 
used to uphold limited procedures.  See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–25 (2005). 
 477 Mashaw, Due Process Calculus, supra note 476, at 45–57. 
 478 See 131 S. Ct. at 2517.  
 479 Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10) [hereinafter Tran-
script of Oral Argument, Turner].  Underlying the question was whether contemnors had defenses 
and whether the procedures in place helped to inform judges of them.  See Brief Amici Curiae of 
the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Brennan Center for Justice, the National 
Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n, the Southern Center for Human Rights, and the American Civil Li-
berties Union in Support of Petitioner at 16–19, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10), 2011 WL 
160857.  More generally, the claim is that lawyers are efficient for courts as well as for parties and 
enhance the quality of decisions.  See ABA Amicus for Turner, supra note 60, at 7–11.  Of course, 
raising such claims would alter the character of proceedings, such as those in South Carolina, that 
took but a few minutes of court time.  As argued to the Court, “[g]iven the straightforward nature 
of child support enforcement proceedings . . . adding lawyers may do little more than increase the 
contentiousness and prolong the duration of the proceeding.”  Law Professors’ Amici for Rogers, 
supra note 105, at 13. 
 480 See cases cited supra note 56. 
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ment.  Given the many references in the majority and dissenting opin-
ions to mothers as the likely custodial parents who were also unlikely 
to have retained lawyers,481 the holding is a frank due process / symme-
try of resources ruling that elides the alternative form of equality — 
providing lawyers for both parties as well as for the child. 
The Court’s imposition of adjudicatory standards could result in 
state court actions of different forms.  One default would be that, in 
lieu of crafting “alternative procedures,” states could supply lawyers 
for indigent contemnors, paying that price for seeking incarceration.  A 
yet more economical form of compliance would be not to seek jail time 
for debtors — and thereby save the costs of lawyers, procedures, and 
confinement (which, in Turner’s case, far outstripped the few thousand 
dollars owed).482  As presently formatted, however, the Turner rule is 
oddly incomplete.  Although it imposes a regulatory regime on South 
Carolina, enforcement depends on and returns contemnors to the very 
judges who dealt with them too hastily. 
But for lawyers who volunteered their services to Turner and “open 
court” obligations, we — third parties — would have no knowledge of 
how South Carolina struggles to staff its courts, the typewritten forms 
it uses (but which are not always completed), and the number of 
people the state sends, uncounseled, to jail.  (Recall that Turner was en 
route to another six months after he had completed the twelve-month 
sentence.)  What the public in-court process revealed were the inade-
quacies of the decider of fact.  The trial judge spent less than five min-
utes, made no findings on the record, left the form incomplete, and 
sent Turner to jail for twelve months. 
How in the future can one ascertain that the requisite findings are 
made and procedural alternatives installed?  Current law on standing 
makes unlikely the potential for a class of potential contemnors to 
bring an affirmative federal action against states, and damages actions 
would be bounded by immunity doctrines.  Further, while the majority 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 481 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at  2519–20; id. at 2525–27 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 482 Specifically, Turner amici noted that jail administrators reported that 13%–16% of their 
population was “made up of family court contemnors,” see Patterson Amici for Turner, supra note 
97, at 4, and that the state spent over $17,000 per detainee, id. at 24–27.  More generally, South 
Carolina has not been an economically rational actor in its structuring of child support enforce-
ment.  As the Solicitor General informed the Court, South Carolina was the “only State that does 
not have a certified automated system” for child support enforcement, as required by federal law, 
and, by the time the case was argued, it had paid $72 million in fines.  U.S. Amicus, Turner, supra 
note 93, at 6, 7 n.4; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, Turner, supra note 479, at 61; supra note 
475. 
  Rogers’s amici argued the utility of detention and the inappropriateness of imposing counsel 
rights and cited the experiences in New Jersey in support of that position.  After that state’s su-
preme court required counsel for indigent parents facing incarceration, its use of the detention 
sanction stopped, as the state could not afford to provide counsel to all eligible.  Senators’ Amici 
for Rogers, supra note 93, at 24–25. 
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argued that it needed to respect the bright line of “criminal/civil,” it 
might well have relied on another bright line of liberty/detention.  Ab-
sent some public accounting and lawyer involvement, few mechanisms 
exist to police the fairness that Turner calls for, to elaborate the norma-
tive question of when the state ought to conclude that a parent has the 
“ability” — as a matter of fact and law — to pay, and to police the 
person making those judgments across sets of similarly situated liti-
gants.  But for the information-forcing function of courts (which could 
be a legal condition mandated for agencies and private providers if ad-
judicatory functions were devolved to them), the challenges facing the 
Turner and Rogers households and the judges of South Carolina be-
come invisible. 
V.  DISAGGREGATED UNFAIRNESS, UNFAIR AGGREGATIONS, 
POLITICAL WILL, AND FRAGILE COURTS 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Wal-Mart noted the “adventuresome in-
novation” of the drafters of the 1966 class action rule.483  All  three of 
the opinions discussed here are likewise innovative, fashioning proce-
dural requirements by extrapolations from statutes, rules, and the 
Constitution.  AT&T and Wal-Mart fit within a series of procedural 
modeling decisions of this and the last few Terms, such as rulings on 
pleadings, standing, government immunities, jurisdiction, and sum-
mary judgment, that impose significant entry barriers to federal 
courts.484  The narrowing of federal access puts pressure on state 
courts, which bear the brunt of responding to civil litigants of all in-
comes and to the vast numbers of criminal defendants — totaling 50 
million cases annually.485 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 483 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558 (referring to Rule 23(b)(3)) (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 484 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleadings); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (pleadings); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 
(2011) (standing); Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (immunity); Bowles v. Russell, 127 
S. Ct. 2360 (2007) (jurisdictional time barriers).  See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and 
the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109 (2009); Arthur R. Miller, The 
Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency 
Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003). 
 485 State court filings (traffic cases excluded) rose almost 22% from the 1980s to the 1990s; rose 
10.6% from the 1990s to 2000; and in the interval from 2000 to 2008, rose more than 39%. 
The numbers include domestic cases and, in the most recent interval, criminal filings, which rose 
at twice the rate of civil filings.  See COURT STATISTICS & INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL 
REPORT 1980, 55 tbl.13 (1984); COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1990, 108 tbl.7 (1992); 
COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD 
STATISTICS, 2001, 138 tbl.7 (2002); COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2008, 45 tbl.1 (2010); COURT STATISTICS 
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The twentieth-century narrative of ever-expanding federal court ac-
tivity produced a sense of confidence that supported impressive in-
vestments in jurisdiction, judgeships, and courthouses.  The numbers 
of judges, case filings, and courthouses rose dramatically during most 
of that century.  But federal filing rates are no longer increasing as they 
once did.  In 2010 (as in 1995), some 325,000–350,000 civil and criminal 
cases were begun, outstripped (as they have been in the past) by bank-
ruptcy petitions numbering almost 1.5 million.486  Further, civil filings 
represented the major source of growth during the big spurt years of the 
1960s to the 1980s.  More recently, criminal filings have constituted the 
primary component of the rise in the current federal caseload.487 
The flattening slope of the demand curve suggests that Congress 
and private market participants are reappraising their interest in using 
federal courts.  Indeed, while members of Congress had for decades 
threatened to strip federal jurisdiction, the 1996 Congress did so, as have 
its successors, imposing new limits on the judiciary’s statutory authori-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: 
AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 38 (2010).  Reports are available online at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/SCCS-pastreports.html.  Funding and filing issues 
make criminal and civil litigation interdependent.  See generally HAZEL G. GENN, JUDGING 
CIVIL JUSTICE (2010); Yeazell, supra note 397. 
 486 A comparison between filings predicted in 1995 and filings occurring, as of 2007, can be 
found in ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LONG RANGE 
PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, STATUS REPORT, I-18 (April 2008).  Focusing on the years 
2001, 2006, and 2009, civil and criminal filings averaged 331,022.  The average for bankruptcy 
filings over the same period was 1,317,570; the year-to-year figures were more volatile.  Filings in 
criminal cases increased in 2010 to 78,428.  See Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2011).  Slight variations on these numbers can be found at Federal Court Manage-
ment Statistics, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/ 
FederalCourtManagementStatistics.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2011), and at Judicial Facts and Fig-
ures 2008, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/ 
JudicialFactsAndFigures/JudicialFactsAndFigures2008.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).  For data 
focused on 1995, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
STATISTICS (1995). 
 487 Civil and criminal filings grew about 10% from 1950 to 1965, about 95% from 1965 to 1980, 
and about 50% from 1980 to 1995; since then, the growth has slackened, to under 25% from 1995 to 
2010.  Specifically, from 1950 to 1965, filings in federal courts increased by 9.39% (23.9% increase 
in civil filings and 11.63% decrease in criminal filings).  From 1965 to 1980, total filings increased 
by 95.73% (149.4% increase in civil filings and 13.24% decrease in criminal filings).  From 1980 to 
1995, they increased by 48.39% (47.13% increase in civil filings and 55.78% increase in criminal 
filings).  From 1995 to 2010, they increased by 22.57% (13.68% increase in civil filings and 71.55% 
increase in criminal filings).  Thus, beginning in 1980, the growth in criminal filings outstripped 
the growth in civil filings.  See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS: 1950, at 138 tbl.C1, 165 tbl.D1 (1950); ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 
1965, at 174 tbl.C1, 213 tbl.D1 (1965); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1980, at 370 tbl.C1, 415 tbl.D1 (1980); 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (1995); 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (2010). 
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ty.488  Further, even as the judiciary has been relatively successful in 
maintaining its budgetary allotments,489 Congress has cut back on con-
struction funds,490 refused many judgeship requests, and consistently re-
jected judicial salary increases that would have kept pace with inflation.491 
Some will argue that reduced use of courts is either efficient or, 
whether wise or not, legally compelled.  The majority in AT&T is sure-
ly right to worry about due process in the odd animal called “class ar-
bitration,” birthed through the state and federal courts’ arbitration ju-
risprudence of the past decades.  The Court raised important puzzles 
about how private dispute resolution mechanisms could or should bind 
absent members and provide the closure that makes aggregation at-
tractive to some would-be defendants.492  But the alternative need not 
be to preclude group litigation.  One could permit nonbinding class ar-
bitrations or read the FAA not to preclude court-based class actions, so 
as to return large-scale cases to judges, charged with publicly policing 
both named representatives and decisionmakers. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 488 See, e.g., Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 
1321-66 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(e), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (2006) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), invalidated in part by Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 
2229 (2008); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 489 Support for operating budgets in both fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 was approx-
imately 96% and 98% of the amount sought, respectively.  See Press Release, Admin. Office of 
the U.S. Courts, Judiciary Makes Case for Fiscal Year 2009 Funding (Mar. 12, 2008), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/08-03-12/Judiciary_Makes_Case_for_Fiscal_Year_ 
2009_Funding.aspx; Update: Fiscal Year 2009 and 2010 Budgets, THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 2009, at 
4, 4, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/09-04-01/Update_Fiscal_Year_ 
2009_and_2010_Budgets.aspx; Press Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judiciary to Get 
$6.9 Billion in FY 2010 Appropriations (Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
News/NewsView/09-12-15/Judiciary_To_Get_6_9_Billion_In_FY_2010_Appropriations.aspx.  The 
2011 budget of $6.91 billion was approximately 94% of what was requested.  See Press Release, 
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Expanding Caseload Fuels Judiciary Request for Resources in 
2011 (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/10-03-18/Expanding_ 
Caseload_Fuels_Judiciary_Request_for_Resources_in_2011.aspx; Federal Judiciary Funded to 
End of Fiscal Year, THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 2011, at 1, 1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
News/TheThirdBranch/11-04-01/Federal_Judiciary_Funded_to_End_of_Fiscal_Year.aspx.  Fur-
ther, the $6.91 billion for 2011 was “about 1 percent above a FY 2010 hard freeze level.”  Id. 
 490 See, e.g., Eliminating Waste and Managing Space in Federal Courthouses: GAO Recommen-
dations on Courthouse Construction, Courtroom Sharing, and Enforcing Congressionally Autho-
rized Limits on Size and Cost: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Pub. Bldgs., and 
Emergency Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 111th Cong. 4–5 (2010); see also 
Courtroom Use: Access to Justice, Effective Judicial Administration, and Courtroom Security: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 111th Cong. 1–2 (2010). 
 491 Requests for salaries are a regular feature of the Chief Justice’s annual review of the judi-
ciary.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 155. 
 492 Were the “hybrid” method expanded, and the merits as well as procedures reviewable in 
court, then the arbitrator would become like a special master, functioning with public oversight. 
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Similarly, the Court in Wal-Mart is right to worry about the scope 
and size of the Dukes class, which would have had to prove that an 
official policy of nondiscrimination coupled with corporate culture and 
managerial discretion at 3400 stores worked, systemwide, a discrimina-
tory pattern or practice or had a disparate impact.  Yet the Court not 
only refused that sprawling class but cut off opportunities to tailor a 
viable group-based claim to explore whether the statistically gendered 
pattern of employment violated congressional equality mandates.  In 
passing, the Justices casually disparaged efforts to use “formulas” to 
deal with large numbers of similarly situated disputants so as to dimi-
nish intra-litigant disparities. 
Likewise, the Turner majority was keenly aware of the vast well of 
need, once the line between a “criminal” right to counsel and civil liti-
gation was breached, and the Court also worried about the risk of ge-
nerating asymmetries by insisting on counsel for only one side of a 
family dispute.  But its holding undervalues liberty by permitting per-
sons to be sent to prison for up to a year at a time without imposing 
either counsel or methods to monitor the structural safeguards it pre-
scribed for those facing the loss of liberty. 
Thus, all three cases invented process by assessing the qualities of 
procedures, and all three holdings relied on the asymmetry of resources 
between plaintiff and defendant to justify limiting procedural oppor-
tunities for underequipped litigants — the Concepcions, Betty Dukes, 
and Michael Turner.  Further, AT&T and Wal-Mart insisted on the 
importance of individual volition (to buy services, sign contracts, pur-
chase services, or treat persons equally rather than discriminatorily) 
while providing no procedural supports to enable the persons affected 
to engage in the autonomous pursuit of arguing about the legality of 
the exchanges. 
Just as boilerplate provisions in contracts are justified in part on 
the grounds of fair treatment across consumers, and just as standards 
for employee pay and promotion are aimed at dampening unfair dis-
cretion, courts also need structures to deal en masse, as well as to dis-
aggregate and to customize when appropriate.  The task is to decide 
which persons or entities can be understood as sufficiently similar to 
proceed as a juridical set, as well as to sort out which litigants have 
access to what forms of process.  Debate — in the name of fairness — 
about how to equip litigants individually and through aggregation is 
what a world teeming with claimants requires. 
What is lost through the AT&T and the Wal-Mart preclusion of 
group-based, court-based adjudication is the opportunity to explore 
how to structure aggregate decisionmaking that is fair and regulated.  
What is lost in Turner is an insistence that the state’s coercive power of 
incarceration is not cushioned by adding the adjective “civil.”  What is 
put at risk are not only entitlements to courts but the legitimacy and 
functional integrity of the institutions of courts as well.  Rather than 
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banning entry to courts and imposing presumptions against rights to 
counsel, law needs to welcome struggles with multiple modes of equi-
page and aggregation to learn methods to balance power asymmetries, 
fund lawyers for certain sets of litigants, identify forms of ADR res-
pecting access and publicity rights, and impose regulations and limits 
on those that do not.  Rather than damping down judicial and political 
engagement with these problems, the Court should be inviting input 
from diverse venues of lawmaking, while insisting that certain aspects 
of “fairness” be maintained, in whatever venue is provided.493 
Above, I discussed the repeated exchanges between the Nebraska 
courts and legislature about whether arbitration could coexist with 
constitutional rights to remedies in “open courts,” and I sketched the 
national Civil Gideon movement aiming to identify subsets of indigent 
civil litigants to be given free lawyers.494  These examples illustrate 
that, just as the twentieth century produced a host of targeted reform 
efforts aiming to whittle at the enormous problem of producing fair 
and binding outcomes for millions of new rights holders, attempts are 
under way in the twenty-first to do so as well.  Given the dedication of 
this volume to the Supreme Court’s Term, this Comment has been 
court-centric.  But rather than positioning the three 2010 Term cases 
as exemplary of the only procedural inventiveness on the drawing 
boards, brief examples taken from Congress and from Europe make 
plain that other institutions are assessing the qualities required for fair 
procedures and responding to asymmetries of resources, intra-litigant 
disparities, access to court, and ways to enable the public to compre-
hend the results. 
Since the 1990s, Congress has considered a series of statutory pro-
posals to respond to the Court’s expansion of the Federal Arbitration 
Act.  Several bills have proposed to exempt civil rights plaintiffs, con-
sumers, and employees from being bound by ex ante waivers of court 
access for claims under federal or state law.495  A few have become 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 493 As Rakoff put it, the challenge is how to deal with a volume of disputes without toppling 
courts or leaving all unregulated by removing “large swathes of contracts from the courts to the 
arbitrators.”  Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, supra note 1, at 206. 
 494 The Chief Judge of New York, for example, proposed that free services be provided to 
homeowners facing foreclosure.  See David Streitfeld, New York Courts Vow Legal Aid in Hous-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, at B1.  Child custody disputes are given priority under the Cali-
fornia pilot project.  See Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651(b)(2) 
(2011). 
 495 Bills introduced between 1996 and 2001 were titled Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act 
and were to apply to claims filed under Title VII, the Age Discrimination Act, the Rehabilitation 
Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Family and Med-
ical Leave Act.  See, e.g., Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1996, H.R. 3748, 104th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1996); Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1997, S. 63, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1997); Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1999, S. 121, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999); Civil 
Rights Procedures Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 1489, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001).   
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law.  In 2002, in a bill called the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract 
Arbitration Fairness Act, Congress addressed the “disparity in bargain-
ing power between motor vehicle dealers and manufacturers.”496  The 
statute prevents car companies from enforcing forms requiring arbitra-
tion of disputes with their dealerships.497  The 2008 Farm Bill included 
the Fair Contracts for Growers Act, making unenforceable arbitration 
provisions in contracts between chicken farmers and processing com-
panies, unless agreements to arbitrate are made after conflicts 
emerge.498  In 2010, one set of employees bringing Title VII claims re-
ceived an exemption from arbitration by way of a provision in the De-
fense Appropriations Act of 2010, which restricts mandatory arbitra-
tion clause enforcement by military contractors.499  The same year, the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act made 
unenforceable arbitration provisions in mortgage and home equity 
loans and in certain whistleblower cases.  The legislation also called on 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, created by the Act, as well 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  Since 2007, proposals for an Arbitration Fairness Act have sought FAA exemptions for con-
sumers as well as for civil rights plaintiffs, employees, and other plaintiffs with unequal bargain-
ing power.  See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007); 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009); Arbitration Fairness 
Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011).  Those bills provided that no “predispute 
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable” if it required arbitration of “employment, 
consumer, or franchise dispute[s]” or “dispute[s] arising under any statute intended to protect civil 
rights or to regulate contracts or transactions between parties of unequal bargaining power,” that 
federal law governed, and that the Act’s application was to be “determined by the court, rather 
than the arbitrator,” regardless of whether a contract specified otherwise.  See, e.g., H.R. 3010 § 4.  
Collective bargaining agreements were excluded.  Id. § 4(d).  In addition, a few bills aimed to re-
gulate particular industries, such as the 2008 Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, which 
would have made not “valid” or “enforceable” predispute arbitration agreements between a “long-
term care facility and a resident.”  Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 2838, 110th 
Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b) (2008). 
 496 See Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, S. REP. NO. 107-266, at 2 
(2002) (describing dealers as “virtual economic captives of automobile manufacturers” who proffer 
contracts on a “‘take it or leave it’ basis”).  The law provides that if parties elect, ex post, to arbi-
trate, arbitrators are required to provide them with a written justification for orders.  See 21st 
Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006). 
 497 See 15 U.S.C. § 1226.  
 498 See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 11005, 122 Stat. 
1651 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 197c (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).  Unlike the automobile 
franchise bill, the Fair Contracts for Growers Act does not impose regulations on arbitrators to 
provide written comments.  See 7 U.S.C. § 197c. 
 499 Government contractors receiving more than $1 million are prohibited from enforcing or 
requiring “as a condition of employment” that either employees or independent contractors “agree 
to resolve” claims through arbitration if such claims could have been filed under Title VII or in-
volved any “tort related to or arising out of sexual assault or harassment.”  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a)(1), 123 Stat. 3409 (2009).  This “Fran-
ken” amendment, named after its proponent, Senator Al Franken, came after a woman was alle-
gedly gang-raped by coworkers at a corporate subsidiary in Iraq.  See Chris McGreal, Rape Case 
to Force US Defence Firms into the Open, GUARDIAN, Oct. 16, 2009, at 27. 
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as on the Securities and Exchange Commission, to consider limiting or 
banning predispute arbitration clauses elsewhere.500 
Turning to the transnational context (in which a market for ADR is 
blooming, with both the AAA and JAMS offering globalized servic-
es),501 the relationship between fair hearings and ADR has been de-
bated in Europe’s courts.  The framing is, once again, “fairness,” ob-
liged by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, providing that “[e]veryone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal.”502 
One example comes from a challenge to an Italian statute imposing 
mandatory “dispute settlement rules” for disputes between consumers 
and telecommunication companies and entailing some use of the inter-
net to file claims.503  Consumers argued that the statute violated Eu-
rope’s commitment to providing everyone with a “fair and public hear-
ing.”504  The European Court of Justice (ECJ) responded and, as in the 
U.S. context, a utility calculation was offered.  The ECJ’s Advocate 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 500 Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1414, 922, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  The Bureau is to study the use of 
predispute arbitration provisions in consumer agreements and, if warranted, “may prohibit or im-
pose conditions or limitations on the use of” arbitration provisions in such agreements.  Id. § 1028.  
The Commission’s authority to “prohibit, or impose conditions or limitations on the use of,” arbi-
tration agreements between customers and broker-dealers is set forth in § 921. 
 501 The AAA helped to launch the International Centre for Dispute Resolution.  International 
ADR, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/icdr (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).  JAMS like-
wise is part of a global network.  About JAMS, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/aboutus_ 
overview (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 502 See ECHR, supra note 2, art. 6.1; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
art. 47, Dec. 7, 2000 (2000 O.J. (C. 364)), as adjusted Mar. 3, 2010 (2010 O.J. (C. 83)) (“Right to an 
Effective Remedy and a Fair Trial”).  Fairness, translated as asymmetries in bargaining power, is 
also the concern of the European Union’s Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.  
Council Directive 93/13 (1993). 
 503 In the United States, the term is “online dispute resolution” or ODR.  See Thomas J. Stipa-
nowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future 
of American Arbitration, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 110–11), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1919936.  As Stipanowich also 
noted, see id. at 70–73, the Canadian Supreme Court recently declined (5–4) to insist on arbitra-
tion of a consumer dispute with a cell phone provider.  The court concluded that, given the prohi-
bition of waivers of “rights, benefits, or protections” under the Business Practices and Consumer 
Protection Act of British Columbia, and that statute’s conferral of a right to bring actions in the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, a consumer contract mandating reference of any claims aris-
ing out of a cell phone contract to “private and confidential mediation,” followed if unsuccessful 
“by private, confidential, and binding arbitration,” was not enforceable as to certain claims.  Sei-
del v. Telus Commc’ns, Inc. (2011), 329 D.L.R. 4th 577 at paras. 13, 31, 48–50 (Can.)).  Because 
the cell phone provision made “the class action waiver dependent on the arbitration provision,” it 
too was not enforceable, but the court took no position on whether a class ought to be certified.  
Id. at paras. 46–49. 
 504 See Case C-317/08, Alassini v. Telecom Italia (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://eur-lex 
.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008J0317:EN:HTML.  Under the statute, 
before courts would take jurisdiction, the law required the parties to “attempt to settle the dis-
pute,” electronically or in person, out of court.  Id. 
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General concluded that “a mandatory dispute resolution procedure 
without which judicial proceedings may not be brought does not con-
stitute a disproportionate infringement upon the right to effective judi-
cial protection . . . [but] a minor infringement . . . that is outweighed 
by the opportunity to end the dispute quickly and inexpensively.”505  
In 2010, the ECJ concurred but, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, im-
posed regulatory caveats: that the settlement outcomes were not bind-
ing; that the ADR efforts imposed no “substantial delay” in bringing 
legal proceedings and that the ADR tolled time bars; that forms of 
judicial “interim measures” remained available; and that, if settlement 
procedures were available only electronically, national courts were to 
assess the burden placed on individuals.506  In contrast, the Supreme 
Court’s rulings in AT&T and Wal-Mart work at a less fine-grained lev-
el, imposing no regulations on ADR, leaving people with fewer ave-
nues to lawyers and courts, limiting the role of lower court judges in 
joining with other branches of government to puzzle about due process 
mandates, and reducing public knowledge about transactions. 
VI.  THEORIES OF VALUE FOR COURTS IN DEMOCRACY 
While the conflicts, participants, institutions, procedural formats, 
and outcomes of the three lawsuits resemble an overly pat story line, 
neither a novelist nor happenstance produced them.  Rather, eigh-
teenth- and nineteenth-century constitutional commitments that courts 
be open helped to generate a new set of democratic norms, an ambi-
tious project that put government processes before the public eye and 
offered access to all then understood as rights holders.  The texts and 
common law practices of those eras generated a “settled usage”507 re-
flected in the many constitutions providing rights to remedies in court 
and echoed in Marbury v. Madison’s embrace of those terms as well.508  
But what were those rights and who had them?  None of the liti-
gants in the three cases on which this Comment centers could have 
then asserted their claims, nor could they have formed aggregates or 
been provided free lawyers.  The Concepcions, Betty Dukes, and Re-
becca Rogers gained their entitlements relatively recently, through the 
social and political movements of twentieth-century America, which 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 505 Cases C-317/08 to C-320/08, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott (Nov. 19, 2009), available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008CC0317:EN:HTML. 
 506 Case C-317/08, Alassini, paras. 47–67. 
 507 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 
163, 197 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotation 
mark omitted)). 
 508 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), is the obvious reference here.  Its oft-
quoted phrase is that when an individual has a legal right, “the laws of his country afford him a 
remedy.”  Id. at 168. 
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endowed consumers, employees, and parents with the particular rights 
pressed in all three cases.  Those statutory entitlements interacted with 
new commitments to equality and with the incorporation of dignity as 
a constitutional value,509 thereby transforming the agenda of courts.  
Legislators, state and federal, responded by authorizing more 
judgeships and delineating additional layers of courts, devolving adju-
dicatory authority to administrative agencies, licensing outsourcing to 
private providers, and shaping various aggregate procedures.  Millions 
of annual filings pay tribute to the embeddedness of right-to-remedy 
aspirations.  But political will did not extend to staff all the venues of 
adjudication, to provide funding for all unable to afford lawyers, or to 
regulate the marketplace of private lawyers to reduce the gaps in services. 
Where do these many new users of courts — of which the Concep-
cions, Dukes, and Rogers are exemplary — fit in adjudicatory institu-
tions that have an ancient lineage but have been profoundly altered by 
democratic precepts?  Do courts in democracies remain legitimate if 
their doors are shut to many potential claimants?  And what are the 
risks of doors’ being open too wide, permitting strategic exploitation of 
opponents? 
Three centuries of the open structure of courts produced the 
records excavated here that pose these questions.  Court documents 
provide the lens through which we — the public — learn about the 
consumer claims of Vincent and Liza Concepcion, the bundle of ser-
vices provided by AT&T and its promotion of alternative dispute reso-
lution, the challenges facing workers such as Betty Dukes, the textured 
structure of the workplace at Wal-Mart, the painful family life of Mi-
chael Turner and Rebecca Rogers, and the disparities in resources at 
play in all of these disputes. 
When critiquing the narrow focus of the “due process calculus” in 
Mathews v. Eldridge, Jerry Mashaw termed its approach “three factors 
in search of a theory of value.”510  The issues raised by AT&T v. Con-
cepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers likewise required 
theories of values, implicitly supplied by the Justices as they elabo-
rated doctrine that enabled or limited the use of courts.  The debates 
among the Justices about the utility and the normative desirability of 
access to courts for individuals and groups paralleled broader conflicts 
about the role and function of government regulation and of govern-
ment support in contexts ranging from voting to health and education. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 509 See, e.g., Naomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 183 (2011); Reva Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Abortion: Abortion Restrictions Un-
der Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008); Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult 
to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1934 
(2003). 
 510 Mashaw, Due Process Calculus, supra note 476, at 28–30. 
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Yet the question of governments’ relationships to courts is distinct, 
not only because of the constitutional charter running to courts but al-
so because of the dependence of the state on courts to order its society.  
If persons like the plaintiffs discussed here have no way to voice their 
claims — be they right or wrong — in court, if the ordinary civil liti-
gant is priced out or among the millions of pro se complainants, then 
courts become the domain of the criminal defendant; of the well-to-do 
litigants who opt in rather than buying private dispute resolution ser-
vices; of the few constitutional claimants able, like Turner, to attract 
issue-oriented lawyers; and of the government, supported by taxpayer 
dollars in its role as plaintiff or defendant in litigation.  That reduced 
spectrum of users becomes a problem for the democratic legitimacy of 
courts, as they sit legally “open” to provide “everyone” with remedies 
but functionally closed.  And the limited use of courts cuts off their 
utility as contributors to democracy through their structural insistence 
on participatory parity and their due process practices of according 
equality and dignity to those before them.  
Traditions of public proceedings surrounding courts are thousands 
of years old, but democratic innovations of recent centuries endowed 
courts’ audiences with participatory capacities to interrogate, confirm, 
or seek to dislodge the procedures imposed and the judgments ren-
dered.  Only through finding paths to courts for diverse users and by 
public disclosures and oversight of dispute resolution, whether in or 
out of court, single file or aggregated, can one know whether fairness 
is either a goal or a result.  AT&T, Wal-Mart, and Turner comprise the 
agenda for the twenty-first century, during which decisions will be 
made about what courts are for, who pays the price for process, and 
what remains of relevance in the phrase “equal justice under law.” 
